Opinion
2:24-cv-00435-JFA-MGB
07-02-2024
Darrell Antonio Barnes, Plaintiff, v. Larry Deason, and Lancaster County Detention Center, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Darrell Antonio Barnes (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. While the undersigned has authorized service of process with respect to Defendant Larry Deason, Plaintiff's allegations against the Lancaster County Detention Center (“LCDC”) must be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to “proper medical treatment” while housed at the Lancaster County Detention Center beginning on or around November 17, 2023.(Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5.) Upon arriving at LCDC, Plaintiff claims that he was escorted to a doctor's appointment at the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (“DHEC”), where the treating physician prescribed him Doxycycline, Rocephin (Ceftriaxone), and Biktarvy to manage his HIV. (Id. at 7.) Although the physician notified the LCDC medical department of Plaintiff's prescriptions, Captain Larry Deason overrode the instructions and prohibited the staff from placing the order, stating that the cost of the medication was too high. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff claims that he is now taking “secondary medication” for his HIV, “but it is not the type of medicine the [physician] at DHEC prescribed,” nor is it effective. (Id. at 6, 8, 14.) As a result, Plaintiff is suffering from ongoing pain, rashes, and swelling, among other symptoms. (Id. at 6, 8-9.) He contends that Defendant Deason has been made “aware” of the situation, but continues to deny him the proper medication. (Id. at 8, 11.) Plaintiff seeks $2.5 million in damages and asks that LCDC be directed to order his medications regardless of the cost. (Id. at 6, 9.)
The protections against “cruel and unusual punishment” afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment extend to detainees like Plaintiff through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977); Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir. 2023).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).
At issue here, Plaintiff named the Lancaster County Detention Center as a defendant in this action. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) Court have routinely found that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds” do not qualify as “persons” or act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020). Accordingly, LCDC is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the “physical building” or the “staff and collection of officials it houses.” Studley v. Watford, No. 3:16-cv-439-JMC-PJG, 2016 WL 2893157, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 2853546 (D.S.C. May 16, 2016); see also Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff must name specific staff members to state a claim against a “person” as required under § 1983). Plaintiff's claims against LCDC are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure his claims against the Lancaster County Detention Center and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS the same without leave to amend. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).