Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-001397-MR
04-06-2018
VALERIE BAKER APPELLANT v. TY YOUNG AND DEBBIE YOUNG APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles T. Lester, Jr. Fort Thomas, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: T. Lawrence Hicks Edgewood, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRED A. STINE, V., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-00059 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: J. LAMBERT, MAZE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Valerie Baker appeals from a summary judgment by the Campbell Circuit Court in favor of the Appellees, Ty and Debbie Young. The trial court found that an interest in real property conveyed to her by Valle Young remained subject to a survivorship clause in the predecessor deed. Baker argues that the deed from Valle terminated the survivorship interest, leaving her and the Youngs as tenants-in-common. However, we agree with the trial court that KRS 381.130(2)(a)(2) requires an express statement in the deed to terminate a joint tenancy, and that the deed from Valle contained no such express statement. Hence, we affirm.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
The facts of this action are not in dispute. On November 3, 1977, Bernard and Beverly Macke executed a deed for the property located at 17 Jennifer Court, Ft. Thomas, Kentucky, to Valle Young and Nancy Young. On March 2, 2004, Valle and Nancy executed a deed for the property to Valle Young and Ty Young, the latter being Valle's son. The 2004 deed established a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between Valle and Ty. On August 28, 2015, Valle Young executed a quit-claim deed transferring his interest in the property to Valerie Baker. The quit-claim deed reads as follows:
Nancy Young apparently died sometime during the period between the two deeds.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the grantor, Valle Young, an unmarried person, for and in consideration of one dollar ($1) and other good and valuable consideration, to him paid by Valerie Baker, a single person, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does quitclaim to Valerie Baker, a single person, her heirs and assigns forever, all of grantor's interest, which consists of an undivided one-half interest, in the following real estate: [description of property]. Subject to easements, conditions and restrictions of record. Being the same property conveyed to the Grantor herein and his son Ty Rome Young, by Deed dated March 2, 2004, and recorded in Deed Book 671, Page 44 of the Campbell County Clerk's records at Newport, Kentucky. Together with all the privileges and
appurtenances to the same belonging. To have and to hold the same to the said Valerie Baker, a single person, whose address is 309 York Street, Newport, Kentucky, her heirs and assigns forever.
Valle Young died on November 30, 2015. Thereafter, Ty and his wife, Debbie Young (the Youngs), brought a petition for declaration of rights against Baker. The Youngs asked the court to declare that they are the sole owners of the property. The Youngs argued that the 2015 deed from Valle to Baker did not contain any language concerning the survivorship aspects of the 2004 deed. Consequently, they argued that Baker's interest in the property terminated upon Valle's death. Baker filed a counterclaim, asking for a finding that the 2015 quit-claim deed terminated the survivorship aspects of the 2004 deed, leaving her and the Youngs as tenants-in-common.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. After considering the deeds and the arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the Youngs' motion for summary judgment. The court held that KRS 381.130 does not require the transferring interest to address survivorship rights, but it must clearly express an intent to partition a joint tenancy. The trial court found that the language in the 2015 deed only expressed an intent to transfer Valle's interest, which would remain subject to the survivorship provision. Consequently, the court concluded that Baker's interest terminated upon Valle's death, leaving the Youngs as sole owners of the property. Baker now appeals from this judgment.
The interpretation of a deed is a matter of law, and thus our review of this case is de novo. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. P'ship, 207 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Ky. App. 2006). The outcome in this case turns on the application of the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Sanderson v. Saxon, 834 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1992), and the subsequent amendments to KRS 381.130. In Sanderson, as in the present case, the property at issue was initially held in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. However, one of the joint tenants conveyed his interest to a third party. Following his death, the third party brought an action seeking a declaration that the conveyance had severed the joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common. Id. at 677-78.
In addressing this issue, our Supreme Court first noted the common-law rule that allowed one joint tenant to destroy the survivorship right of another by conveyance to a third party. Id. at 679 (citing Osborne v. Hughes, 219 Ky. 116, 292 S.W. 748 (1927); Elliott v. Nicholas, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 502 (1868); and Rogers v. Grider, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 242 (1833)). The Court also noted that KRS 381.120, which allows one joint tenant to judicially compel a physical division of property held in joint tenancy, is not inconsistent with the common-law rule. Id. However, the Court concluded that KRS 381.130 carves out an exception to this rule, and preserves the survivorship aspect of joint tenancies. Thus, under the new rule established by KRS 381.130, joint tenant's conveyance remains subject to the right of survivorship established in the deed creating the joint tenancy. Id.
