Opinion
Civil Action 2:18-cv-0171
08-09-2023
BRANDON DANTE BARNES, Plaintiff, v. SGT. MILLER, et al., Defendants.
STEPHANIE L. HAINES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are the following two motions:
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Brandon Dante Barnes (ECF No. 81); and
(2) The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Miller, Jenkins, McGuire, Drew, Price, Valencia, Kelly, Gumbarevic, Shawley, Matthews, Gaso, Smith, Zaken, Leggett, Wilson, Keller, Braunlich, Michniak, Durco, Lewis, Eagle, Varner, and Gilmore (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Corrections Defendants”). (ECF No. 97).
The motions have been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the motion filed by Plaintiff be denied and the motion filed by the Corrections Defendants be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural and Factual History
Plaintiff, Brandon Dante Barnes, is a Pennsylvania state prisoner, currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at SCI-Dallas. The case was initiated on February 7, 2018, when the Clerk of Court received from Plaintiff a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (the “IFP Motion”), with a civil rights Complaint attached. Because of certain defects in the IFP Motion, the IFP Motion was denied, the Complaint was lodged pending receipt of either the filing fee or a properly filed IFP motion, and the case was administratively closed on February 15, 2018. (ECF No. 2). On April 16, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a second IFP Motion (ECF No. 4), which was granted and the Complaint was officially filed on April 17, 2018, and docketed at ECF No. 6.
Named as defendants are 23 individuals who were DOC officials or employees (collectively referred to as the “Corrections Defendants”), and six John Does and six Jane Does, all of whom were employed at SCI-Greene during the relevant time period. Plaintiff's claims in involve an:
illegal search, and destruction of Plaintiff's legal work on October 14, 2014, the issuance of a misconduct and subsequent placement in the Restricted Housing Unit based on an anonymous letter, written on March 20, 2015, the loss of exercise period and issuance of a fabricated misconduct on or about May 28 -May 31, 2015.Pl's Br. at p. 1 (ECF No. 107). The Complaint also states that on May 31, 2015, Plaintiff was denied his “medical approved snack bag” and two meals. Complaint, at ¶¶ 112 - 138.
In lieu of filing an Answer, the Corrections Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing, inter alia, the defense of statute of limitations, asserting that Plaintiff's claims were untimely and, therefore, time barred. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion. The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 51) recommending that the motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice, that the parties conduct limited discovery to discern whether Plaintiff's claims are time barred and whether Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that Defendants be permitted to file a motion for summary judgment on those limited issues. The R&R was adopted as the opinion of the Court and the Corrections Defendants' motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice. (ECF No. 52).
The Corrections Defendants filed their Answer (ECF No. 54) and a Case Management Order was issued. (ECF No. 55). Discovery has closed and the parties have each filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment contending that the undisputed facts in the record support his allegations that his constitutional rights were violated. The Corrections Defendants seek summary judgment arguing that all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff filed a brief (with attachments) and a concise statement of material facts. (ECF Nos. 82 and 83). In response, the Corrections Defendants filed a brief in opposition and a response to Plaintiff's concise statement of material facts. (ECF Nos. 101 and 102). Plaintiff then filed Reply Briefs to the Corrections Defendants' brief in opposition and to the Corrections Defendants' response to his concise statement of material facts. (ECF Nos. 105 and 106).
Additionally, the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff's verified Complaint (ECF No. 6), to the extent they are based upon his personal knowledge, will also be considered as evidence on summary judgment. Jackson v. Armel, 2020 WL 2104748, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2020) (citing Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion)); Boomer v. Lewis, 2009 WL 2900778, at *2 n.4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2009) (“A verified complaint may be treated as an affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment if the allegations are specific and based on personal knowledge.”).
In support of their motion, the Corrections Defendants filed a brief, a concise statement of material facts, and appendix. (ECF Nos. 98, 99, and 100). In response, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition and a response to the Corrections Defendants concise statement. (ECF Nos. 107 and 108). The Corrections Defendants then filed a Reply Brief and Supplemental Exhibits, addressing only the issue of equitable tolling. (ECF Nos. 110 and 111). Plaintiff requested and was granted leave to file a Sur-Reply (ECF Nos. 112 and 113). Plaintiff thereafter filed his Sur-Reply. (ECF No. 116).
The Court takes judicial notice of Supplemental Exhibits 11- 17 as they are copies of state court records. The Court notes that Supplemental Exhibit 1, the motion for IFP and attached authorization, was submitted to Greene County Court of Common Pleas (“Greene County CCP”) on the forms supplied by this Court. This exhibit contains the received date stamp by Greene County CCP, as well as the Greene County CCP case number assigned to the case, AD-389-2017.
Both motions for summary judgment are ripe for disposition.
B. Standard of Review
The standard for assessing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is well-settled. A court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Furthermore, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 250.
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Hudson v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prod. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). It is not the court's role to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative, or to make credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S at 247-48. An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could possibly hold in the nonmovant's favor with respect to that issue. See id. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial'.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Huston, 568 F.3d at 104.
This standard is somewhat relaxed with respect to pro se litigants. Where a party is representing himself pro se, the complaint is to be construed liberally. A pro se plaintiff may not, however, rely solely on his complaint to defeat a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (“Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). Allegations made without any evidentiary support may be disregarded. Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[Unsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment.”).
Notably, these summary judgment rules do not apply any differently where there are cross-motions pending. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,"' [c]ross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.'" Id. (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241,245 (3d Cir. 1968)). If review of cross-motions reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be granted in favor of the party entitled to judgment in view of the law and undisputed facts. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to the pending motions for summary judgment.
C. Discussion
The undersigned will first address the Corrections Defendants' motion because if Plaintiff's claims are time barred, as the Corrections Defendants argue, Plaintiff's motion will be moot and there will be no need to address his claims on the merits. However, if the claims are not time barred, the undersigned will then proceed to address Plaintiff's motion.
The Corrections Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. “In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the state's statute of limitations for personal injury.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. Id.; 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524. See also Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634-35 (3d Cir. 2009) (two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania).
The Corrections Defendants do not seek summary judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the PLRA. See Br. at 5 n.2. (ECF No. 98).
“[A] cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.' ” Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (quoting Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc., 142 F.3d at 599). “Accrual is the occurrence of damages caused by a wrongful act-when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). For tort actions, the accrual date is “when the wrongful act or omission results in damages.” Id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391(2007).
In this case, the Complaint was received by the Court on February 7, 2018. (ECF No. 11). Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, however, the Complaint is deemed filed on January 15, 2018, the date Plaintiff signed and dated the Complaint. (ECF No. 6, at p. 22). The Corrections Defendants argue that any claim which Plaintiff knew or should have known prior to January 15, 2016 is barred by the applicable Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations. It is not disputed that all of the conduct complained of in this case occurred prior to January 15, 2016: (1) The investigative search and confiscation of Plaintiff's personal property, including his legal papers, occurred on October 17, 2014; (2) the issuance of a misconduct and subsequent placement in the RHU occurred on March 20, 2015; (3) the loss of exercise period and issuance of a fabricated misconduct occurred on or about May 28, 2015; and (4) the deprivation of a medically approved snack bag and two meals occurred on May 31, 2015. See Complaint, at ¶¶ 28-64, 65-85, 86-101, 102-111, 112-129, 130-138.
The undisputed summary judgment record reflects that Plaintiff was aware of each of these claims at the time they accrued as he contemporaneously filed inmate grievances related to each of these claims. Moreover, even allowing for tolling during the time Plaintiff's grievances were pending does not save his claims as the undisputed summary judgment record reflects that the latest a Final Appeal Decision was issued by the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances & Appeals on any relevant grievance submitted by Plaintiff was October 8, 2015. See Corr. Defs' SMF, at ¶ 26 (regarding Grievance No. 572006). Thus, even excluding the time during which Plaintiff's grievances were being addressed through the DOC's inmate grievance process, all his claims remain untimely. Because Plaintiff failed to file this suit within the two-year time period, the statute of limitations bars this action.
