Bailey v. Lynch

5 Citing cases

  1. Salmon v. McAleenan

    Case No.: 4:18-cv-01978-KOB-JHE (N.D. Ala. May. 14, 2020)

    And nothing in Zadvydas or its progeny limit detention pursuant to § 1231(a)(1)(C), which authorizes extension of the removal period where a noncitizen "fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure." See e.g. Reyes-Rivera v. Sessions, 2018 WL 5986533, *3 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2018) (citing Powell v. Ashcroft, 194 F.Supp.2d 209, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)) (holding Zadvydas inapplicable because it "did not discuss the constitutionality of Section 1231(a)(1)(C) and the tolling of the removal period during the time of an alien's non-cooperation"); Bailey v. Lynch, 2016 WL 5791407, *3 (D.N.J Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that although the petitioner's "presumptively reasonable period of detention had elapsed before he was taken back into immigration custody, his actions while in detention, specifically refusing to cooperate with his removal by telling Jamaican officials that he was born in the U.S. Virgin Islands despite his Jamaican birth certificate ... implicate 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C)."). Thus, based on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Singh, the sole question before this court is whether Salmon's refusal to complete relevant forms constitutes the requisite bad faith to extend the removal period.

  2. Diaz-Ortega v. Lund

    CIVIL DOCKET NO. 1:19-CV-670-P (W.D. La. Oct. 15, 2019)   Cited 3 times

    Nor does any interpretive regulation of which the Court is aware. See Hamama, 2019 WL 2118784, at *2; see also Bailey v. Lynch, CV 16-2600 (JLL), 2016 WL 5791407, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2016) ("The removal period does not restart simply because an alien who has previously been released is taken back into custody."). Of course, this textual silence is not just persuasive - it has interpretive meaning.

  3. Hamama v. Adducci

    Case No. 17-cv-11910 (E.D. Mich. May. 15, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    The Government does not establish when this period began. If, like many Zadvydas subclass members, Younan was ordered removed years ago, the removal period has likely come and gone based on the date his order of removal became administratively final. See Bailey v. Lynch, No. CV 16-2600, 2016 WL 5791407, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2016) ("Petitioner's removal period had concluded long before he was taken back into custody by immigration officials, and his detention is therefore not presumptively reasonable and is thus subject to challenge under Zadvydas."). The Government has provided no authority that the removal period can be reset after it has expired.

  4. Sied v. Nielsen

    Case No. 17-cv-06785-LB (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018)   Cited 10 times
    Approving the approach, taken by "several courts" that "the six-month period does not reset when the government detains an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, releases him from detention, and then re-detains him again"

    Several courts have held that the six-month period does not reset when the government detains an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), releases him from detention, and then re-detains him again. Nhean v. Brott, No. 17-28 (PAM/FLN), 2017 WL 2437268, at *2 (D. Minn. May 2, 2017) (report and recommendation) (holding that when the government detains an alien for 90 days, releases him, and then re-detains him, the second detention "was presumptively reasonable for an additional 90 days (six months in total)," not an additional six months), adopted, 2017 WL 2437246 (D. Minn. June 5, 2017); Bailey v. Lynch, No. 16-2600 (JLL), 2016 WL 5791407, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that the six-month Zadvydas period "does not restart simply because an alien who [was previously detained and then] has previously been released is taken back into custody"); Farah v. INS, No. Civ. 02-4725(DSD/RLE), 2003 WL 221809, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that when the government releases an alien and then revokes the release based on changed circumstances, "the revocation would merely restart the 90-day removal period, not necessarily the presumptively reasonable six-month detention period under Zadvydas"). Here, where Mr. Sied has been detained under Section 1231(a) for (1) almost 15 total months and (2) almost seven consecutive months, the six-month Zadvydas period has expired.

  5. Zaghlol v. Green

    Civil Action No. 16-5341 (SDW) (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017)

    Id. "Courts have long held that this [statutory provision] not only stands for the proposition that the removal period may be extended where an alien is the impediment to his own removal, but also that such an alien cannot demand his release under Zadvydas as he 'has the keys to his freedom in his pocket and could likely effectuate his removal by providing" the necessary information to the appropriate officials.'" Bailey v. Lynch, No. 16-2600, 2016 WL 5791407, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2016) (quoting Pelich v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Callender v. Aviles, No. 15-8579, 2016 WL 3792794, at * 3 (D.N.J. July 14, 2016). "Thus, 'Zadvydas does not save an alien who fails to provide requested [information necessary] to effectuate his removal.