Opinion
J-A31022-16 No. 2692 EDA 2015
03-20-2017
RACHITA BARNES v. PHL RENTAL PROPERTIES, LLC AND JOHNNY DANG APPEAL OF: PHL RENTAL PROPERTIES, LLC
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 000877 February Term, 2014 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
PHL Rental Properties, LLC ("PHL Rental") appeals from the August 4, 2015 judgment entered in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in favor of Rachita Barnes and against PHL Rental. Following a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Barnes and awarded her $450,000.00 in damages. We affirm.
The jury also found that co-defendant Johnny Dang was negligent. However, the jury found that Dang was PHL Rental's agent and working within the scope of his agency. Accordingly, the jury found PHL Rental 100% liable for the damages award. Dang did not file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this appeal.
The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history, which we incorporate and adopt herein. Opinion, 6/28/16, at 1-4 ("1925(a) Op.").
PHL Rental raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the lower court abused its discretion by denying PHL [Rental's] motion for summary judgment and allowing the jury to decide that Dang was an agent of PHL [Rental] as a matter of law and by committing various reversible error[s] at trial by allowing and/or denying evidence which prevented [PHL Rental] from receiving a fair trial under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.PHL Rental's Br. at 2. PHL Rental argues the trial court erred when it: (1) denied PHL Rental's summary judgment motion, (2) denied PHL Rental's motion for directed verdict; and (3) granted Barnes' motion in limine to preclude PHL Rental from presenting evidence of Barnes' failure to pay rent and her eviction.
PHL Rental's issue suggests that it challenges more than one evidentiary ruling. Before the trial court, it argued that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to preclude Barnes from arguing that Dang was PHL Rental's agent. However, PHL Rental has waived this, and any additional evidentiary challenges, by failing to argue them in its brief. See Commonwealth v. Kearney , 92 A.3d 51, 66 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating appellant's failure to develop argument with citation to pertinent authority results in waiver of issue raised on appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b) (requiring citation to pertinent authority in the argument section of an appellate brief). --------
PHL Rental first argues that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for summary judgment. PHL Rental maintains that it did not breach any duty owed to Barnes and that it had no notice of any dangerous condition. It maintains that Dang was not its agent, but rather an independent contractor, and, therefore, his knowledge of any defect cannot be imputed to PHL Rental.
A trial court should grant summary judgment "only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club , Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. 2002)); see Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2(1). When considering a motion for summary judgment, "the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . [and] must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party[.]" Summers , 997 A.2d at 1159.
We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment for an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Id. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:
[T]he issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers , Inc., 926 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Pa.2007) (internal citations omitted). To the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the context of the entire record. Id., at 903.Id.
The trial court addressed the claim that it erred in denying PHL Rental's summary judgment motion in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and properly concluded that whether PHL Rental acted as a reasonable landlord and whether PHL Rental knew or should have known of the dangerous conditions were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. We agree with and adopt the trial court's reasoning. See 1925(a) Op. at 4-6.
PHL Rental next contends the trial court erred when it denied PHL Rental's motion for directed verdict. PHL Rental again maintains it had no notice of the alleged defect. It argues that Dang was an independent contractor, not an agent, and, therefore, his knowledge cannot be imputed to PHL Rental. It argues the trial court should not have allowed the "jury to speculate as to whether Dang's knowledge of the defect could be imputed to PHL [Rental] merely because the word 'agent' appeared in some document." PHL Rental's Br. at 22.
This Court applies the following standard of review to orders denying a motion for directed verdict:
Our standard[s] of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.
There are two bases upon which a judgment N.O.V. can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.Reott v. Asia Trend , Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Campisi v. Acme Markets , Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super. 2006) (alteration in original).
The trial court addressed PHL Rental's claim that it should have granted PHL Rental's motion for directed verdict in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, including concluding that it was for the jury to determine whether Dang was PHL Rental's agent or an independent contractor. We find the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in denying PHL Rental's motion for directed verdict. We agree with and adopt the trial court's reasoning. See 1925(a) Op. at 10-15.
PHL Rental next argues the trial court erred when it granted Barnes' motion in limine and precluded PHL Rental from presenting evidence of Barnes' failure to pay rent and her eviction. It maintains the evidence was relevant to Barnes' credibility and to whether she had a motive in accusing PHL Rental of negligence.
This Court has stated:
The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling
by the trial court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.McManamon v. Washko , 906 A.2d 1259, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting B.K. v. J.K., 823 A.2d 987, 991-92 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
The trial court addressed PHL Rental's claim that it should have been permitted to present evidence of Barnes' eviction and late rental payment in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and did not abuse its discretion when it found that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the proposed evidence. We agree with and adopt the trial court's reasoning. See 1925(a) Op. at 7-10. The parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court's June 28, 2016 opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/20/2017
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