The Corrections Defendants do not dispute that the time attributed to the disposition of Plaintiff's grievances should be excluded from the statute of limitations calculation. See ECF No. 98 at pp. 7-8.
Plaintiff responds, however, that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled and his claims be allowed to proceed. Equitable tolling may apply when extraordinary circumstances prevent a plaintiff from asserting his rights. Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 237 A.3d 986, 996 (Pa. 2020); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
Absent a conflict with federal law, state law tolling principles govern Section 1983 claims, Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 2015). The elements of equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances are the same under federal and state law. Compare DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 418, with Dubose, 173 A.3d at 644.
The undisputed summary judgment record reflects that Plaintiff timely initiated a state court action in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (“Greene County CCP”) for the same claims against these same defendants, which was docketed at Case No. 389 A.D. of 2017, by submitting a motion for in forma pauperis. The motion is signed and dated May 5, 2017, and was received and docketed by Greene County CCP on May 18, 2017. Supp. Exh. 11. Plaintiff sought and was granted an extension of time to file an amended complaint. Supp. Exh. 12. Having failed to do so, the Greene County CCP denied Plaintiff's request for in forma pauperis status and dismissed the complaint on September 25, 2017. See Supp. Exhs. 13 and 14.
Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which was docketed at No. 1656 WDA 2017. See Supp. Exhs. 13 and 14. By Order entered on November 6, 2017, Greene County CCP directed that Plaintiff file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Supp. Exh. 15. However, instead of filing the statement of matters as directed, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Voluntary Withdrawal of Civil Suit #389 AD of 2017” in the Greene County CCP. See ECF 82-1 at p. 4. On December 6, 2017, the Superior Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to submit a Praecipe to discontinue if he sought to discontinue his appeal. On December 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed with the Superior Court an application to withdraw the appeal and on December 19, 2017, the Superior Court accepted the application to withdraw the appeal and the appeal was discontinued. See Supp. Exhs. 16 and 17. Approximately a month later, Plaintiff initiated the instant case in federal court.
As noted above, the Complaint was received by the Clerk of Court on February 7, 2018. (ECF No. 1-1). Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, however, the Complaint is deemed filed on January 15, 2018.
Under Pennsylvania law, which governs the issuance of whether a limitations period should be tolled, an individual action filed in state court does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to a subsequent action filed in federal court. Ravitch v. Pricewaterhouse, 793 A.2d 939, 942-943 (Pa. Super. 2002)(citing Royal-Globe Ins. Co. v. Hauck Mfg. Co., 335 A.2d 460, 462 (Pa. Super. 1975)(citing Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, United Mine Workers of America, 355 F.2d 658 (3rd Cir. 1966); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1974)(“The running of a Pennsylvania statute of limitations against a federal cause of action is not tolled under Pennsylvania concepts of tolling by the commencement of a similar suit in state court”). See also Atlantic Pier Associates, LLC v. Boardakan Restaurant Partners, L.P., 2011 WL 3268129, *6 (E.D.Pa. 2011)(“‘[t]he decisions rendered by both federal courts and Pennsylvania courts . . . indicate that the commencement of an action in a Pennsylvania court does not toll the statute of limitations applicable to a subsequent action commenced in federal court'”)(quoting Walstrom v. City of Altoona, 2008 WL 5411091, *10 (W.D.Pa. 2008)(citing Ravitch v. Pricewaterhouse, 793 A.2d at 942).
Conversely, the filing of an action in federal court does not toll the statute of limitations against a subsequent action filed in state court. Ravitch, 793 A.2d at 942.
Because Plaintiff did not file suit in federal court until January 15, 2018, the two-year statute of limitations bars this action. Although Plaintiff filed a state court action for the same claims in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County, Pennsylvania, in May 2017 that state court action did not toll the running of the statute of limitations for any subsequent case filed in federal court. Ravitch, 793 A.2d at 942-43.
For these reasons, because Plaintiff's federal complaint was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations period, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment filed by the Corrections Defendants be granted.
It is further recommended that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied as moot as Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff be denied and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Corrections Defendant be granted.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Markowitz, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by August 28, 2023, and the Corrections Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by August 23, 2023. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).