Opinion
1:20-CV-00009
03-17-2022
ERIC BAEZ, Plaintiff v. JENNIFER MOONEY, CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES; LT. BASHOR, PREA COMPLIANCE MANAGER; BRIAN MARTIN, CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES SUPERVISOR; AND LAURA GILES, INMATE EMPLOYMENT, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NO. 47
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47) be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background and Procedural Posture
Plaintiff Eric Baez (“Baez”), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at its State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jennifer Mooney, a supervisor in the Corrections Industries (“CI”) department at SCI-Albion, Lt. Bashor, the Corrections Officer responsible for investigating Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaints, Brian Martin, a CI supervisor, and Laura Giles, an SCI-Albion employee responsible for inmate employment. Baez's Complaint claimed that (1) Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by removing him from his prison industries job in retaliation for having filed “Request to Staff' forms; (2) Mooney violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by disclosing his identity in connection with a PREA complaint allegedly filed against him; and (3) Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by removing him from his prison industries job. See ECF No. 26, pp. 5-11. On Defendants' motion to dismiss Baez's Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), the Court dismissed Baez's Eighth Amendment claim but allowed his retaliation and equal protection claims to proceed. See ECF No. 31. The Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on those remaining claims. See ECF No. 47. They argue that the record establishes that Baez was removed from his prison job because he repeatedly caused disruption in the workplace and not because of unlawful retaliation or discrimination.
III. Relevant Factual Background
Baez previously had a job in the CI department of SCI-Albion. On May 30, 2019, Mooney, the Corrections Stock Clerk responsible for supervising inmate work details at CI, informed Baez and several other inmates that they were being reassigned from the “wall” of CI to the “floor.” ECF No. 49 (Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts), ¶¶ 4-6; ECF No. 61 (Baez's Responsive Concise Statement), ¶ 5; ECF No. 55 (Baez Affidavit), p. 2. See ECF No. 7. Apparently, the inmates could be surveilled more readily in the “floor” area of the shop than the “wall” area. ECF No. 55, p. 1.
The parties' explanations of what prompted these reassignments differ materially. Mooney asserts that the decision to relocate the inmates was prompted by anonymous “Requests to Staff' submitted by inmates to Corrections Officer Grinnell alleging that Baez and the other reassigned inmates “had been stealing items from CI and making threatening comments to other inmate workers.” ECF No. 49, ¶ 4; ECF 49-1, ¶ 4. In contrast, Baez asserts that Mooney told him that another inmate named “Bennett” had submitted a PREA complaint against him and other inmates and that Lt. Bashor, the PREA Compliance Manager, wanted Baez and the other inmates placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), but she (Mooney) prevented this action. ECF No. 55, pp. 2-3. According to Baez, Mooney also warned the inmates not to inquire regarding the PREA complaint because this would prompt Lt. Bashor to reopen the investigation and place the inmates in the RHU. Id.
According to Mooney, the reassigned inmates' belief that their work reassignments had been prompted by another inmate's PREA complaint was the product of their own speculation or contrivance rather than any statement she made to them. ECF No. 49, ¶ 11; ECF 49-1, ¶¶ 11-12. She specifically disputes that she told Baez or the other inmates that an Inmate Bennett had filed a PREA complaint, that Lt. Bashor wanted to put the reassigned employees in the RHU, or that Lt. Bashor would reopen the investigation if they asking about Bennett's PREA complaint. Id. Lt. Bashor, the Corrections Officer at SCI-Albion responsible for investigating and tracking PREA complaints, attests that no PREA complaint had been submitted by Inmate Bennett; in fact, no PREA complaint has ever been submitted against Baez. ECF No. 49, ¶ 11; ECF 49-1, ¶ 12.
According to Baez, the next factual event relevant to his claims occurred on July 22, 2019. He attests that he and three other inmates, Houck, Burkett, and Rutledge, sent a DC-135A “Request to Staff' form to Lt. Bashor inquiring about the status of the PREA complaint that, according to Mooney, Bennett had filed against them. ECF No. 55, p. 2. Baez states that Lt. Bashor did not answer his inquiry but did respond to Inmate Houck, advising him that there was no PREA investigation and that, if a PREA complaint or investigation were pending, she, rather than Mooney, would be the one to inform him. Id.
According to the Defendants, the Request to Staff on July 22, 2019, and other requests for information about the nonexistent PREA complaint were part of a ploy cooked up by Baez and possibly other inmates to pressure prison personnel to give them increased hours and compensation in the CI department. See ECF No. 49, ¶¶ 12-16, 22-25. Mooney asserts that, on August 1, 2019, Baez came to her office on his own initiative to discuss the reassignment of inmates within CI and complained that the reassignment had caused a reduction in his work hours and corresponding reduction in pay, which Baez asserted created a “hostile work environment.” Id., ¶¶ 19-20. According to Mooney, she explained the limitations on the number of workers in CI and the reduction in hours available to Baez. Id., ¶ 21. During this discussion, Mooney asserts Baez admitted to typing at least two of the Requests to Staff-his request and that of his cellmate, Inmate Houck--and acknowledged that he and Houck submitted the requests because they wanted to work on Fridays to get more money. Id., ¶ 22. Mooney submitted an Employee Report of Incident dated August 1, 2019, in which she recounted this exchange and further stated:
Inexplicably, no party has seen fit to include in the record the actual “Request to Staff” forms that all parties repeatedly reference in their respective Concise Statements of Material Facts, affidavits, and briefs.
I informed inmate Baez that engaging in a group activity to manipulate staff to give them extra hours is breaking institutional rules. I previously spoke to inmate Houck regarding this same issue which he told this writer that it was not a hostile work environment for them, it's more a hostile environment against this writer. Inmate Houck also stated that he let this group of inmates talk him into signing the request slip. This was a manipulation attempt on staff to give them extra hours/more money on their books. I am writing this to protect myself from any further allegations/retaliation from this group of inmates. .ECF No. 49-5.
In contrast, Baez asserts that Mooney called him to her office on August 1, 2019, and informed him that “she had seven (7) request slips from inmates to Lt. Bashor inquiring about the alleged PREA Complaint and investigation...ECF No. 55, pp.2-3. Baez further attests that, after Mooney reminded him that she had instructed him not to contact Lt. Bashor, she indicated that she was now forced to write an incident report “in order to protect herself.” Id., p. 3. According to Baez, Mooney then informed Baez that the actual reason he was moved on the shop floor was that she had “received a Request Slip from another inmate saying that I was stealing merchandise and that she had lied before about the PREA complaint and investigation.” Id.
When Baez attempted to report for work at CI on August 7, 2019, Brian Martin, the CI supervisor, informed him that he was suspended until further notice and should return to his housing unit. Id., pp. 3-4. Defendants have submitted a record titled “Unit Management Team Staffing for Job Removal” dated August 8, 2019, which states that Baez had been suspended from his CI job for “violating shop rules” and includes handwritten notations that he had “submitted unfounded request slips” and “original issues of moving positions due to theft.” ECF No. 49-1, p. 14. None of the other reassigned inmates, or inmates who had submitted Requests to Staff, were suspended. ECF No. 55, p. 4.
On October 1, 2019, Baez attended a “Staff Support Meeting” with Martin, Laura Giles, and Mr. Seymour during which Martin explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss Baez's alleged disruption of the workplace. Id. Baez asserts that he told the group that the “disruption” with which he was charged was his submission of the Request Slip to Lt. Bashor. Id. Giles advised Baez that a decision concerning his work assignment could not be made until she spoke with Mr. Snyder, his Unit Manager. The next day, on October 2, 2019, Baez was removed from his work assignment. Baez was informed that he was being reassigned from his position with CI to the general labor pool because he “disrupts the workplace.” Id.
IV. Standards of Decision
A. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartier, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to its analysis and discussion of the pending motion.
