Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5639-12T3
06-23-2015
RASHAUN BARKLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendants-Respondents, and CLIFFORD J. MINOR in this official and individual capacity, STEPHEN JUDE TAYLOR in his official and individual capacity, WILLIAM F. ISETTS in his official and individual capacity, AARON GREEN, STEPHEN BRIGHT, RICHARD O'MALLEY, STEPHEN SCOTT, and NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
Rashaun Barkley, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian P. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Reisner and Currier. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8049-12. Rashaun Barkley, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian P. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, Rashaun Barkley, pro se, appeals from the May 1, 2013 order dismissing his complaint with prejudice and the June 21, 2013 order denying reconsideration.
In April 1994, plaintiff was convicted of felony murder, five counts of first-degree robbery, second-degree conspiracy, two counts of second-degree handgun possession, two counts of third-degree theft and two counts of third-degree handgun possession. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of life imprisonment plus forty years, with a fifty year parole ineligibility term.
His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) was denied, which we affirmed in 2001. A second PCR was denied, which we affirmed in 2008. In his second PCR, plaintiff raised issues of prosecutorial misconduct. We found the claims untimely and without merit. State v. Barkley, No. A-2462-05 (App. Div. Aug. 26, 2008).
On November 5, 2012, plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit against the State of New Jersey and the Essex County Prosecutor's Office as well as individual assistant prosecutors and other personnel. The complaint contained allegations of malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, breach of constitutional rights and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) regarding the alleged misconduct. The allegations all arose out of the 1993 charges and 1994 convictions.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) on numerous grounds including that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. On May 1, 2013 the motion was granted. A motion to amend the court's judgment (reconsideration) was denied on June 21, 2013.
On this appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues:
We quote plaintiff's point headings exactly as they appear in his brief. --------
I. THE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONVERTED INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THEY ATTACHED SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AS EXHIBITS.
II. THE COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE INSTEAD OF WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED AS COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF ALL DEFENDANTS SINCE HE ACTED ON THEIR BEHALF BY FILING A MOTION REDACT PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE COURT.
IV. JUDGE MICHELE HOLLAR-GREGORY, JSC SHOULD HAVE SUA SPONTE RECUSE HERSELF FROM PARTICIPATING IN THIS CIVIL ACTION AFTER SHE HAD ALREADY DECIDED THE CRIMINAL ACTION DURING A SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL COURT.
V. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE RICO CLAIMS.
We find no merit in any of these contentions and therefore affirm the orders of May 1, 2013 and June 21, 2013.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have converted defendants' motion to one for summary judgment under R. 4:46-1. Whether the court decided the motion under a R. 4:6-2 standard or a summary judgment standard the result is the same. All of plaintiff's claims were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations for each cause of action. All of plaintiff's claims arose out of his arrest, subsequent charges and trial. Plaintiff provides no evidence to support the application of the discovery rule so as to toll the statute of limitations; rather he continues to raise the same arguments he made at the time of his appeal from his convictions and his PCR motions.
We agree with the trial court that there was no legal justification presented to support the equitable tolling of any of the applicable statutes of limitation.
We find the remainder of plaintiff's arguments to be without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION