Opinion
Case No. 2:86-CV-361 JTG
March 31, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On May 5, 2000, Plaintiffs, members of the inmate class housed on "B block" at the Wasatch unit of the Utah State Prison, moved for an order to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt of court for violating the injunction entered by in Baker v. Holden, 787 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Utah 1992). Defendants deny any material violation and have moved to terminate the injunction under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (West 2000). Plaintiff urges the Court not to terminate the injunction but to instead make findings necessary to lift the automatic stay imposed by the PLRA and continue the injunction. The case was referred to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 6 36(b)(1)(B).
Background
This case was originally filed in 1986 by inmates challenging the conditions of confinement in the Wasatch unit of the Utah State Prison. The primary issue raised was whether double celling inmates in certain areas of the Wasatch unit amounted to cruel and unusual punishment given the totality of the conditions there. On April 10, 1991, a preliminary injunction was issued prohibiting double celling in B, B North, C and D blocks of the Wasatch unit pending a decision on the merits. On March 18, 1992, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order making detailed findings regarding the conditions in each area of the Wasatch unit. See Baker. 787 F. Supp. 1008. Based on those findings the Court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting double celling on the third tier of C block and in all areas of B-North block. The Court dissolved the preliminary injunction as to the second tier of C block, and all three tiers of D block, allowing double celling to resume immediately in those areas. Finally, regarding B block the Court ordered that:
[T]he injunction prohibiting double celling in block B is continued in full force and effect. Double bunking in B block may be permitted by further order of the court upon a showing that construction in B block of common areas on all three tiers similar to that accomplished at D block has been completed . . . .Baker, 787 F. Supp. at 1019.
On April 26, 1996, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act became effective. Section 3626 of the PLRA created a new framework under which the Court must decide "any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1) (West 2000). On May 5, 2000, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the 1992 injunction by resuming double bunking on B block without a further court order. Defendants responded by asserting that no contemptuous conduct occurred and that the injunction as to B block should be dissolved because renovation in accordance with the 1992 order was completed before double bunking resumed. Defendants also asserted that the entire 1992 consent decree should be terminated under the PLRA.
The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Boyce, who concluded that the mere failure to obtain an order authorizing resumption of double bunking on B block "would be insignificant" if, in fact, renovation of B block had been completed before resuming double bunking. Accordingly, the attorneys for both parties were ordered to meet and confer at the prison then submit affidavits or other factual material bearing on their respective positions about B block's status. Although Magistrate Judge Boyce also noted his opinion that it was an "unlikely proposition that the [1992] injunction terminated under provisions of the [PLRA]," he did not directly address the issue at that time. (Doc. 324 at 1 n. 1.)
Defendants renewed their motion to terminate the entire 1992 injunction under the PLRA in their presentation of evidence regarding B block's renovation. The parties have had ample opportunity to brief this issue which is now properly before the Court. The Magistrate Judge makes the following report and recommendation regarding termination under the PLRA of the permanent injunction entered in this case in 1992.
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
In response to growing concerns about the unwarranted involvement of federal courts in regulating prisons, and in an effort to conserve scarce judicial resources, Congress enacted the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act in 1996. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14, 419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham); id. at S14, 418 (statement of Sen. Hatch), The PLRA requires termination, upon motion, of prospective relief granted as to prison conditions in the absence of specific findings by the court. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) states:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (West 2000).
A motion to terminate prospective relief under § 3626(b)(1) acts as an automatic stay beginning thirty days after the motion is filed.See id. § 3626(e)(2)(A)(i). The automatic stay remains in effect until the court enters a final order ruling on the motion. See id. § 3626(e)(2)(B).
Section 3626(b)(3) allows the Court to continue prospective relief despite the mandatory termination requirement of § 3626(b)(2) by making:
[w]ritten findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.Id. § 3626(b)(3). A party opposing termination of prospective relief under § 3626 must be given a chance to present evidence showing that the prospective relief meets the requirements of § 3626(b)(3). Loyd v. Ala. Dept. of Corr., 176 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) .
Preliminary Considerations I. Automatic Stay
Defendants' first requested termination of the 1992 consent decree in their memorandum opposing Plaintiff's motion for an order to show cause filed May 19, 2000. (Doc. 321 at 3.) Accordingly, the Court should find that the 1992 injunction was automatically stayed under 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2)(A)(i) beginning June 19, 2000, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 348, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 2259 (2000), and that the automatic stay will remain in effect until a final ruling is made on Defendants' motion for termination,
II. Hearing Requirement
Plaintiffs appear to assert that they are entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding continuing prospective relief under § 3626(b)(3). The plain language of § 3626(b)(3) requires the Court to make findings "based on the record.'7 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West 2000). While this has been interpreted to mean that Plaintiff's are entitled to make an evidentiary presentation on the issue, a hearing is not necessarily required. See Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1999). The parties have had ample opportunity to supplement the record in this case with relevant documentary evidence. There is no indication that a hearing would materially assist the Court in making its decision. As Defendants have correctly pointed out, the issues in this case are simple compared to other cases where evidentiary hearings have been allowed. See Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 782 (11th Cir. 2000); Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 664 (6th Cir. 2000).
