Opinion
CASE NO. 1:20-cv-23504-GAYLES/OTAZO-REYES
2022-12-08
BAL HARBOUR SHOPS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiff, v. SAKS FIFTH AVENUE LLC, a Massachusetts limited liability company, Defendant.
Harold Eugene Lindsey, III, Katz Barron, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff. Connis O. Brown, III, Seth Peter Robert, Brown Robert, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Edward Soto, Weil Gotshal & Manges, Miami, FL, Matthew R. Friedenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Harold Eugene Lindsey, III, Katz Barron, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff. Connis O. Brown, III, Seth Peter Robert, Brown Robert, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Edward Soto, Weil Gotshal & Manges, Miami, FL, Matthew R. Friedenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant. AMENDED ORDER DARRIN P. GAYLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on the Eleventh Circuit's Order of Limited Remand [ECF No. 68], entered on the district court docket on May 5, 2021, and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court [ECF No. 72], filed on May 19, 2021. The Court has reviewed the record, the parties' jurisdictional briefings, and is otherwise fully advised. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This is a commercial landlord/tenant dispute involving real property located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Specifically, Plaintiff Bal Harbour Shops, LLC ("Bal Harbour") and Defendant Saks Fifth Avenue LLC ("Saks Fifth Avenue") entered into a lease agreement (the "Original Lease") for Defendant to rent certain premises in the Bal Harbour Shops located in Miami-Dade County. The Original Lease contained an arbitration mechanism applicable to, for example, events of default. See [ECF No. 11-1 at 64, 74]. In 2018, the parties amended the Original Lease (the "2018 Amendment"), which referred to the Original Lease and all subsequent modifications collectively as the "Lease," see [ECF No. 11-3 at 2], and made clear that it was entered into between the parties. See generally [ECF No. 11-3]. Section 9 of the 2018 Amendment revised the remedies available to either party if a party violates an obligation under the Lease. See id. at 24.
Beginning in March 2020, Defendant defaulted on the Lease. After unsuccessful demands for payment, Plaintiff terminated the Lease on August 17, 2020. The next day, Defendant filed a demand for arbitration in accordance with the terms of the Original Lease. [ECF No. 3-1]. On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed an action in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, which Defendant later removed on diversity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. [ECF No. 1]. On August 25, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 3] under the Original Lease. The Court denied the Motion on December 17, 2020 [ECF No. 45], concluding the language of the 2018 Amendment made clear that the parties intended to nullify the arbitration clause of the Original Lease. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of the Court's decision. [ECF No. 47].
During the course of the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit questioned the parties' citizenship. Plaintiff subsequently discovered a potential jurisdictional issue and asked the Eleventh Circuit to remand the action to this Court to determine the citizenship of the parties and confirm the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit granted Plaintiff's request and remanded the appeal for the limited purposes of determining whether diversity jurisdiction existed at the time of removal. [ECF No. 68]. The Court ordered additional briefing on the matter. [ECF No. 69]. After extensive jurisdictional discovery and supplemental briefing, this matter is now ready for the Court's review.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the federal removal statute, a defendant in a civil action brought in a state court may remove the action to federal court only if it "could have been brought, originally, in a federal district court." Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 83, 126 S.Ct. 606, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court's original jurisdiction is limited to one of three types: "(1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)." PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997)). Federal question jurisdiction exists over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §1331. Diversity jurisdiction exists over a civil action in which the parties' citizenship is fully diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, "assessed at the time of removal." Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The diversity statute requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants, meaning that each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978).
"The removing party bears the burden of proof regarding the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction," City of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012), and bears the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper, see Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). When considering a motion for remand, the district court must " 'strictly construe[ ] the right to remove' and apply a general 'presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand.' " Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001)).
ANALYSIS
The jurisdictional dispute in this matter boils down to the citizenship of three trustees in the complex "family tree" of Plaintiff's members. Plaintiff contends that these three trustees are dual citizens of the United States and Costa Rica but that they are each domiciled in Costa Rica, thereby defeating diversity jurisdiction. Defendant argues the evidence indicates that these three trustees are domiciled in Florida, despite residing in Costa Rica, and that the Court therefore has diversity jurisdiction over this action.
