Opinion
11-09-2016
BANK OF NEW YORK, etc., respondent, v. Leah KRAUSZ, appellant, et al., defendants.
Solomon E. Antar, Brooklyn, NY (Albert S. Antar and Meryl Wenig of counsel), for appellant. Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester, NY (Larry T. Powell of counsel), for respondent.
Solomon E. Antar, Brooklyn, NY (Albert S. Antar and Meryl Wenig of counsel), for appellant.
Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester, NY (Larry T. Powell of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Leah Krausz appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated November 20, 2014, which denied, without a hearing, her motion, in effect, to vacate her default in appearing or answering the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage on certain residential property. The appellant allegedly was personally served with process in May 2008, pursuant to CPLR 308(1), and failed to appear or answer the complaint. In December 2013, the appellant moved, in effect, to vacate her default in appearing or answering the complaint.
The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's motion, in effect, to vacate her default. To the extent that the appellant moved to vacate her default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) for lack of personal jurisdiction due to failure to serve process, her bare and unsubstantiated denial of service was insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service established by the duly executed affidavit of service of the plaintiff's process server, or even to require a hearing (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 102 A.D.3d 724, 957 N.Y.S.2d 868 ; Reich v. Redley, 96 A.D.3d 1038, 947 N.Y.S.2d 564 ; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Dixon, 93 A.D.3d 630, 939 N.Y.S.2d 705 ; U.S. Natl. Bank Assn. v. Melton, 90 A.D.3d 742, 743, 934 N.Y.S.2d 352 ; Citimortgage, Inc. v. Phillips, 82 A.D.3d 1032, 1033, 918 N.Y.S.2d 893 ).
Moreover, insofar as the appellant also sought to vacate her default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) by demonstrating a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 141, 501 N.Y.S.2d 8, 492 N.E.2d 116 ; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Stewart, 97 A.D.3d 740, 948 N.Y.S.2d 411 ; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Luden, 91 A.D.3d 701, 936 N.Y.S.2d 561 ), the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default, since the only excuse proffered was that she was not served with process (see Reich v. Redley, 96 A.D.3d at 1038, 947 N.Y.S.2d 564 ; Stephan B. Gleich & Assoc. v. Gritsipis, 87 A.D.3d 216, 221, 927 N.Y.S.2d 349 ; Tadco Constr. Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 73 A.D.3d 1022, 1023, 900 N.Y.S.2d 687 ). Since the appellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, it is unnecessary to determine whether she demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Stewart, 97 A.D.3d at 740, 948 N.Y.S.2d 411 ; Reich v. Redley, 96 A.D.3d at 1038, 947 N.Y.S.2d 564 ).
In view of our determination, we need not reach the appellant's remaining contentions.