Note, however, that the right accrues only to an individual plaintiff who can show harm distinct in kind and degree from that suffered by the public in general. Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So.2d 881 (1974). Plaintiffs have not made such a showing.
The opinion in Hall references three decisions by this Court holding that individuals could seek to abate nuisances that blocked access to public roads. See Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So. 2d 881 (1974) (noting that nuisance blocked plaintiff's access to public road leading to his property and required him to take circuitous route that added "two or three extra miles"); Scruggs v. Beason, 246 Ala. 405, 20 So. 2d 774 (1945) (noting that nuisance blocked access to public road leading to cemetery where plaintiffs’ family members were buried); Sloss–Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 147 Ala. 384, 41 So. 907 (1906) (noting that nuisance blocked public road and required plaintiff to take a circuitous route to his property). See also McIntosh v. Moody, 228 Ala. 165, 167, 153 So. 182, 184 (1934) (holding that a nuisance in the form of a building that had been erected on a public road could be abated in an action brought by the owners of another building "at the point where the alleged obstruction [was] maintained").
Such a public nuisance may also give an individual a cause of action for abatement when he has suffered damages different in degree and kind from those suffered by the general public. See Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So.2d 881 (1974). However, the abatement remedy is limited when the conduct giving rise to the damage is statutorily authorized.
The former suit was over the right of access to certain real property. Appellants' lost and appealed to this court. That judgment, which is the one here in controversy, was affirmed by this court in Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So.2d 881 (1974). The sole contention of appellants is that they were denied due process of law because they did not testify at the former trial.
Strickland v. Lambert, 268 Ala. at 584, 109 So.2d at 667. Of all the Alabama "special injury" cases, Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So.2d 881 (1974), Scruggs v. Beason, 246 Ala. 405, 20 So.2d 774 (1945), and Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. Johnson, 147 Ala. 384, 41 So. 907 (1906), are the most nearly analogous to the facts of the instant case because those decisions address the question whether individual plaintiffs established "special injury" as a consequence of the public nuisance created by a defendant's obstruction of a public road. Although the present case does not deal with the obstruction of a public road, the effect on the traveling public is the same when a business continuously operates oversized vehicles on the road as when a business erects a permanent obstruction on the road.
He cannot now complain on appeal. Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So.2d 881 (1974); Jack Cole Co. v. Hays, 281 Ala. 118, 199 So.2d 659 (1967). Stockstill asserts, for various reasons, that the attorney's lien statute is not applicable to the instant circumstances.
Rule 60 (b), ARCP. See Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So.2d 881 (1974); Barnes v. Kent, Ala., 350 So.2d 437 (1977). The trial court's judgment was not in error and is therefore affirmed.