Baez initially failed to submit a responsive concise statement of material facts with his response in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 1-2. Local Rule 56(C)(1) directs the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to submit a “separately filed concise statement which responds to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts by ... admitting or denying whether each fact contained in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts is undisputed and/or material.” LCvR 56(C)(1)(a). Noting this deficiency, the Court ordered Baez to respond to the Defendants' Concise Statement. See ECF No. 60. He has since done so. See ECF No. 61.
V. Discussion and Analysis
As the foregoing recitation demonstrates, Baez and the Defendants agree on the basic sequence of certain events, including the initial reassignment of Baez and the other inmates, the dates of certain discussions and meetings, and the dates of Baez's suspension from CI and his later dismissal from that department. Their versions of the facts differ materially, however, regarding what was communicated in connection with these events, especially as those communications relate to the parties' motivations for their actions. It is the Court's task to determine whether the parties' many disputes of fact are material and preclude summary judgment. This first requires identification of the elements of each of Baez's claims.
A. Retaliation Claim
To support a retaliation claim, Baez must produce evidence that (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). See also Williams v. Clark, 2021 WL 6052121, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2021). This Court previously concluded that Baez had alleged facts sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. See ECF No. 31. But on summary judgment, the Court's inquiry is different. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting the “vastly different” standards applicable to motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment); McFadden v. Dalmasi, 837 Fed.Appx. 135, 138 n.8 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 2020). On summary judgment, Baez must cite to relevant portions of the summary judgment record to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of his claim. See Angle v. Carter, 2019 WL 981914, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2019); Waskiewicz v. PPL Services, Inc., 2012 WL 170693 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2012).
As to the first element of his retaliation claim, Baez asserts that he engaged in constitutionally protected activity when he made requests for information to Mooney and Bashor. Baez asserts that he made these requests based on Mooney telling him and the other inmates that a PREA complaint had been filed against him and that she was moving his placement on the shop floor as a result. ECF No. 55, p. 1. Baez also claims that Mooney warned him and the other inmates that inquiring about the PREA complaint or investigation would have adverse consequences, including possible placement in the RHU. Id. Defendants contend that Mooney never made the statements Baez attributes to her about a supposed PREA complaint; that Baez contrived this story to manipulate Mooney and others to give him the work assignment and hours he desired.
Baez makes similar assertions against Bashor. He claims that “on or about July 22, 2019, [Baez] as well as Mr. Houck, Mr. Burkett, and Mr. Rutledge sent DC-135A's (‘Request Slips') to Lt. Bashor inquiring about the alleged PREA complaint that Ms. Mooney informed us Mr. Bennet had filed.” ECF No. 55, p. 2. He further states that although Bashor did not respond to him, she did respond to Mr. Houck. Id. Bashor does not deny that Baez and others filed DC-135A forms. Bashor also acknowledges that “Eric Baez asked me verbally if a PREA complaint had been filed against him.” ECF No. 49-1, p. 9, ¶ 6.
This Court has previously recognized an inmate's “request to staff' via a DC-135A form as constitutionally protected conduct. See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 2011 WL 3290217, at *13 (W.D. Pa. June 17, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3298508 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2011). See also Dennis v. Smith, 2021 WL 2077651, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2075451 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2021); Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 2016 WL 7029385, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7031778 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016); Alex v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 433667, *5 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (the filing of inmate requests slips constitutes protected activity for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim); Baez v. Falor, 2012 WL 4356768 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 24, 2012). This is because such “request slips” serve as a “general avenue of expression for prisoners seeking some type of relief and can, therefore, be an important step within the grievance process.” Baez, 2012 WL 4356768, at *51, aff'd, 566 Fed.Appx. 155 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Alexander v. Fritch, 2010 WL 1257709 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2010) (describing that the prison administrative policy provides that, prior to utilizing the grievance system, prisoners are required to attempt to resolve problems on an informal basis through direct contact or by sending an inmate request slip to the appropriate staff member). Such requests for information have also been recognized as protected even when made verbally rather than in writing. See Nadab v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 6131247, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2020) (citing Mackv. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 297-98 (3d. Cir. 2016)).