The Court begins with the comparably simple task of establishing Defendant's citizenship. Defendant is a Massachusetts limited liability company. [ECF No. 73 at 1]. It is well-established that the citizenship of a limited liability company is determined based on the citizenship of its members. See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). The sole member of Saks Fifth Avenue LLC is Saks & Company LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. [ECF No. 73 at 1]. The sole member of Saks & Company LLC is Saks Incorporated. See id. A corporation is considered a citizen of each state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The parties do not dispute that Saks Incorporated is incorporated in Tennessee and has its principal place of business ("PPB") in New York. [ECF No. 73 at 1]; [ECF No. 72 at 6]. Thus, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Defendant is a citizen of Tennessee and New York.
Plaintiff is also a Delaware limited liability company. [ECF No. 72 at 2]. The sole member of Bal Harbour Shops, LLC is Whitman Family Properties, LLLP ("WFP"), a Florida limited liability partnership, with two general partners and seventeen limited partners. See id. Like limited liability companies, the citizenship of limited liability partnerships is determined based on the citizenship of its partners. See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021. It is a citizen of every state of which any partner, limited or general, is a citizen. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96, 110 S.Ct. 1015, 108 L.Ed.2d 157 (1990). Several of WFP's limited partners are trusts. The citizenship of a traditional trust is determined by the citizenship of its trustee. See Alliant Tax Credit 31, Inc. v. Murphy, 924 F.3d 1134, 1143 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 383, 136 S.Ct. 1012, 194 L.Ed.2d 71 (2016)). The parties do not dispute that all of the trusts at issue in this case are traditional trusts. [ECF No. 72 at 4]; [ECF No. 127 at 2-3, 14]. The trustee(s) of all but one of the trusts are natural persons. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a natural person is a citizen of the state in which he or she is domiciled. See Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013).
To promote clarity, all of WFP's partners and their citizenships are set forth in the following table:
The citizenship of all of WFP's partners is undisputed, unless otherwise noted.
| Name of WFP Partner | Trustee (if applicable) | Citizenship |
|---|---|---|
| General Partners: | ||
| Matthew W. Lazenby | Florida | |
| Randall A. Whitman | Florida | |
| Limited Partners: | ||
| Randall A. Whitman Revocable Trust | Florida | |
| Dudley A. Whitman Marital Trust | Trust Bank, Successor Trustee | Incorporated North Carolina PPB. North Carolina |
| William F. Whitman Marital Trust | (1) Angela Whitman, Co-Trustee(2) Christopher C. Whitman, Co-Trustee | (1) Florida(2) *Disputed* |
| Randall Whitman 2012 Irrevocable Trust | Michael D. Katz, Trustee | Florida |
| Name of WFP Partner | Trustee (if applicable) | Citizenship |
|---|---|---|
| Stanley F. Whitman & Dorothy S. Whitman Grandchildren's Irrevocable Trust FBO Matthew W. Lazenby | Gwen W. Lazenby, Trustee | Florida |
| Stanley F. Whitman & Dorothy S. Whitman Grandchildren's Irrevocable Trust FBO Lori L. Faison | Gwen W. Lazenby, Trustee | Florida |
| Todd Whitman | Florida | |
| Renee W. Zahourek | Colorado | |
| Renee Whitman Zahourek 2012 Irrevocable Trust | Emma Laly Whitman, Trustee | Colorado |
| Dudley A. Whitman, Jr. | Florida | |
| Eric W. Whitman | Florida | |
| Eric W. Whitman 2012 Irrevocable Trust | Pamela W. Mattson, Trustee | California |
| Pamela W. Mattson | California | |
| Pamela W. Mattson 2012 Irrevocable Trust FBO Marina Nicole Mattson | Christopher C. Whitman, Trustee | *Disputed* |
| Christopher C. Whitman Revocable Trust | Christopher C. Whitman, Trustee | *Disputed* |
| Christopher C. Whitman 2012 Irrevocable Trust FBO William T. Whitman | William T. Whitman, Trustee | *Disputed* |
| Christopher C. Whitman 2012 Irrevocable Trust FBO Paul A. Whitman | Paul A. Whitman, Trustee | *Disputed* |
In sum, the parties only dispute the citizenship of the following trustees:
(1) Christopher C. Whitman —
- Co-Trustee of the William F. Whitman Marital Trust
- Trustee of the Pamela W. Mattson 2012 Irrevocable Trust FBO Marina Nicole Mattson
- Trustee of the Christopher C. Whitman Revocable Trust
Specifically, Plaintiff maintains these three trustees are domiciled in Costa Rica, while Defendant argues they are domiciled in Florida.
