Opinion
No. 5:16-CT-3150-D
02-05-2019
Robert S. Ballard, Plaintiff, v. Dennis Daniels, et al., Defendants.
Memorandum & Recommendation
Plaintiff Robert S. Ballard filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"). This matter is currently before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (D.E. 38). After reviewing the parties' submissions, the undersigned recommends that the district court allow the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
I. Procedural Background
Ballard filed his complaint in June 2016, describing actions that took place at Maury Correctional Institution ("Maury") (D.E. 1). In March 2017 United States District Judge James C. Dever III dismissed Ballard's ADA claims and requests for injunctive relief (D.E. 11). Judge Dever also directed Ballard to particularize the allegations relating to his § 1983 claims. Id. at 6.
Ballard is now incarcerated at Central Prison. See Am. Compl. at 2, D.E. 16. --------
Ballard filed an amended complaint in May 2017 (D.E. 16). Except for Defendants Dennis Daniels and R. Watson, Ballard says he is suing defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 3-6. Judge Dever reviewed the amended complaint, reiterating the frivolity of Ballard's ADA claims and requests for injunctive relief (D.E. 17). Judge Dever allowed Ballard to proceed with "his section 1983 cell-condition claims against defendants Daniels, Watson, Moore, Shields, Mullins, and Goodman, and with his section 1983 claim that he was left to lay on the floor for several days against defendants Officer Taylor and Nurse Magana." Id. at 3.
Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment in May 2018 (D.E. 38). The motion seeks dismissal of ADA claims already dismissed by Judge Dever. See Def. Mem. at 1, D.E. 39. The Defendants spend little time on Ballard's Eighth Amendment claims. To the extent they do address the Eighth Amendment claims, they argue that they entitled to a judgment in their favor under the doctrines of qualified, sovereign, and Eleventh Amendment immunities. Ballard filed many responses to the motion (D.E. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50), defendants replied (D.E. 51), and Ballard sur-replied (D.E. 52).
II. Factual Background
Ballard, who is confined to a wheelchair, alleges that he correctional officials placed him in a non-handicapped cell for 45 days as part of a disciplinary infraction. Am. Compl. at 7, D.E. 16. Ballard alleges that he fell out of his wheelchair onto the concrete floor and laid there for several days after no one assisted him back into his wheelchair. Id. at 7. Ballard injured his left hip during this fall. Id. Ballard also alleges that he was exposed to unconstitutional conditions of confinement because the bathrooms and showers were not wheelchair-accessible. Id. at 7-8. Finally, Ballard alleges that the cell was "not . . . cleaned in 45 days," and he was "forced to lay on . . . the same dirty sheets for 45 days." Id. at 8.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, and other proper discovery materials before the court shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact," thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014). In making this determination, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor." News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); accord Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866.
The movant carries the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a factual dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movant discharges this burden by identifying "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. In response, the non-movant must identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 323. In so doing, the non-movant may rely on a verified complaint when allegations in the document are based on personal knowledge. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). Conclusory allegations and speculation do not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). If the non-movant fails to introduce evidence contradicting a fact supported by the movant's evidence, the court may "consider the fact undisputed for summary judgment purposes." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). If the non-movant fails to meet his burden, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. ADA Claims
As noted, defendants seek summary judgment on Ballard's ADA claims. Judge Dever has already dismissed these claims. (D.E. 11, 16). Thus, the district court should deny this portion of the motion for summary judgment as moot.
C. Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
Defendants argue that Ballard cannot sue them in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign States." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The amendment guarantees that "nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). The immunity applies to suits brought by a state's own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). But see Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 535-40 (E.D.N.C. 2017) (discussing conflict between current extent of Eleventh Amendment immunity and original public meaning of the Amendment). State agencies and officials sued in their official capacities are also entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because they are merely alter egos of the state itself. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-68.
Ballard seeks compensatory damages and sues both defendants in their individual and official capacities. See Compl. at 12-13, D.E. 1; Am. Compl. at 3-6, D.E. 16. Courts consider suits against state officers in their official capacities as suits against the state and, thus, they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Myers v. North Carolina, No. 5:12-CV-714-D, 2013 WL 4456848, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2013) ("State agencies and state officials acting in their official capacities also are protected against a claim for damages because a suit against a state office is no different from a suit against the state itself.") (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 519 U.S. at 429; Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-68 (1974); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2005)). Although Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived by a state or abrogated by Congress, see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989), neither exception applies here. Thus, the Defendants, in their official capacities, have a right to have the claims against them dismissed.
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that qualified immunity shields them from Ballard's claims for monetary damages. In support of this argument, defendants contend that Ballard failed to adequately plead a constitutional claim against them in their individual capacities. The Supreme Court has explained that "officers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time.'" District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). A right is clearly established if "at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was 'sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable official would understand that what he is doing' is unlawful." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741-42 (2011)). To meet this standard, "[t]he rule must be 'settled law,' which means it is dictated by 'controlling authority' or 'a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority[.]'" Id. at 589-90 (citation and quotations omitted).
Courts must be cautious when defining the right at issue. In determining whether a right is clearly established the court must consider whether "the legal principle clearly prohibit[s] the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances before him." Id. at 590. The Supreme Court has "repeatedly stressed that courts must not 'define clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.'" Id. (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014)).
Here, the rights at issue (1) whether the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right through deliberate indifferent to the injuries Ballard suffered when he fell out of his wheelchair; and (2) whether the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to humane conditions of confinement by leaving him in a non-handicapped cell that was not cleaned for 45 days.
The Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Ballard has not adequately pleaded a constitutional violation against them. But this position ignores the fact that twice Judge Dever reviewed Ballard's claims and determined that he stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. (D.E. 11, 16). Given the court's prior holding on this point, the Defendants argument about qualified immunity fails to establish that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity should be denied without prejudice. If the district court adopts this recommendation, the undersigned also recommends directing defendants to re-file their summary judgment motion to address Ballard's Eighth Amendment claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court recommends allowing in part and denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment (D.E. 38). The court should: (1) deny summary judgment on Ballard's ADA claims as moot; (2) allow summary judgment on Ballard's claims against defendants in their official capacities; and (3) deny without prejudice defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. If the district court adopts this recommendation, the undersigned also recommends directing defendants to re-file their summary judgment motion to address Ballard's Eighth Amendment claims.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R") on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Dated: February 5, 2019
/s/_________
Robert T. Numbers, II
United States Magistrate Judge