This does not end the inquiry in this case, however, because conduct that normally would be considered constitutionally protected for purposes of a retaliation claim loses that protection if it is based on assertions that the inmate knows to be materially false. See Hadden v. Howard, 713 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (3d Cir.1983) (discussing at length that inmates have no right to lie about prison personnel in documents submitted through Pennsylvania's inmate complaint process); Coffee v. Burkhart, 2014 WL 1316100, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014); Lane v. Zirkle, 2012 WL 6860255, at *7 n. 12 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2012) (prisoner “has no constitutionally protected right to file a false grievance”); Hale v. Scott, 371 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir.2004) (collecting authorities confirming that inmates have no constitutional right to make false accusations about prison personnel); Williams v. Klem, 2008 WL 4453100, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Sept.30, 2008); Floyd v. Klem, 2008 WL 3914830, at *7-8 (M.D.Pa. Aug.20, 2008); Brightwell v. Lehman, 2007 WL 2479682, at *6 (W.D.Pa. Aug.29, 2007).
While an inmate's filing of a grievance against prison officials normally represents conduct quintessentially protected by the First Amendment, for example, no such protection extends to a grievance comprised of knowingly false assertions of fact. Coffee, 2014 WL 1316100, at *9. After recognizing this proposition of law, the court in Coffee nevertheless denied summary judgment to the defendants in that case because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the truth or falsity of the facts asserted in the plaintiffs grievance. Id. (holding that “[t]he resolution of the factual question of whether Plaintiffs statements about Burkhart in Grievance No. 399229 are constitutionally protected is a disputed issue of material fact because if the statements are a lie they are not protected conduct, but if the statements are truthful, the filing of the grievance is constitutionally protected conduct”-such “factual dispute” being “fatal to Defendants' motion for summary judgment”).
The same analysis applies to Baez's requests for information in this case. Baez contends that he submitted the requests for information in good faith to ascertain information concerning a PREA complaint that Mooney had told him had been filed against him. The Defendants assert that the premise upon which Baez presented the requests-that Mooney had told him that a PREA complaint had been submitted against him-was a lie and contrivance. Mooney and Baez each support their respective version of the facts by means of an affidavit under oath and premised on personal knowledge.
Defendants have also produced documentary evidence and an affidavit attesting that neither Inmate Bennett nor any other inmate had filed a PREA complaint against Baez. Baez has offered only the statement he attributes to Mooney to support a contrary finding. Whether this statement alone is enough to support such a finding is irrelevant for present purposes, however. The issue is not whether the statement Baez attributes to Mooney (i.e, that he had been reassigned within CI because Bennett had submitted a PREA complaint) was true, but whether Mooney in fact made the statement. If she did, Baez arguably had a good faith and reasonable basis upon which to request information regarding the matter. While it is unclear why Mooney would falsely claim that a PREA complaint had been submitted against Baez and other inmates, the credibility of Mooney and Baez regarding this issue is for the jury, not the court. If the jury finds that Baez's testimony is true regarding Mooney's statement, then Baez's requests for information concerning the matter will be constitutionally protected. If the jury believes Mooney and finds that Baez's story is a lie, Baez's requests for information will have no such protection. This dispute is not one that can be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court's function is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Davison Design & Development, Inc. v. Frison, 2018 WL 6324996, *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2018) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000)) (citing decisions); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998).