(2) William T. Whitman — Trustee of the Christopher C. Whitman 2012 Irrevocable Trust FBO William T. Whitman
(3) Paul A. Whitman — Trustee of the Christopher C. Whitman 2012 Irrevocable Trust FBO Paul A. Whitman ("PAW Trust")
As noted, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an individual is a citizen of the state in which he or she is domiciled. See Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1269. "[D]omicile requires both residence in a state and an intention to remain there indefinitely[.]" Id. (quotation marks omitted). "Residence alone is not enough." Id. Moreover, once a person establishes domicile, it continues until he or she satisfies the mental and physical requirements of domicile in a new place. See McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1483 (11th Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 21 Wall. 350, 353, 22 L.Ed. 584 (1874). Thus, a person can reside in one place, but be domiciled in another. See Turner v. Penn. Lumbermen's Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., No. 3:07-cv-374, 2007 WL 3104930, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2007).
When assessing a person's domicile—specifically, his or her subjective intent to remain in a place—courts consider a series of non-exclusive, objective factors, including: the location of real and personal property, business ownership, employment records, bank accounts, payment of taxes, voter registration, vehicle registration, driver's license, membership in local organizations, and other similar indications. See Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 991 F.3d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir. 2021). The Court may also consider an individual's statement of intent, but such declarations are generally afforded little weight, particularly when contradicted by objective evidence. See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1342 (11th Cir. 2011). No single factor is conclusive; rather, the Court looks to the "totality of the evidence." Jones v. Law Firm of Hill & Ponton, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1355 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
A United States citizen domiciled abroad, however, is neither a "citizen[ ] of a State" under § 1332(a) nor a "citizen[ ] or subject[ ] of a foreign state." United States citizens domiciled abroad "therefore are not proper parties to a diversity action in federal court." Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1341 (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828-29, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989)). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Christopher C. Whitman, William T. Whitman, and Paul A. Whitman are domiciled in Costa Rica or Florida. If the Court finds that any one of them is domiciled in Costa Rica, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction and the action must be remanded to the state court.
The Court begins and ends its analysis with Paul A. Whitman. Because he is a dual citizen of the United States and Costa Rica, Paul has both a U.S. and a Costa Rican passport. See [ECF No. 135-4 at 105]; see also id. at 709 (U.S. passport), 710-12 (Costa Rican passport). At a deposition conducted during the jurisdictional discovery phase of this matter, Paul testified that he was born and educated in Costa Rica and that he has continuously resided in Costa Rica, save for a six-month period in or around 2015 when he attended flight school in California. Id. at 10-12, 17-19, 117-19; see also id. at 737 (birth certificate). The record reflects that Paul married a Costa Rican national in 2013 in Costa Rica. See id. at 19-20, 125-26; see also id. at 739 (marriage certificate). Both of his children were born in Costa Rica, in 2014 and 2020. See id. at 126-27; see also id. at 740-41 (children's birth certificates). Paul continues to live with his family in Costa Rica, where he constructed and owns a home. See id. at 17, 111, 127-28, 131. He has a Costa Rican driver's license and owns a car in Costa Rica. See id. at 107, 128-29; see also id. at 742 (driver's license).
In an effort to establish that Paul is domiciled in Florida, Defendant points to Paul's recent tax returns and several aspects of the PAW Trust indicating a link to Florida. [ECF No. 127 at 11-13]. Paul's 2017-2020 U.S. tax returns state he is a U.S. resident and list a Florida address. [ECF No. 135-4 at 336-708 (tax returns)]. Consequently, Defendant argues the Court should apply a doctrine of "quasi-estoppel" to prevent Paul from now taking a position that is inconsistent with his sworn statements on his tax returns. [ECF No. 127 at 12, 19-20]. To apply estoppel in the context of a domicile inquiry, however, would contravene the Court's well-established duty to assess domicile based on the totality of the circumstances. See Jones, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. Paul's tax returns are merely one factor for the Court to consider in making that determination.
None of the cases cited by Defendant in support of this proposition originate in this Circuit. [ECF No. 127 at 16 (citing two E.D.N.Y. cases and one Fourth Circuit case)]. Only one of those cases concerned domicile and the court's decision centered on the fact that the plaintiff offered nothing more than his subjective claims of New York domicile, which the court concluded was belied by his tax returns' assertions of Georgia domicile. See Desir Austin Austin v. Ray's Rapid Transp. LLC, No. 13 CV 912 (VMS), 2015 WL 9412542, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2015). Here, by contrast, Paul offers numerous objective indicia of his Costa Rican residence and intent to remain.