In response to the holding in Sanderson, the General Assembly amended KRS 381.130, which now provides as follows:
(1) KRS 381.120 shall not apply to any estate which joint tenants hold as executors or trustees, nor, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, to an estate conveyed or devised to persons in their own right, when it manifestly appears, from the tenor of the instrument, that it was intended that the part of the one dying should belong to the others, neither shall it affect the mode of proceeding on any joint contract or judgment.
(2) (a) 1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, one (1) or more joint tenants of real property may partition their interest in the real property during their lifetime by deed or other instrument.
2. The deed or other instrument shall express the intent of the joint tenant to partition the joint tenant's interest in the real property and shall be recorded at the office of the county clerk in the county where the real property or any portion of the real property is located.
3. The partitioning shall be effective at the time the deed or other instrument is recorded.
(b) Residential real property that is owned exclusively by husband and wife as joint tenants with a right of survivorship and actually occupied by them as a principal residence shall not be partitioned as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
(c) The deed or other instrument shall convert the partitioning joint tenant's interest in the real property into a tenancy in common with the remaining joint tenants. If there are two (2) or more nonpartitioning joint tenants, the interests of the nonpartitioning joint tenants in relation to each other shall be governed pursuant to the terms of the instrument creating the interest.
There is no published authority addressing the effect of this amendment to KRS 381.130. However, this Court discussed the issue in Elliot v. O'Daniel, 2008-CA-002107-MR, 2010 WL 45904 (Ky. App. Jan. 8, 2010). In Elliot, the decedent was a joint tenant with right of survivorship in a farm. She intended to sever the joint tenancy and give her one-half interest to her children. To do so, she executed a deed which stated, in pertinent part, "the Grantor has bargained and sold and does hereby grant, sell and convey unto the Grantees all of her one-half undivided interest in and to the property described below as follows . . . ." Id. at *1-2.
This Court interpreted the amendment to KRS 381.130 to mean that joint tenants with survivorship may partition their interest in real property during their lifetimes by recording a deed to that effect, and that the partition is effective if the deed or other instrument expresses the intent of the joint tenant to partition the interest in the real property. Id. at *4. The Court concluded that the language used in the deed did not specifically express an intent to sever the survivorship arrangement. Rather, the four corners of the deed only expressed an interest to partition her life interest in the property, and that interest terminated upon her death. Id.
In the current case, the trial court applied the holding in Elliot as follows:
The Court does not agree with the Plaintiff's argument that K.R.S. § 381.130 requires the transferring interest to address survivorship rights to sever the joint tenancy.
There is no language in subsection (2) of the statute regarding survivorship rights. However, the statute does require that the joint tenant express his interest to partition his or her interest. "Partition" means "[t]he act of dividing; esp., the division of real property held jointly or in common by two or more persons into individually owned interests." Therefore, the statute indicates that to come within the exception of subsection (2), the joint tenant must express an intent to divide his or her interest. The language quoted above from the 2015 quit-claim does not speak of partition or division. Rather, it speaks of transferring an interest, subject to conditions and restrictions of record.(Emphasis in original.)
Partition, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (footnote in original).
Baker argues that Sanderson was wrongly decided, and that the holding makes Kentucky an outlier with respect to joint tenancy. But as an intermediate appellate court, this Court is bound by published decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court. SCR 1.030(8)(a). The Court of Appeals has no authority to overrule the established precedent set by the Supreme Court or its predecessor Court. Smith v. Vilvarajah, 57 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Ky. App. 2000). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that Baker has preserved this issue for further review.
Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court. --------
Baker also argues that the 2015 quit-claim deed adequately expresses Valle's intent to partition his interest under KRS 381.130. In the granting and habendum clauses of the deed, Valle transferred all of his interest to Baker and "her heirs and assigns forever." Baker argues that such language is inconsistent with an intent to transfer only a life interest subject to a right of survivorship. Baker also points out that Valle's will and his statements to his attorney expressed an intent to sever the survivorship interest in the joint tenancy.
But as the trial court noted, KRS 381.130(2)(a)(2) requires that the deed "shall express the intent of the joint tenant to partition the joint tenant's interest in the real property" in order to sever a survivorship interest. We agree with the holding in Elliot that the intention to partition the joint tenant's interest must be expressly stated, and cannot be merely implied from broad language in the granting or habendum clauses. Furthermore, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written instrument in the absence of an ambiguous deed. Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky. 2000).
Consequently, we agree with the trial court that the interest which Valle transferred to Baker remained subject to the Youngs' survivorship interest. That interest expired upon Valle's death, leaving the Youngs as sole owners of the property. Therefore, the trial court properly granted the Youngs' motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles T. Lester, Jr.
Fort Thomas, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: T. Lawrence Hicks
Edgewood, Kentucky