o protect workers employed on a construction site from injuries proximately caused by risks associated with falling from a height or those associated with falling objects (Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1, 3 [2011]; Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267-268 [2001]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 500 [1993]). For a defendant to be held liable under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiffs injuries must be "the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential" (Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599, 603 [2009]; see Wilinski, 18NY3dat 10). Generally, in the context of a falling worker case, an 18-inch elevation at a work site does not trigger the need for a Labor Law § 240 (I) protective device and thus does not present a significant elevation differential for purposes of section 240 (1) liability (Balfe v Graham, 214 A.D.3d 693, 694 [2d Dep't 2023];Fischer v VNO 225 W. 58th St. LLC, 215 A.D.3d 486, 487 [1st Dep't 2023]; Barillaro v Beechwood RB Shorehaven, LLC, 69 A.D.3d 543, 543-544 [2d Dep't 2010]). When, however, the safety device intended to protect a worker working at an elevation fails to do so, courts do not focus on the distance of the fall (McGarry v CVP I, LLC, 55 A.D.3d 441, 441 [1st Dep't 2008]; Barber v Kennedy Gen. Contrs., 302 A.D.2d 718, 720 [3d Dep't 2003]; Siago v Garbade Constr. Co., 262 A.D.2d 945, 945 [4th Dep't 1999]).
4A.D.3d 1222, 1222 [2d Dept 2018]; Vitalev Astoria Energy II, LLC, 138 A.D.3d 981, 983 [2d Dept 2016]; Avilav Plaza Constr. Corp., 73 A.D.3d 670, 671 [2d Dept 2010], Iv granted 15 N.Y.3d 706 [2010], appeal withdrawn 15 N.Y.3d 918 [2010]; Alviav Teman Elec. Contr., 287 A.D.3d 421, 422 [2d Dept 2001], Iv denied 97 N.Y.2d 749 [2002]; see also Keavey v New York State Dormitory Auth., 6NY3d 859, 860 [2006], affirming 24 A.D.3d 1193 [4th Dept 2005]; cf. O'Connerv Lincoln Metrocenter Partners, L.P., 266 A.D.2d 60, 61 [1st Dept 1999] [hole was big enough that plaintiff could have fallen through to level below if he had not held himself up in the opening]). Even if plaintiff could have fallen to the level below, the protections of the statute were not implicated under these circumstances since the waterproofing membrane and concrete slab were only approximately one-and-one-half feet below the wood decking (see Rocovichv Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514-515 [1991]; Balfe v Graham, 214 A.D.3d 693, 694 [2d Dept 2023];Piccuillo v Bank of N.Y. Co., 277 A.D.2d 93, 94 [1st Dept 2000]; D 'Egidiov Frontier Ins. Co., 270 A.D.2d 763, 765 [3d Dept 2000]) and because the accident occurred on a fully-constructed, permanent wood decking under conditions where no section 240 (1) safety device would have been expected (see Carrillov Circle Manor Apts., 131 A.D.3d 662, 662-663 [2d Dept 2015], Iv denied 27 N.Y.3d 906 [2016]; Romeov Property Owner (USA) LLC, 61 A.D.3d 491, 491 [1st Dept 2009]; Geoniev OD & PNY Ltd., 50 A.D.3d 444, 445 [1st Dept 2008]; cf. Quizhpiv South Queens Boys & Girls Club, Inc, 166 A.D.3d 683, 684 [2d Dept 2018] [foreseeable that roof would collapse and cause plaintiff to fall to lower level]; Shipkoski v Watch Case Factory Assocs., 292 A.D.2d 587, 588-589 [2d Dept 2002] [issue of fact as to whether it was foreseeable that floor would collapse and allow plaintiff to fall to floor level below]). Although the Appellate Division, Second Department does not men