Opinion
J-S79034-16 No. 647 EDA 2016
01-10-2017
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, F/K/A COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, N/K/A CHRISTIANA TRUST, A DIVISION OF WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT AS TRUSTEE OF ARLP TRUST 4 v. PETER IABONI AND CELINDA IABONI, H/W, AND PETER IABONI, JR., Appellants
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order entered January 14, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County, Civil Division at No(s): 656-2012 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Peter Iaboni and Celinda Iaboni, husband and wife, and Peter Iaboni, Jr. (collectively "the Iabonis"), appeal from the Order entering a verdict in favor of Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, n/k/a Christiana Trust, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity but as Trustee of ARLP Trust 4 (collectively "Bank of America"), and declaring that the refinance mortgage on the property in Greene Township applied to both Peter and Celinda Iaboni on the basis of the tenants by the entireties presumption. We affirm.
The trial court set forth an extensive recitation of the facts, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 1-6 (unnumbered).
On appeal, the Iabonis raise the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court was incorrect in entering a verdict in favor of [Bank of America] on the basis of the tenants by the entireties presumption[,] and in finding that the mortgage applied to both Peter Iaboni and Celinda Iaboni[,] where the only evidence of this was the fact that Celinda Iaboni referred several times in her testimony to title as tenants in common, which testimony demonstrated her intention that she hold title not as an entireties cotenant[,] but as a tenant in common[,] and which clearly should have been sufficient to rebut the presumption[?]Brief for Appellants at 4.
2. Whether the [trial] court was incorrect in finding that Peter Iaboni acted on behalf of himself and Celinda Iaboni when he refinanced the loan on the property where it found that Celinda Iaboni was not removed from the deed and mortgage but[,] rather[,] was present at the refinance and "was aware of the actions taken that day[,]" but neglected to consider that Celinda Iaboni signed the deed the day before the loan refinance closing and, although she was present at the closing, took no part in the closing itself[?]
3. Whether the [trial] court was incorrect in reforming the mortgage to add Celinda Iaboni[,] where there was no mutual mistake in the preparation of the mortgage document[,] but where the mistake was unilateral[?]
Our standard of review is as follows:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light
most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, [where] the issue ... concerns a question of law, our scope of review is plenary.Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating & Cooling LLC , 100 A.3d 660, 664-65 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
The trial court's conclusions of law on appeal originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is the appellate court's duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.
In their first claim, the Iabonis contend that Celinda Iaboni's testimony was sufficient to rebut the tenants by the entireties presumption. Brief for Appellants at 6. The Iabonis argue that Celinda Iaboni stated that she had obtained the property in question as a tenant in common. Id. The Iabonis further point to Celinda Iaboni's testimony, with regard to the 2006 deed accompanying the subject mortgage, that she was present at the closing and merely signed "what she was told to sign." Id.
The trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed the Iabonis' claim and determined it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 9-11 (unnumbered). Here, the Iabonis merely cite to testimony that supports their position and ostensibly ask this Court to reweigh the evidence in their favor, and reassess the credibility determinations made by the trial court. See Kornfeld v. Atl. Fin. Fed., 856 A.2d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that in a non-jury trial, "[i]t is not our role to pass on the credibility of witnesses, as the trial court clearly is in the superior position to do so."). We decline to reweigh the evidence, and we adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 9-11. Thus, the Iabonis are not entitled to relief on this claim.
In their second claim, the Iabonis contend that the trial court failed to consider the fact that the deed accompanying the subject mortgage was not signed at the closing, but was signed the day before closing. Brief for Appellants at 7. The Iabonis again point out Celinda Iaboni's testimony that she had signed what she was asked to sign, and that no one asked her to sign the mortgage. Id. The Iabonis also assert that the mortgage broker testified that Peter Iaboni was the intended borrower. Id. The Iabonis thus argue that Celinda Iaboni was not aware of the actions that took place that day. Id.
The trial court addressed this claim and determined that it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 11-12 (unnumbered); see also Stephan , 100 A.3d at 664 (noting that the trial judge's findings of fact are given the same weight as the verdict of a jury). Thus, we adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis with regard to the Iabonis' second claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 11-12 (unnumbered).
In their third claim, the Iabonis contend that the trial court incorrectly ordered that the mortgage be reformed because there was no evidence of a mutual mistake. Brief for Appellants at 8. The Iabonis argue that the mortgage company made the mistake as it failed to include Celinda Iaboni on the mortgage. Id.
We note that the Iabonis cite to a single case, and do not include any citations to the evidence of record to support their claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the argument section shall contain "such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent"); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (noting that "[i]f reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth ... a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears[.]").
The trial court addressed the Iabonis' third claim and determined that it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 15-18 (unnumbered). Because the Iabonis' argument on appeal does not demonstrate that the trial court erred in reforming the mortgage, we adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court as to this claim. See id.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/10/2017
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