Regarding the second element of Baez's claim, it is undisputed that Baez suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials. “[T]he termination of prison employment constitutes adverse action sufficient to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017); Pepe v. Lamas, 679 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017). The factual issue here is whether Baez's alleged constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. This issue also turns on resolution of genuinely disputed and materially divergent factual assertions that cannot be determined on the present record. Indeed, this question of motivation appeal's to overlap factually with the factual disputes underlying a determination of whether Baez's requests for information were constitutionally protected. For these reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied as to Baez's retaliation claim.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment does not differentiate the conduct of Defendant Brian Martin from that of the other Defendants. Instead, they acknowledge that Martin “made the decision to remove Plaintiff from CL” ECF No. 48, p. 7. The record also supports that he was aware of Baez's submission of requests for information when he made this decision. Therefore, summary judgment also should be denied as to the claims against Martin. As to Defendant Laura Giles, Defendants argue that she was not personally involved in Baez's termination. See ECF No. 48, p. 7. Baez's declaration, however, relates that he attended a Staff Support meeting at which Giles and Martin were both present to discuss his alleged disruption of the workplace. ECF No. 55, p. 4. Baez attests that he “explained to Ms. Giles ... that the disruption Mr. Martin refers to is the Request Slip that I sent to Lt. Bashor” and that “Ms. Giles stated that before a decision could be made about my work assignment, she needs to talk to Mr. Snider, my Unit Manager.” ECF No. 55, p. 4. Baez goes on to state that he was removed from his work assignment the next day, October 2, 2019. Id. This evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of Giles' personal involvement in the conduct upon which Baez bases his claims. Because Defendants have not come forward with evidence to defeat this inference, the Court should also deny summary judgment on the claims against Giles.
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they would have terminated Baez's CI position regardless of whether he made inquiries relating to the purported PREA complaint. Defendants are apparently alluding to the “same decision” defense to retaliation claims. This defense is available to a defendant even where the prisoner establishes a prima facie case of retaliation. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to prison officials to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.'” See Cooper v. Garman, 2021 WL 4033113, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2021) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001)). Stated differently, “[a] defendant may defeat the claim of retaliation by showing that it would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff had not engaged in the protected activity.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). Upon this showing by prison officials, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to (1) produce “other evidence” of the defendant's retaliatory motive, and (2) demonstrate that the prisoner's violation of prison policy was “not so ‘clear and overt'” that the court can conclude that the defendant would have taken the same action despite this evidence. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016).
In this case, Defendants have failed to make the threshold factual showing necessary to shift the burden of production to Baez. For example, they claim that this dispute started when prison officials received anonymous DC-135A forms stating that Baez and others were stealing while employed at CI, but they have failed to produce copies of those documents or any other foundation for this assertion. Further, they contend that Baez was a disruptive presence on the shop floor but provide no misconduct reports or other evidence to substantiate that claim. They claim that Baez submitted numerous unfounded DC-135 A forms, but they produce none of those requests, and, in any case, the legitimacy of Baez's requests is genuinely disputed.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be denied as to Baez's First Amendment retaliation claim.
B. The Motion to Summary Judgment Should Be Denied as to Baez's Equal Protection Claim.
To sustain an equal protection claim, Baez must show that the Defendants “intentionally treated [him] differently from others similarly situated, ” and “there [was] no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Talbert v. Corr. Dental Assocs., 2021 WL 131554, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2021) (citing Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Williams v Wetzel, %T1 Fed.Appx. 158, 161 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, Baez's declaration states that after he and several other inmates filed DC-135A request slips on July 22, 2019, he was the only inmate whose employment in the CI was suspended and ultimately terminated. ECF No. 55, p. 4 (Neither “Mr. Houck, Mr. Burkett, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Bolanos, nor anyone else was suspended from their work assignment. I was the only individual suspended.”). Defendants do not directly dispute this assertion. Mooney states that other inmates expressed hesitation to get involved with Baez's “disruptive activity” and that inmate Houck felt Baez “pressured him to sign an inmate Request to Staff.” ECF No. 49-1, p. 4, ¶¶ 22, 25. She also states that she was not responsible for Baez's employment reassignment. Id. Bashor declares that “it is my understanding that inmate Eric Baez was removed from CI by Brian Martin for security reasons and returned to the general labor pool.” Id., p. 10, ¶ 11. While a rational basis may have existed for suspending Baez and later terminating him from his job in CI and for not taking such action against the other inmates who submitted information requests, it has not been properly developed on the existing record. Therefore, Defendants' motion also should be denied as to Baez's equal protection claim.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be DENIED.
VII. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the Parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See id. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007). .