II. Share of Ownership Florence next contends we failed to decide whether the rule of Baker v. Chambers (1980), Ind. App., 398 N.E.2d 1350 applies to joint tenancies. Baker says where original grantees take real estate as tenants-in-common, a rebuttable presumption of equality of shares arises.
Shoe v. Heckley (1922), 78 Ind. App. 586, 590-591, 134 N.E. 214, 216. Florence contends this court's ruling in Baker v. Chambers (1980), Ind. App., 398 N.E.2d 1350, entitles her to be declared sole equitable owner of the entire 32.63 acres. We disagree. Baker deals only with the intent of tenants in common concerning their relative shares of ownership. It does not alter the rule of Shoe and cases cited therein concerning the type of ownership and legal effect of the deed.
There is a rebuttable presumption that two or more persons holding title as tenants in common possess equal shares. Willett v. Clark, 542 N.E.2d 1354, 1358 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Baker v. Chambers, 398 N.E.2d 1350, 1351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). To refute this presumption, extrinsic evidence of contribution can be shown.
The debtors next asserted that the court, in allowing claims 8, 9, and 10, erroneously concluded that it did not need to address the debtors' argument about the right of contribution from partners or co-tenants. The debtors pointed to Baker v. Chambers, 398 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980), which expressed the "Veil-established rule . . . that when two or more persons take as tenants in common under an instrument which is silent in regard to their respective shares, there is a presumption that their shares are equal." Id. at 1351.
The debtors next asserted that the court, in allowing claims 8, 9, and 10, erroneously concluded that it did not need to address the debtors' argument about the right of contribution from partners or co-tenants. The debtors pointed to Baker v. Chambers, 398 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980), which expressed the "well-established rule . . . that when two or more persons take as tenants in common under an instrument which is silent in regard to their respective shares, there is a presumption that their shares are equal." Id. at 1351.
Hallett claims that she did not receive notice of Appellees' motion to reconsider, but she acknowledges that she obtained actual notice online and has neither alleged nor established any resulting prejudice. Hallett also asserts that a summary judgment motion is "not permitted by the partition statute[, ]" Appellant's Br. at 14, but she cites no authority for this assertion. Indiana Code Chapter 32-17-4 does not prohibit such motions, and this Court reviewed a summary judgment ruling in a partition action in Baker v. Chambers, 398 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980). Consequently, we reject Hallett's argument that the mediated agreement finally disposed of the matter and thus Appellees' motion to reconsider was untimely and they were required to provide her with "new service of process[.]"
It was undisputed that by the warranty deed, Willett and Clark were co-tenants of the VanBibber real estate. They also owned Yellow Banks jointly. When two or more persons take as tenants in common under an instrument which is silent in regard to their respective shares, there is a presumption that their shares are equal. Baker v. Chambers (1980), Ind. App., 398 N.E.2d 1350. This presumption is rebuttable, however, and extrinsic evidence, such as contribution, can be shown to refute it. Id.