Opinion
NO. 01-0809, CIVIL ACTION, SECTION "C"(1)
April 22, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants' Rule 56(c) Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the arguments of counsel, the record and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is hereby partially GRANTED and partially DENIED as set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual disputen . . . [to be] `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifis to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First Nat's Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (citations omitted).
BACKGROUND
This suit arises from an incident on June 16, 2000. Plaintiff Joseph Dwayne Douglas attended a "back to school party" in Dumas Coliseum ("Coliseum"), in Houma, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 7. Upon leaving the dance, Douglas testified in his deposition, he heard gunshots. See Rec. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 41. Defendants allege that after the shots were fired, Defendant Officers Jeffrey Lirette, Daniel Belanger, and Troy Voisin received a call over the police radio dispatching them to the area apparently around the Coliseum. See Rec. Doc. 29 at Mem. in Supp. of Rule 56(c) Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' Mem.").
Defendants allege that as these Officers approached a nearby intersection, they saw Douglas run directly in front of a police car. See Defs.' Mem. Belanger testified that he and Voisin then exited their car, chased Douglas and that Belanger "hollered" at Douglas, "`Police, stop.'" See Defs.' Mem., Ex. 3 at 14-15. Douglas testified that he ran into the driveway leading to the rental house apparently owned by his mother, Plaintiff Tonetta Baker, and heard tires screech and people running behind him. See Rec. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 48. Douglas testified that he then hid under the rental house. See id. Next, Douglas testified, an unidentified person told him, "Get my ass out from under the house or I'm going to shoot you." Id. at 54. Voisin testified that he drew his gun because he could not see Douglas' hands and did not know whether he had a weapon. See Rec. Doc. 29, Ex. 4 at 11. According to Vois in's testimony, he told Douglas, "Let me see your fucking hands," see id. at 11, but that Douglas didn't immediately comply with the demand. See id. at 13. Voisin testified that he then asked Douglas to exit from underneath the house and that Douglas crawled out on his stomach in front of the house onto ground Douglas testified was muddy. See id. at 13; Rec. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 56.
In the deposition testimony submitted by Defendants, there is evidence that only Belanger and Voisin saw Douglas running. See Rec. Doe. 29 at Exs. 3, 4. Lirette's deposition testimony submitted by Defendants does not contain evidence that Lirette saw Douglas running. See id. at Lx. 2.
Baker testified that she was in her house, near the rental house, at the time, and that another occupant of the house told her that Police Officers had Douglas on the ground. See id., Ex. 2 at 25. She testified that she emerged from her house and saw the police had Douglas on the ground, but that she was blocked from getting closer by an officer who was identified to Baker as Defendant Jude McElroy. See id. at 29-3 1. Baker testified that she attempted to tell this officer that Douglas had asthma, but that the officer ignored this information and continued to block her. See id. at 31-32.
Voisin testified that Belanger arrived and handcuffed Douglas, and Douglas was searched on the ground. See Rec. Doc. 29, Ex. 4 at 14. Douglas testified that the Officers did not identify themselves but that he discovered their identity when he was handcuffed. See Rec. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 48-50. Plaintiffs testified that Douglas remained on the ground with his face in the mud for twenty to twenty-five minutes. See id. at 57; id., Ex. 2 at 35. Douglas testified he suffered an asthma attack "because . . . I was scared, . . . I couldn't breathe, and . . . they had their knee in my back." Id., Ex. 1 at 62. Douglas testified that he didn't state that he was having trouble breathing because an officer, whom Douglas did not identify, "didn't want me to talk." Id. Thereafter, Douglas testified, an unidentified Officer brought him to his feet by his handcuffs, Douglas was searched again, asked questions, and released. See id. at 60. Plaintiffs allege that the Officers' treatment of Douglas was malicious. See Rec. Doc. 33 at 2.
Although the Complaint does not allege that the Officers acted maliciously, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dqes contain this allegation. Because this allegation is consistent with the facts set forth in the Complaint, the Court considers this allegation here. See Halter v. Alimerica Fin. Life Ins. Annuity Co., No. 98 0718, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13250, at *12 n. 2 (ED. La. Aug. 19, 1998).