Even a cursory review of the record demonstrates that the tax returns are not the compelling evidence of Florida domicile Defendant makes them out to be. Paul's 2018, 2019, and 2020 individual U.S. tax returns indeed list a Florida address, but it is obvious the accounting firm used its own address as Paul's "home" address. [ECF No. 135-4 at 336, 339, 356, 413, 416, 431, 497, 500, 516]. Cf. Lussier v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:12-cv-238-J-37JBT, 2012 WL 13098525, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2012) (Florida address used on tax return not dispositive where other factors indicated different domicile and plaintiff explained he used Florida address because tax preparer said it did not matter which address was used). Further, Defendant fails to acknowledge other portions of the tax returns that support Paul's attestations of a Costa Rican domicile: he pays taxes in both the U.S. and Costa Rica [ECF No. 135-4 at 155, 379, 450, 533]; he has numerous Costa Rican bank accounts, see id. at 343-45, 420-21, 504-06; and he has three companies incorporated in Costa Rica between the years 2017-2019, which identify him as the sole shareholder with a Costa Rican address, see id. at 388-89, 461-62, 468-69, 475-76, 544-45, 553-54, 560-61.
Defendant also relies heavily on the following aspects of the PAW Trust: (1) the principal place of administration of the trust is in Florida; (2) 2017-2020 K-1 Forms list the trust as a domestic beneficiary with a Florida address; (3) the financial firm that managed the trust until 2019 had a Florida address on file for Paul; and (4) the financial firms tasked with managing the trust are based in Florida. [ECF No. 127 at 11-13]. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, however, the citizenship of the trust is determined by the domicile of the trustee, not the other way around. See Alliant Tax Credit 31, Inc., 924 F.3d at 1143. Defendant seems to reverse the inquiry by emphasizing where the trust is administered and managed. While perhaps relevant in assessing Paul's domicile, these aspects of the PAW Trust are hardly dispositive.
Moreover, Paul explained that any use of the address for the Florida property (owned by his father and where his half-brother resides) was either for convenience—because Costa Rican homes do not have addresses in the same way homes in the United States do—or because it's simply the address his accountant used and which he did not notice. [ECF No. 135-4 at 16, 60-62, 65, 118, 131-32, 141]; see id. at 265, 273, 279 (beneficiary address in Florida). Paul further explained that he believes the K-1 Forms categorize the trust as a domestic beneficiary because he is a U.S. citizen. See id. at 54. And though Defendant highlights documents from the trust's pre-2019 firm [ECF No. 127 at 13], Defendant ignores documents revealing that the asset management firm that began to manage the trust in 2019 used a Costa Rican address for Paul—including in account statements dated in June, September, and October of 2020—both before and after this action was removed to federal court. [ECF No. 135-4 at 147-53, 749-879]. In any event, these features of the trust documents are indirect indicators of Paul's domicile—much more attenuated than the numerous aspects of Paul's everyday life that suggest a Costa Rican domicile.
In addition, the address listed for the PAW Trust on the 2019 K-1 Form is actually the accountant's Miami address [ECF No. 135-4 at 243, 288, 336]; the address used for the PAW Trust on the 2017 and 2018 K-1 Forms is the same as the address listed for Bal Harbour Shops, LLLP, see id. at 251, 258.
Defendant also urges the Court to conclude Paul is domiciled in Florida because, in 2019, Paul and William sought FBI background checks, using a U.S. address on the applicable forms. [ECF No. 127 at 13]. However, Paul explained that the Costa Rican government required Paul and William, as U.S. citizens, to obtain FBI background checks as part of its own background investigation in order for William to be able to open his mortgage lending business in Costa Rica. [ECF No. 135-4 at 32-39, 138-40, 238]. Paul testified that, to submit the FBI background check, he needed a second form of proof of his U.S. citizenship, so he used his half-brother's Florida address to obtain a Florida voter registration card. See id. at 32-35, 138-40. Nevertheless, he maintains that he has never voted in any Florida or United States election. See id. at 34. Paul is also registered to vote in Costa Rica. See id. at 136-37; see also id. at 747-48 (Costa Rican voter registration). Although generally limited to Florida residents, Paul also states that he and his wife traveled to Florida and used his half-brother's Florida address to obtain COVID-19 vaccines because they were too young to receive the vaccine under Costa Rica's regulations at the time. See id. at 45-46, 143-45, 241.
