[M]ost lower federal courts have limited the 'exception' for formal or nominal party defendants to situations in which it is clear that the defendant is not a necessary or an indispensable party as a matter of law, the party has nothing at stake in the litigation, and no real, present claim for relief is being sought against the party." Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860 CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012). Both parties cite to the same case in support of their arguments, Dumas v. Patel. Geico quotes Dumas for the proposition that "where a plaintiff settles his controversy with a resident defendant, the controversy against the remaining nonresident defendant is then removable irrespective of whether a formal dismissal as to the resident defendant has been entered."
Cf. Walsh v. Arbuckle, No. 4:17-CV-00664-NKL, 2017 WL 4512586, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2017); see also Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860-CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *4 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (“[Defendant] has a stake in [the] litigation because plaintiff seeks a judgment against her-regardless of who pays it.”).
“[M]ost lower federal courts have limited the ‘exception' for formal or nominal party defendants to situations in which it is clear that the defendant is not a necessary or an indispensable party as a matter of law, the party has nothing at stake in the litigation, and no real, present claim for relief is being sought against the party.” Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860 CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012).
"[M]ost lower federal courts have limited the 'exception' for formal or nominal party defendants to situations in which it is clear that the defendant is not a necessary or an indispensable party as a matter of law, the party has nothing at stake in the litigation, and no real, present claim for relief is being sought against the party." Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860 CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012). BACKGROUND
"[M]ost lower federal courts have limited the 'exception' for formal or nominal party defendants to situations in which it is clear that the defendant is not a necessary or an indispensable party as a matter of law, the party has nothing at stake in the litigation, and no real, present claim for relief is being sought against the party." Balling v. Bendickson, 2012 WL 3715810, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "In a classic enunciation of this rule, Justice Story wrote for the Supreme Court: 'This Court will not suffer its jurisdiction to be ousted by the mere joinder or non-joinder of formal parties; but will rather proceed without them, and decide upon the merits of the case between the parties, who have the real interests before it, whenever it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others.'"
However, most courts limit this "exception" for nominal party defendants "to situations in which it is clear that the defendant is not a necessary or an indispensable party as a matter of law, the party has nothing at stake in the litigation, and no real, present claim for relief is being sought against the party." Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860 CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012) (citing Maryville Data Sys., Inc. v. Holman, No. 4:05CV1535JCH, 2005 WL 3416470, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2005)). Garcia Empire is a necessary and indispensable party to the litigation, and therefore the nominal party exception to the unanimous consent requirement does not apply. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 379.200 requires plaintiffs to join both the judgment debtor and the insurance company in equitable garnishment actions filed under the statute.
There has been no liability determination, and neither Yuldashev nor A.K. Logistics has entered into a consent judgment. See Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860 CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *2-4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012) (declining to find that defendant was a nominal party for purposes of determining the court's diversity jurisdiction over personal injury action where she was represented by competent counsel, the essence of her § 537.065 agreement with plaintiff was to limit recovery to a specified amount to be paid by her insurance company, there had been no determination as to her liability, and she had not entered into a consent decree). For these reasons, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Riley's claims against Yuldashev and A.K. Logistics.
That judgment fixed the liability against MacMillan and ended his obligation to participate in this litigation. Cf. Balling v. Bendickson, No. 4:12-CV-860-CAS, 2012 WL 3715810, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2012) (holding that a tortfeasor's entry into a § 537.065 settlement agreement with the injured party did not render the tortfeasor a nominal defendant because the tortfeasor never agreed to entry of a consent judgment but rather still contested liability in the federal court action after removal). Although MacMillan may still be party to more litigation, it would be ancillary to this case: it would arise solely from the terms of the settlement agreement, which contemplates that Progressive may institute a separate declaratory judgment action against Schafer and MacMillan, as defendants. This action, if it even comes to pass, will only determine whether Progressive must pay the remaining $25,000 policy limits; it will not concern whether MacMillan is liable for Schafer's injuries, and if so, how much he must pay.