Plaintiffs testified that Douglas was physically and mentally injured by the incident. Baker testified that after the incident, Douglas told her he couldn't breathe, so Baker gave him two "treatment[s]." Id., Ex. 2 at 42-43. Douglas also testified he took two puffs on his inhaler. See id., Ex. 1 at 63. Douglas further testified that his back and ribs, to which he had not previously suffered any injury, were injured as a result of the incident, though he did not specify the extent of the injuries. See Rec. Doc. 29, Ex. 1 at 31. According to his testimony, Douglas thinks he probably visited Terrebonne General Hospital ("Hospital") the following day for these injuries, but doesn't remember. See id. at 32. Plaintiffs have not produced any records evidencing a visit to the Hospital. Douglas also testified that since the incident, "I have been scared to go outside" and has had "dreams" and "flashbacks." Rec. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 61. Baker testified that she brought him to "mental health" and that Douglas "has emotional scars that will never go away." Id., Ex. 2 at 42-43.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed this suit, seeking recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds that the above-mentioned Defendants, as well as their supervisor, City of Houma Police Department Chief of Police Patrick Boudreaux, violated Douglas' rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and that Defendants are further liable to Douglas for false imprisonment, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law and to Baker under La. Civ. Code Art. 2315.6. See Rec. Doc. 1.
Defendants now move to dismiss the § 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as well as the state law claims. See Rec. Doe. 29.
ANALYSIS Fourth Amendment claims against Belanger. Voisin. and Lirette in their individual capacities
Defendants in effect maintain that the claims against Belanger, Voisin, and Lirette must be dismissed because they were entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct during the incident. Given that Defendants have pleaded a defense of qualified immunity, the Court must analyze the claims under the two-part inquiry of Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 5. Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court first must determine whether Plaintiffs have "`alleged a constitutional violation at all' under current law." Id. (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. at 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277). If Plaintiffs hive done so, the Court then must determine whether Defendants' conduct was "`objectively reasonable' with reference to `clearly established law' at the time of the actions in question. Id. at 899-900 (citing Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277; Rankin v. Kievenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 108 (5th Cir. 1993)).
In determining here whether Belanger's, Voisin's, and Lirette's alleged actions violated the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1699 1700, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Court, taking the incident and the resulting seizure of Douglas in the light most favorable to the parties asserting the injury, must examine the "objective reasonableness" of the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted "by focusing on the facts and circumstances of [this] particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Petta, 143 F.3d at 907, n. 14.
Here, given the testimony that Douglas ran from the officers and under the rental house and Voisin's testimony that he could not see Douglas' hands at that point, it may have been reasonable for Voisin to draw his gun and for Douglas to be secured until it was determined he was unarmed. Whether a forceful knee in the back, face in the mud, and handcuffs were reasonable is a closer question. Furthermore, once Douglas was contained, there was no danger justifying Defendants' continuing efforts to keep Douglas prone, face in the mud, for twenty to twenty-five minutes, as alleged by Plaintiffs. This rendered the seizure of Douglas unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001) (Fourth Amendment violated where officers forced children to lie on the ground for ten to fifteen minutes at gunpoint after officers had gained complete control of situation). Cf. Lloyde v. Lord, No. 94 Civ. 484, 1997 11.5. Dist. LEXIS 2978, at *7-10 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 17, 1997) (plaintiff prisoner stated Eighth Amendment claim where she suffered minimal swelling in shoulder and knee after correctional officer allegedly was on top of her for twenty minutes, threatened to break her neck if she moved, and dragged her face along cement ground).
Having established that the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, showed that Officers' seizure of Douglas violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court must ask whether Belanger, Voisin, and Lirette are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. In this regard, the Court must determine whether Defendants' conduct was "`objectively reasonable' with reference to `clearly established law' at the time of the conduct in question." Petta, 143 F.3d at 899-900 (citing Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at L793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277; Rankin, 5 F.3d at 108).
Under the Fifth Circuit test for qualified immunity in the context of an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show "(1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need and (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999).
Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, Defendants maintain first that Douglas' injury was de minimis and that Belanger, Voisin, and Lirette thus must prevail on a defense of qualified immunity. See id. at 703. The Court disagrees. See Id. at 704. In Williams, the plaintiff alleged that defendants maliciously choked him, causing fleeting dizziness, temporary loss of breath, and coughing. See ici. Here, likewise, Plaintiffs have alleged that these Officers acted maliciously, see Rec. Doc. 33 at 2, and produced evidence in support of this claim, namely that the Officers held Douglas in the mud for up to twenty-five minutes, causing Douglas injuries to his back and ribs as well as mental anguish and an asthma attack. Thus, Douglas' injury suffices under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
Under the second prong of the analysis, Plaintiffs, as noted above, have set forth evidence that the injuries resulted directly and only from the use of force which, as alleged above, was clearly excessive under the circumstances.
Third, as noted above, given Plaintiffs' allegations, the use of force by Belanger, Voisin, and Lirette was objectively unreasonable.