Termination of the 1992 Injunction Under the PLRA
The issue before the Court is whether the appropriate findings under the PLRA either were or should be made, such as to allow any part of the 1992 injunction in this case to remain in effect. Thus, the Court must first determine whether its 1992 order included the specific findings required under § 3626(b)(2) of the PLRA, to-wit: (1) that the relief granted was narrowly drawn, (2) extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and (3) was the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2) (West 2000).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court's findings as to C block, third tier, and B-North block are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 3626(b)(2). Regarding C block, third tier, Plaintiffs rely upon the Court's conclusion that "double bunking on the third tier of C block should not be permitted because it would violate the constitutional standard." Baker, 787 F. Supp. at 1019. Regarding B-North block, Plaintiff's point to the Court's statement that "it seems highly unlikely that double celling could be appropriately instituted there given the small cells with no windows and lack of common area for each tier." Id. These statements do not satisfy the requirements of § 3626(b)(2).
Although the statements relied on by Plaintiffs show that the Court believed double bunking in certain areas would violate inmates' federal rights, the required findings about the character of the relief granted are missing. The 1992 order does not specifically find that the relief granted is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary, and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation of a Federal right. These findings cannot be implied merely from the fact that the Court ordered the preliminary injunction regarding certain areas of the prison-to remain in effect. Thus, it appears that the relief ordered inBaker was granted in the absence of the specific findings required under § 3626(b)(2) of the PLRA; therefore, Defendants are entitled to termination of the injunction unless the Court makes the written findings required under § 3626(b)(3).
To allow the 1992 injunction to remain in effect under the limitation provision in § 3626(b)(3), the Court must find: (1) that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the federal right, (2) extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and (3) that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West 2000). The Court reviews each part of the 1992 injunction separately to determine whether these findings can be made from the record.
I. C Block/Third Tier
The Court's 1992 order prohibited double bunking on the third tier of C block based on its conclusion that double bunking in that area would violate constitutional standards regarding "the basic human need of shelter and adequate living space." Baker, 787 F. Supp. at 1007. This finding was based on a combination of conditions including "small cell size with no windows, no adjacent common area and inadequate fire escape and congestion caused by the cell release levers when opened." id. The Court also found that the Utah Department of Corrections (UDC) had planned since 1986 to double cell inmates on C block.
There is no evidence in the record showing that the 1992 injunction as to C block, third tier, remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right. The Court's decision to issue a permanent injunction in this case relied heavily on the finding that UDC officials intended since 1986 to double cell the entire Wasatch unit. Baker, 787 F. Supp. at 1009. This was an important factor in the Court's finding of deliberate indifference. Id. Although the constitutional standard of adequate living space has not changed significantly since 1992 there is no evidence in the record that Defendants still have plans to double cell inmates on the third tier of C block. Furthermore, it is unlikely that UDC officials will implement double bunking on the third tier of C block without substantial renovation, given the Court's 1992 opinion that doing so would probably violate inmates' Federal rights. To terminate the 1992 injunction at this time would not prevent inmates from filing future lawsuits challenging double celling on the third tier of C block. Accordingly, the Court should find that the 1992 injunction as to C block, third tier, is no longer necessary and therefore must be terminated under the PLRA.
II. B-North Block
The Court made the following findings regarding B-North block in its 1992 order:
Block B North is in the midst of renovation and no double bunking is contemplated there because it is intended to be used as a single cell mental health facility. If that intention changes, the matter will be reassessed after construction is completed. However, it seems highly unlikely that double celling could be appropriately instituted there given the small cells with no windows and lack of common area for each tier of B-North block.Baker, 787 F. Supp. at 1019. Based on these findings the Court continued in effect the injunction prohibiting double celling on B-North block.
The injunction as to B-North block appears to be precisely the type of relief which was targeted for termination under the PLRA. At the time of the 1992 order it could not be determined whether conditions on B-North block would be adequate for double celling because the block was undergoing renovation. However, the Court noted that no double celling was contemplated on B-North block because it was intended to be used as a single cell mental health facility following renovation. Thus, the rationale for leaving the injunction in effect as to B-North block was apparently only to guarantee the Court a chance to make a final determination on the matter if such plans were ever developed, not to rectify a current and ongoing violation of a federal right.
Although the Court observed that it seemed "highly unlikely" that double celling could be appropriately instituted on B-North block following renovation the Court did not reach a conclusion on the issue at that time.
