Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-6258-11T3
05-01-2014
JAMES BAKER, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
James Baker, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrew J. Sarrol, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Messano and Hayden.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
James Baker, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrew J. Sarrol, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Inmate James Baker, while incarcerated at Northern State Prison, was found guilty of a disciplinary infraction for committing prohibited act .053, indecent exposure, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). He appeals the final decision and sanction imposed by the Department of Corrections (DOC). Having thoroughly considered the record before us, we affirm.
The record reveals that on July 8, 2012, a counselor at the prison reported that Baker came to her office, asked to borrow some tape, and sat down in a chair in front of her desk. She noticed that his hand was on his groin, and he was making a pulling motion. She observed a large hole in the groin of Baker's pants, his genitals were fully exposed, and he appeared to be partially aroused. She told Baker to leave her office immediately and notified Senior Corrections Officer Slinger of the event, who in turn notified Sergeant Castro.
According to the officers' reports, after Baker was detained, Slinger found the pants described by the counselor, secured them in a bag, and asked Castro if he needed to retain them. Castro observed the hole in the pants and told Slinger that he could dispose of them. Baker was issued a disciplinary charge for indecent exposure. The next day, Sergeant Bussey conducted an investigation, determined the charge had merit, and referred the case to a hearing officer.
The disciplinary hearing began on July 10, 2012. Baker's request for counsel substitute pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12 was granted, and Baker pleaded not guilty. The hearing was postponed because the hearing officer requested to view the confiscated pants. This did not occur as they had already been discarded.
At the continuation of the hearing on July, 24, 2012, Baker stated that "[t]he whole situation was over a stapler. I never got a chance to sit down. She told me to get out [and] I thought she was writing me up for a threat." Baker's counsel substitute argued there was insufficient evidence as there was no seizure report, no photo evidence, and Slinger never said he saw the hole in the pants. Baker called a fellow inmate as a witness, who stated "I was not present for this." Baker also declined to confront and cross-examine any adverse witnesses.
The hearing officer, after considering Baker's statements and the staff's reports, found Baker guilty of the charge. The hearing officer found that, although there were no seizure reports or photo evidence, Slinger and Castro's reports stating that they observed the hole in the pants were sufficiently reliable to sustain the charge. Furthermore, the hearing officer highlighted that the counselor had no reason to falsify such an allegation in her report. Baker received a sanction of ten days' detention and ninety days' administrative segregation.
On July 24, 2012, Baker filed an administrative appeal. On July 27, 2012, the Administrator upheld the hearing officer's decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Baker raises the following points for review:
POINT I: THE STATE ACTION TAKEN AT APPELLANT'S DISCIPLINARY HEARING VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE FAIRNESS AND STANDARD[S] OF NEW JERSEY.
POINT II: APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS TO CHALLENGE REPORTS AGAINST HIM, TAINTING THE PROCESS OF A FAIR HEARING.
Baker's reply brief also raises the following points:
POINT I: PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED AN IMPARTIAL HEARING [WHICH] VIOLATED HIS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS [RIGHTS].
A. Mr. Baker was Denied [His Right] to Challenge Investigating Report of Sergeant [Bussey].
B. Mr. Baker was Denied His Right to Challenge[] the Reports of Officer[s] Slinger and Castro.
C. Officer Slinger['s] Original Report was a Credibility Issue.
D. Hearing Officer Jantz Denied Baker a Fair Hearing.
Our role in reviewing an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). Our function is to determine whether the administrative action was "'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006).
The DOC has "broad discretionary powers" to promulgate regulations aimed at maintaining security and order inside correctional facilities. Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 252 (1987). Furthermore, as we have previously noted, "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999).
Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Nonetheless, prisoners are entitled to certain limited due process protections. Id. at 525. These protections include written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; an impartial tribunal, which may consist of personnel from the central office staff; a limited right to call witnesses; the assistance of counsel substitute; and a right to a written statement of evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed. Id. at 525-33; see also McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 193-96 (1995).
"A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence means "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We have carefully considered each of Baker's contentions in light of the applicable law and find that none have sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following comments.
We are satisfied that the record contains sufficient and substantial evidence that amply supported the agency's finding of guilt and that Baker was afforded the limited due process rights to which he was entitled. While Baker claims on appeal that there was no evidence to support the charge because the pants were disposed of and there was no seizure report or photos, there is no such requirement for those items to be available in order to sustain a finding of guilt. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15. Rather, there need only be substantial evidence that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that Baker's guilt was adequately supported. See ibid.; Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas, supra, 35 N.J. at 376. The hearing officer reviewed the officers' reports in which they stated that they observed the hole in the pants, and the counselor's report stating the same. The counselor's report also alleged that Baker exposed his genitals to her. The hearing officer found the officers' reports credible and also determined that the counselor had no motive to fabricate her allegation. Baker offered no contrary evidence aside from a general denial and a witness who stated he was not present during the incident. Taken together, the unrefuted reports provide substantial evidence to sustain the finding of guilt. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15; Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas, supra, 35 N.J. at 376.
Baker also claims that his due process rights were violated because he was denied the right of confrontation and the opportunity to cross-examine the adverse witnesses. We disagree. Here, all of Baker's limited due process requirements were met. See Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 522-33. Baker had twenty-four hours' notice of the charge prior to the initial hearing; he was granted counsel substitute; the hearing took place before a member of the DOC's central office staff, which constitutes an impartial tribunal; Baker and his counsel substitute were provided an opportunity to make a statement on Baker's behalf; and Baker was afforded the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf. Importantly, the hearing officer's written decision specified that Baker declined the opportunity to confront any witnesses against him, and his counsel substitute acknowledged in writing that the report accurately reflected what occurred at the hearing.
In sum, because we find there are no perceivable violations of Baker's due process rights, and the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings of the DOC, we must defer. See Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80. We find no reason in the record to disturb the DOC's final decision upholding Baker's guilt and sanctions.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPEIJATE DIVISION