Fourth Amendment claim against McElroy in his individual capacity
Defendants assert, and McElroy testified in his deposition, that he arrived at the scene after Douglas was stopped by other officers and, though still handcuffed, was standing. Defendants also appear to contend that McElroy neither made any decisions with regard to probable cause, nor touched Plaintiff and, as a result of the lack of contact, did not use excessive force. Therefore, Defendants apparently argue, McElroy, like the other officers on the scene, is entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs, however, have produced deposition testimony by Baker to the effect that McElroy blocked Baker's view of Douglas beginning from the time Douglas was on the ground and that during this time, the officer ignored Baker's entreaties that Douglas had asthma. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, this deposition testimony is sufficient to uphold the claims against McElroy against Defendants' motion. "[O]ne who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge." Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972). As there is testimony that McElroy ignored Baker regarding Douglas' asthma while Douglas' face was in the mud for up to twentyfive minutes, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether McElroy in his individual capacity violated Douglas' right to be free from the use of excessive force pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the motion is denied as to McElroy in his individual capacity with respect to Douglas' claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
Again, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the deposition testimony establishes that the officer blocking Baker and ignoring her pleas as to Douglas' asthma was McElroy, as identified to Baker by her husband. See Rec. Doc. 33, Ex. 2 at 35-36.
Fourth Amendment claims aeainst Boudreaux in his individual capacity
In a suit against a police supervisor in his individual capacity, liability may be found if the supervisor either was "personally involved in the constitutional violation" or if his acts were "causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged." Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 against a supervising officer for the acts of his subordinates under a vicarious liability theory. See Watson v. Interstate Fire Cas. Co., 611 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs apparently allege that Boudreaux, as Houma Police Department Chief of Police, is liable for the actions of the other Defendants here for Boudreaux's failures in his responsibilities of "training, suspension, hiring, [and] conduct" of the other officers. See Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 3. Plaintiffs, however, have produced no evidence beyond the fact of Boudreaux's supervisory authority over the other officers to show any connection between Boudreaux's alleged failures in these areas and the alleged conduct of the other officers here. As such, the motion is granted as to the claims against Boudreaux in his individual capacity.
Fourth Amendment claims against officers in their official capacities
Defendants also move for summaryjudgment on Plaintiffs' claims against the officers in their official capacity.
"[A] suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is the same as a suit against [the] entity of which [the] officer is an agent." McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1737 n. 2, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) (internal quotations deleted). Here, that entity is the City of Houma.
Monoll v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Set-vs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), provides that local governments may be liable for damages whenever:
. . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover . . . local governments. may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" eveP though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision-making channels.
Liability may be based on a policy maker's actual or constructive knowledge of and acquiescence in the unconstitutional custom or practice. See McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 511 (7th Cir. 1993). Acts of omission may serve as the predicate for a finding of unconstitutional policy or custom. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992).
In addition, the failure to train, supervise or discipline employees may result in liability. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). inadequate training that amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come in contact may serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Deliberate indifference in a failure to train case may be established by demonstrating a failure to train officials in a specific area where there is an obvious need for training in order to avoid violations of citizens' constitutional rights, or where a pattern of unconstitutional conduct is so pervasive as to imply actual or constructive knowledge on the part of policy makers, whose deliberate indifference may be evidenced by a failure to correct the situation once the need for training became obvious. See id. Having no policy may constitute deliberate indifference. See Vineyard v. County of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 1993); Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1477.
Even assuming that Plaintiffs have properly alleged that the acts of the qfficers on the scene implemented or executed official municipal decision-making or custom pursuant to Monell, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to support any such claim(s). The only connection between the alleged acts of the officersand the City of Houma is the officers' employment, an association that alone is "clearly insufficient to establish municipal liability under section 1983." Howard v. Del Castillo, No. 00-3466, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15186, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2001).
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims
Because it is clear that Douglas was seized and that the seizure specifically implicates Douglas' rights under the Fourth Amendment, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). As such, Douglas' claim must be dismissed to the extent it is based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
State law claims
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed on the ground that their § 1983 claims fail. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c). But as Plaintiffs' excessive force claims withstand Defendants' Motion and as Defendants have not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs's § 1983 claims to the extent that they are based on the Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the state law claims is denied.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above analysis,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) the Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED as to (a) Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Lirette, Belanger, Voisin, and McElroy in their individual capacities and (b) Plaintiffs' state law claims, but
(2) the Motion is hereby GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims (a) pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Boudreaux in his individual capacity, (b) pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause against Defendants in their individual capacities, and (c) against Defendants in their official capacities.