Finally, Defendant asserts Paul should be considered a domiciliary of Florida because he derives the majority of his income from distributions Plaintiff makes to the PAW Trust. [ECF No. 127 at 12]. But Defendant again overstates the import of this fact and discounts other evidence that contextualizes Paul's work and income history. Although Paul earned a U.S. FAA commercial pilot's license in 2015, he also has a Costa Rican commercial pilot's license, obtained in 2016. [ECF No. 135-4 at 40-42, 110, 239-40]; see also id. at 744-45 (Costa Rican commercial pilot's license). Likewise, Paul has both U.S. and Costa Rican bank accounts. See id. at 124, 343-45, 420-21, 504-06. Paul has never worked in the United States. Beginning in 2016—after finishing flight school—Paul worked in vacation rentals in Costa Rica, he has conducted paragliding tours in Costa Rica since 2019, and he has worked with his brother, William, in his Costa Rican mortgage business. See id. at 23-27, 109-10, 129-30. Paul also owns several businesses in Costa Rica, all of which he began prior to the commencement and removal of this action. See id. at 22, 25; see also id. at 461-62, 468-69, 475-76, 544-45, 553-54, 560-61 (tax returns indicating companies opened in Costa Rica in 2017, 2018, and 2019). He now works as a flight instructor exclusively in Costa Rica and owns an aerial cropdusting business in Costa Rica. See id. at 20-23. Notably, Defendant does not contest these facts, much less identify any evidence to the contrary.
Defendant also emphasizes that Paul's Costa Rican bank accounts are kept in U.S. currency but neglects to acknowledge that the account statement reflects a Costa Rican customer address. [ECF No. 127-13 at 133-72].
Although this case undoubtedly presents a close call, the Court has carefully considered the objective indicia of domicile and concludes Paul's personal and professional lives are centered in Costa Rica. As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, it is Defendant's burden to establish that diversity existed and removal was proper. See City of Vestavia Hills, 676 F.3d at 1313 n.1. Defendant has not done so. The totality of the record reflects that Paul resided in Costa Rica at the time of removal and he intends to remain there indefinitely. Because he is a "stateless" U.S. citizen, Paul is not a "proper part[y] to a diversity action in federal court." Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1341; Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828-29, 109 S.Ct. 2218. The Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. To the extent there is even a modicum of doubt, such uncertainty must be resolved in favor of remand. See Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882.
To be clear, the Court does not disregard Paul's repeated declarations of U.S. residency. [ECF No. 127 at 19-20]. The Court simply concludes that declarations of U.S. residency on tax forms he did not prepare do not out-weigh the other factors indicating Costa Rican domicile. While Defendant protests Paul's conflicting assertions of U.S. residency and Costa Rican domicile as problematic and unfair, questions about the propriety of Paul's tax practices are not before the Court. The Court's sole inquiry is whether the totality of the evidence supports a Florida or Costa Rican domicile.
Defendant argues that Paul's father, Christopher, was domiciled in Florida and Paul's legal domicile was therefore also Florida, at least while Paul was still a minor. [ECF No. 127 at 19]; Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (minors have the same domicile as their parents until the minor becomes an adult and acquires a new "domicile of choice"). Paul was a minor until December 2012. Even if the Court assumes Christopher and therefore Paul were domiciled in Florida until December 2012 [see ECF No. 135-4 at 178], the record demonstrates that Paul had acquired a new "domicile of choice" in Costa Rica by the time this case was removed from state court. See also McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1483 (once a domicile is established, the burden "rests on the party asserting the abandonment of one domicile to demonstrate the acquisition of another"). In other words, Paul has produced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of continued domicile in Florida and to show that he is domiciled in Costa Rica. See, e.g., Freidrich v. Davis, 767 F.3d 374, 376-77, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2014).
Because Paul is not actively involved in the management of Plaintiff or WFP, Defendant also invites the Court to treat Paul (and Christopher and William) as "jurisdictional zeroes" that do not defeat diversity jurisdiction. [ECF No. 127 at 15 n.24 (citing Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 2008) (McKee, J., concurring))]. Plainly, the Court cannot do so under current Supreme Court precedent. See Orchid Quay, LLC v. Suncor Bristol Bay, LLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1304-08 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
Because Paul is not a diverse party under § 1332, the Court need not evaluate where Christopher and William are domiciled.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court [ECF No. 72] is GRANTED. The Court's previous rulings in this action [ECF Nos. 43, 45] are VACATED. This action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer the funds held in the Court's Registry to the Miami-Dade County Clerk of the Courts. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 8th day of December, 2022.