Opinion
No. 05-10-01104-CR
03-02-2012
MIGUEL CAMACHO BALTIERRA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM and Opinion Filed March 2, 2012
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F10-00788-Q
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, O'Neill, and Fillmore
Opinion By Justice Fillmore
A jury convicted Miguel Camacho Baltierra of robbery. Baltierra pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs in the indictment, and the trial court assessed punishment of twenty-five years' imprisonment. In three points of error, Baltierra asserts the trial court erred by improperly limiting the conduct elements in the jury charge and by including a definition of reasonable doubt in the jury charge, and the judgment is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of this case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion because the law to be applied in this case is well settled. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4. Factual Background
Baltierra has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Accordingly, we recite only those facts necessary to provide context for Baltierra's complaints.
Kimberly Berkley and Michael Chad Whitney both testified they were walking toward the White Rock Lake bike trail when they were approached by Baltierra and Delmont Mueller. Whitney testified that Mueller had "fronted" a number of "painkillers" to Whitney to sell. Whitney instead used the pills personally and never paid Mueller for the pills. Berkley and Whitney testified that Mueller demanded payment from Whitney and then physically attacked Whitney.
Berkley testified that Baltierra demanded that she give him her cellphone. Berkley initially told Baltierra that she did not have the cellphone with her. She then saw that Baltierra had a gun in his hand. According to Berkley, Baltierra said, "I have a gun. I will shoot you." Berkley testified she was scared and gave Baltierra the cellphone. Whitney confirmed that Baltierra had a gun and took Berkley's cellphone. Berkley's cellphone was recovered when the police arrested Baltierra and Mueller. The police also found an air pistol that Berkley and Whitney identified as the gun used in the robbery. Baltierra was convicted of the robbery of Berkley Jury Charge
In his first two points of error, Baltierra contends the trial court erred by submitting a charge to the jury that (1) improperly limited the conduct elements and (2) contained a definition of reasonable doubt. Baltierra did not object to the jury charge at trial on either of these grounds.
Standard of Review
Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists. Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). If error exists, we must determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44. When, as in this case, the error was not objected to, the error must be "fundamental" and requires reversal "only if it was so egregious and created such harm that the defendant 'has not had a fair and impartial trial.'" Barrios, 283 S.W.3d at 350 (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g)). Egregious harm is the type and degree of harm that affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defense theory. Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In making an egregious harm determination, "the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information [revealed] by the record of the trial as a whole." Trejo v. State, 280 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
Conduct Elements
Baltierra first contends that, as indicted, the robbery in this case was a combination of a "nature of conduct" offense and a "circumstances surrounding the conduct" offense, and the trial court erred by not limiting the conduct elements in the jury charge. The trial court instructed the jury that a person commits robbery if, "in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of property of another, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death." The trial court also instructed the jury that a person commits theft if "he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of such property." The jury charge defined the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" as follows:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to the result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
There are three "conduct elements" that can be involved in an offense: (1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the result of the conduct; and (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 (West 2011); Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). An offense may contain one or more of these conduct elements, which alone or in combination form the overall behavior that the legislature intended to criminalize, and it is those conduct elements to which a culpable mental state must apply. McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The culpable mental state definitions in the charge must be tailored to the conduct elements of the offense. Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states to the conduct element or elements of the offense to which they apply. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Cook, 884 S.w.2d at 491.
Baltierra argues that "as indicted, the instant robbery was a combination of nature of conduct and circumstances surrounding conduct offense" and "[s]ince the Trial Court did not so limit the conduct elements there is error in the jury charge." Baltierra's primary concern appears to be the trial court's inclusion of "result of conduct" language in the definitions of the culpable mental states.
As indicted, to obtain a conviction for robbery, the State was required to prove that, in the course of committing theft, Baltierra intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed Berkley in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (West 2011). To establish Baltierra committed "theft," the State was required to prove that he unlawfully appropriated property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2011). The phrase "unlawfully appropriate[d]" in the statutory definition of theft refers to the nature of the conduct. Ash v. State, 930 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.); Fields v. State, 966 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 1 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Threatening or placing another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death refers to the result of the conduct. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2); Garza v. State, 794 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd); see also Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195 (causing bodily injury is result of conduct offense); Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 739 (same). Finally, threatening or placing another in fear of bodily injury "in the course of committing theft" refers to the circumstances surrounding the conduct. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a); Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195; Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 739.
Robbery, as indicted in this case, contains all three conduct elements. Garza, 794 S.W.2d at 500-01; see also Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195; Barnes v. State, 56 S.W.3d 221, 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd), overruled on other grounds by Bell v. State, 169 S.W.3d 384, 398-99 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by including "result of conduct" language in the definitions of the culpable mental states. See Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492 (because offense contained all three conduct elements, trial court did not err by defining culpable mental states to include all three conduct elements). We resolve Baltierra's first point of error against him.
See also Chanthakoummane v. State, No. AP-75794, 2010 WL 1696789, at *26 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2010) (not designated for publication), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 506 (2010).
Definition of Reasonable Doubt
In point of error number two, Baltierra asserts the trial court erred by including a definition of reasonable doubt in the charge. The trial court instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving Baltierra guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge included the instruction, "[I]t is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution's proof exclude all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt." Baltierra contends this instruction impermissibly defines "reasonable doubt." See Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, the court of criminal appeals has concluded a trial court does not abuse its discretion by giving the complained-about instruction. See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011); see also O'Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd) (complained-about instruction "simply states the legally correct proposition that the prosecution's burden is to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt" and does not define "reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original)). We resolve Baltierra's second point of error against him. Jurisdiction
In his third point of error, Baltierra contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case against him because the case was not transferred to the trial court's docket. A grand jury was impaneled by the Criminal District Court Number 3. The indictment was returned to the 204th Judicial District Court where the case was adjudicated. Baltierra argues that, because the record does not include a transfer order to the 204th Judicial District Court, the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over the case and the judgment is therefore void.
A grand jury formed and impaneled by a district judge inquires into all offenses liable to indictment, and hears all the testimony available before voting on whether to indict an accused. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.09, 20.19 (West 2005); Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446, 448 (1987). Because the court "exercises some 'supervisory power over the grand jury,'" the grand jury is "often characterized as an arm of the court by which it is appointed rather than an autonomous entity." Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd)(quoting Dallas Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Doe, 969 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.)). After the conclusion of testimony, a grand jury votes "as to the presentment of an indictment." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.19. Following presentment, an indictment is filed in a court with jurisdiction to hear the case. Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 678 (citing Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248, 255 (1961)).
In counties having two or more district courts, the judges of the courts may adopt rules governing the filing, numbering, and assignment of cases for trial, and the distribution of the courts' work as they consider necessary or desirable for the conduct of the business of the courts. Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 1753 (current version at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.024 (West Supp. 2011)); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.093(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2011) (addressing adoption of local rules of administration to provide, in part, for assignment, docketing, transfer, and hearing of all cases). Thus, a specific district court may impanel a grand jury, however, it does not necessarily follow that all cases returned by that grand jury are assigned to that court. Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 678.
Here, the record shows the grand jury was impaneled by the Criminal District Court Number 3. Following the return of Baltierra's indictment, the case was filed in the 204th Judicial District Court. Nothing in the record indicates this case was originally filed in or appeared on the trial docket of the Criminal District Court Number 3. Therefore, a transfer order to the 204th Judicial District Court was not required. Id. We resolve Baltierra's third issue against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
101104F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
MIGUEL CAMACHO BALTIERRA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-10-01104-CR
Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F10- 00788-Q).
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Bridges and O'Neill participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered March 2, 2012.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE