These cases depend upon the theory that the easement granted is completely and clearly defined because the width and location of the right of way are specified in the grant. (See, for example, Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673 [ 110 P. 118]; Herman v. Roberts, 119 N.Y. 37 [23 N.E. 442, 16 Am. St. Rep. 800, 7 L.R.A. 226].) They do not necessarily require a similar conclusion where the easement is for the limited purpose of laying underground water pipes to serve the surrounding property with water for domestic purposes.

b. Geliebter does not have an absolute right to enjoy all the land encompassed by the recorded easement Relying on Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673 (Ballard), Geliebter contends the owner of an easement has an absolute right to enjoy the full scope of an easement that has a specifically described location. (Id. at p. 681 [“[w]here the width of this mere right of way is expressly specified, the owner may have the absolute right to use to the limits of the specified width even though the result be to give him a wider way than is necessary”].)

[3] It is true that the route of the pipe-line is not definitely described in the deed, but it has been held that in such a case a reasonable route is intended, and title may be quieted to such reasonable route. ( Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 683, [ 110 P. 118]; Civ. Code, sec. 1419; Sulloway v. Sulloway, 160 Cal. 513, [ 117 P. 522]; Stone v. Imperial Water Co., 173 Cal. 39, [ 159 P. 164]; Byington v. Sacramento Valley etc. Co., 170 Cal. 132, [ 148 P. 791].) [4] It is proper and customary under such circumstances, in view of the general equitable jurisdiction to do full and complete justice in one action, for the court to designate for the parties just what would be a reasonable route under all the circumstances in evidence.

(Ibid.) This case involves an easement for a right-of-way, meaning "'the privilege which one person, or particular description of persons, may have of passing over the land of another in some particular line.'" (Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673, 681 (Ballard).) Right-of-way easements can be appurtenant or in gross.

[1] If we construe the clause as a reservation of a right of way, the objection that the description is too uncertain to be valid would be overcome by the rule which permits the delimitation of the right of way subsequent to the conveyance. As was said in Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 683, [ 110 P. 118, 122]: "It is settled law that where an unlocated right of way is granted or reserved, the owner of the servient estate may in the first instance designate a reasonable way, and if he fails to do so, the owner of the dominant estate may designate it. (Jones on Easements, sec. 337; Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 62, [11 P. 879]; Blum v. Weston, 102 Cal. 362, [41 Am. St. Rep. 188, 36 P. 778].)" (See, also, Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, [10 N.W. 6].) Under our code, which establishes a different rule from that of the common law, an exception is construed most strongly in favor of the grantor.

The Bishop and Huntley Maps expressly specify that the easement was 60 feet in width. Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673, 681 and Tarr v. Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362, 366, are instructive in this context. These cases stand for the proposition that, where the width of a right of way is expressly specified in a grant or conveyance, the owner may have the absolute right to use it to the limits of the specified width even if that gives the owner a wider way than necessary.

"[A] right of way is a privilege of passage over the land of another, 'with the implied right... to make such changes in the surface of the land as are necessary to make it available for travel in a convenient manner.' " (White v. Walsh (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 828, 832, quoting Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673, 681.) Use of the easement is " 'limited only by the requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with purposes for which the easement was granted.' "

“Where the way over the surface of the ground is one of expressly defined width, it is held that the owner of the easement has the right, free of interference by the owner of the servient estate, to use the land to the limits of the defined width even if the result is to give him a wider way than necessary. Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 681.” (Tarr v. Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362, 366.)

As Scruby emphasizes, when the width of an easement is definitely fixed by the grant or reservation creating the same, its use may be interpreted as commensurate with the entire width thereof. (See, e.g., Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673, 681 [ 110 P. 118]; Tarr v. Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 293].) It is equally well settled, however, that "[t]he specification of width and location of surface rights-of-way does not always determine the extent of the burden imposed on the servient land. . . ."

That is at least one reason why the authorities cited by plaintiff pertaining to "floating" easements are distinguishable. They encompass cases such as Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673 [ 110 P. 118]; Youngstown Steel etc. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1952) 38 Cal.2d 407 [ 240 P.2d 977]; Cummins v. Levy (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 253 P.2d 975, 255 P.2d 29]. In such cases the undefined right of way has been held to be limited to that "suitable and convenient" for ordinary uses. Also included are the so-called "pipeline" cases, exemplified by Winslow v. City of Vallejo (1906) 148 Cal. 723 [ 84 P. 191, 113 Am.St.Rep. 349, 7 Ann.Cas. 851, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 851].