Not only has there been no determination that double celling on B-North block would violate a federal right, there is also no evidence in the record that Defendants have resumed double celling on B-North block, or that they intend to do so in the future. Thus, there appears to be no basis for a finding that continuation of the injunction as to B-North block is necessary to prevent a current and ongoing violation of a federal right. Accordingly, the Court should find that the 1992 injunction as to B-North block must be terminated under the PLRA,
III. B Block
The Court's 1992 injunction prohibiting double bunking on B block was based primarily on the finding that the cell block lacked adequate dayroom space or internal common areas. Baker, 787 F. Supp. at 1014. The Court ordered that double celling on B block "may be permitted by further order of the court upon a showing that construction in B block of common areas on all three tiers similar to that accomplished at D block has been completed." Id. at 1019.
Defendants have submitted ample evidence showing that renovation of B block to D block standards was completed before resuming double celling on B block. See Def. Memo. Providing Info. Per May 30 Court Order (Doc. 336); Resp't Memo. Re Applicability of the PLRA (Doc. 354). Plaintiffs do not challenge this evidence; instead, they assert that the injunction remains necessary despite the renovation because B block is now used as a "lockdown" facility where inmates are confined to their cells for extended periods of time. Plaintiffs argue that the Court implicitly based its conditional approval of double celling on B block on the assumption that the length of time inmates were confined to their cells would not be increased significantly.
Magistrate Judge Boyce addressed this argument in his order of June 8, 2000, concluding that "[n]othing in the injunction entered inBaker specifically enjoined double bunking beyond a certain time limit." (Doc. 330 at 1.) He further concluded that although lockdown time could be the basis for some form of future injunctive relief the issue "may be more appropriately addressed in a new action, as the relief is beyond what this court previously addressed." (Doc. 330 at 2.) Thus, the issue of lockdown time is not relevant to the question whether the existing injunction regarding B block should be terminated under the PLRA. If Plaintiffs wish to raise a new challenge to the conditions on B block based on the extent of lockdown time they should file a new action.
Plaintiff's have not shown that the injunction prohibiting double celling on B block remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right. The apparent purpose for the B block injunction was only to prevent double celling in that area until adequate dayroom or internal common areas were provided. It is undisputed that Defendants satisfied the remodeling requirement before resuming double celling on B block. Accordingly, the injunction as to B block is no longer necessary and should be terminated under the PLRA.
Plaintiffs' Contempt Motion
Plaintiffs' original Motion for Order to Show Cause filed May 5, 2000, is still pending. (Doc. 315.) Plaintiffs' motion asks that Defendants be found in contempt for violating the 1992 injunction and that Plaintiffs be awarded attorney fees for costs incurred in pursing the order to show cause. Regarding Plaintiffs' contempt motion Magistrate Judge Boyce concluded that Defendants had violated the 1992 injunction by resuming double celling on B block without first obtaining an order from the Court. (Doc. 324 at 1.) However, he also concluded that "the extent of lockdown may not be a basis for contempt" (Doc. 330 at 1), and that "there is no contemptuous conduct related to the application of double bunking in B block if the block otherwise met the court's requirements." (Doc. 324 at 2.)
As previously discussed, the record shows that renovation of B block in accordance with the Court's order was completed before resuming double celling. Accordingly, the Court should find that there was no contemptuous conduct and deny Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees.
Motion to Intervene
Brian K. Stack, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, has filed a motion to intervene in this action alleging that he was double celled on B block in violation of the Court's 1992 injunction. (Doc. 355.) In 2000, the Court considered a similar motion filed in this case by a group of inmates housed on B block. (Doc. 307.) Following the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Boyce (Doc. 311) the Court denied that motion to intervene stating that "[p]ro se prisoners which seek to enforce the judgment in a class action may file an action seeking to intervene only if their gripes are first presented to class counsel and `he refuses to examine [them] or inappropriately determines they have no merit. `" (Doc. 312 at 2, quoting McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1992).) The Court also concluded that "resurrecting this ancient case and exhuming this dead litigation from its peaceful interment [was] not the proper vehicle for addressing movants' allegations." (Doc. 312 at 3'.) The Court should deny the motion by Brian K. Stack to intervene in this case for substantially the same reasons set forth in its order of April 3, 2000.
Recommendation
Based on the foregoing analysis it is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that:(1) the injunction entered in Baker should be terminated under 18 U.S.C. § 3626;
(2) Plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause and for attorney fees should be denied;
(3) the motion to intervene by Brian K. Stack should be denied; and
(4) this case should be closed.
Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being mailed to the parties who are hereby notified of their right to object to the same. The parties are further notified that they must file any objections to the Report and Recommendation, with the clerk of the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), within ten (10) days after receiving it. Failure to file objections may constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent appellate review.