Opinion
Civil Action 23-cv-00608-NYW-MEH
04-24-2024
GARY BALDWIN, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN PEDREGON, PURNA SIWAKOTI, DANIEL MCCANN, EARL SIMS, CHRISTOPHER WARREN, DANIEL WILLIAMS, ALEXANDER YOUNG, SGT. CASIAS, DEMELLO DONALD, ELIAS DIGGINS,[1] and NURSE SELINA, Defendants.
MINUTE ORDER
Nina Y. Wang Judge
This matter is before the Court on several motions filed by Plaintiff Gary Baldwin (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Baldwin”) that warrant summary disposition. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d) (“Nothing in this rule precludes a judicial officer from ruling on a motion at any time after it is filed.”).
Mr. Baldwin proceeds pro se. The Court therefore affords his filings a liberal construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That said, it is not this Court's function “to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff's pro se status does not exempt him from complying with the procedural and substantive rules that govern all claims. See Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002); Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 878 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).
First, on April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for a Martenez Hearing and Motion for Leave to Amend 1983 Petition.” [Doc. 64]. This Court referred the filing to the Honorable Michael E. Hegarty. [Doc. 65]. Then, on April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for a Martenez Hearing and Motion for Leave to Amend 1983 Petition.” [Doc. 69]. These two filings are substantively identical. Compare [Doc. 64], with [Doc. 69]. Accordingly, the second “Motion for a Martenez Hearing and Motion for Leave to Amend 1983 Petition,” [Doc. 69], is DENIED as duplicative. The first “Motion for a Martenez Hearing and Motion for Leave to Amend 1983 Petition,” [Doc. 64], remains pending before Judge Hegarty.
Next, Plaintiff has filed two documents titled “Motiton for Preventive Injunctive Relief.” See [Doc. 67; Doc. 68]. These filings are identical, except that the second “Motiton for Preventive Injunctive Relief” includes additional pages of exhibits. Compare [Doc. 67], with [Doc. 68]. For that reason, the Court DENIES as moot the first “Motiton for Preventive Injunctive Relief,” [Doc. 67], in light of the second “Motiton for Preventive Injunctive Relief,” [Doc. 68].
Turning to the second “Motiton for Preventive Injunctive Relief,” [Doc. 68], Plaintiff requests that this Court “order the restitution of the petitioner be suspended, and all collected restitution be placed back on the petitioners D.O.C. account, due to the hospital bill being a result of the excessive force of the defendants in question,” [id. at 1]. He contends that a Colorado state court has ordered that he pay restitution in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and he requests “preventive injunctive relief.” [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff cites a 1951 case that involves injunctive relief but does not otherwise present legal argument. See [id. at 3 (citing City & Cnty. of Denver v. Denver Tramway Corp., 187 F.2d 410, 416-17 (10th Cir. 1951))].
Plaintiff refers to himself as the “petitioner.”
To succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the moving party must show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant's favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). “Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Chem. Weapons Working Grp., Inc. (CWWG) v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
While Plaintiff explains the kind of relief he requests, see, e.g., [Doc. 68 at 2 (“This preventive injunctive relief would prevent the petitioner from further loss regarding restitution being collected.”)], he does not discuss the factors required for preliminary injunctive relief or explain why they are satisfied here, see generally [id.]. Even though Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his failure to address these factors is sufficient to warrant denial of Plaintiff's motion. See, e.g., Nagim v. Walker, No. 10-cv-02973-WYD-KLM, 2011 WL 1542460, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2011) (“Given that Plaintiff has failed to allege irreparable injury, injunctive relief is subject to denial on this basis alone.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1542157 (D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2011). However, even if the Court attempted to parse the merits, it appears that Mr. Baldwin seeks to avoid a monetary obligation. See [Doc. 68 at 3 (“This motion is to prevent the collection and losses of restitution.”)]. Assuming the relief requested falls within the Court's authority and this action's scope, it is “well settled that simple economic loss usually does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm,” because “such losses are compensable by monetary damages.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003). The second “Motiton for Preventive Injunctive Relief,” [Doc. 68], is respectfully DENIED without prejudice.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) The Motion for a Martenez Hearing and Motion for Leave to Amend 1983 Petition [Doc. 69] is DENIED as duplicative;
(2) The Motion for Preventive Injunctive Relief [Doc. 67] is DENIED as moot;
(3) The Motion for Preventive Injunctive Relief [Doc. 68] is DENIED without prejudice;
(4) Plaintiff is ADVISED that, generally, he need not file court documents more than once; and
(5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to:
Gary Baldwin
#193046
Fremont Correctional Facility
P.O. Box. 999
Canon City, CO 81215-0999