Opinion
1:20-cv-0009
02-08-2021
ERIC BAEZ, Plaintiff v. JENNIFER MOONEY, LT. BASHOR, BRIAN MARTIN and LAURA GILES, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
ECF NO. 17
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17) Plaintiff s Complaint be granted in part and denied in part.
II. Report
A. Factual Background
The following factual allegations of the Complaint (ECF No. 7) are taken as true for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss. See Victor v. Overmyer, 2020 WL 2220541, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2220128 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2020) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
On May 30, 2019, Plaintiff Eric Baez (Baez), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, was working his Correction Industries (C.I. Shop) job at SCI-Albion. Defendant Jennifer Mooney (Mooney), a supervisor at the C.I. Shop, approached Baez and told him that an inmate named “Robert Bennitt'' has filed a complaint against him under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). This PREA complaint, Baez alleges, was also filed against several other inmates: Elouck, Burkett, Rutledge, and Milano. Mooney apparendy informed these inmates of the charges en masse and in public. Mooney told the inmates that Defendant Lt. Bashor, SCI-Albion's PREA compliance manager, wanted them all placed in restrictive housing, while she (Mooney) investigated the claim, but Mooney intervened and moved the inmates from the back of the shop to the front. That way, she said, they could be monitored on camera.
Mooney then warned Baez and the other inmates not to write or otherwise inquire about the pending PREA complaint. To do so, she cautioned, would prompt Bashor to re-open the investigation and place everyone in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). Mooney divulged to the inmates that she sent the PREA complaint to the “Security Department” for handwriting analysis, which identified Bennitt as the author of the complaint. Baez heard nothing further about Bennitt's PREA complaint for almost a month.
On July 22, 2019, Baez, along with Houck, Burkhart, and Rutledge, sent a DC-135A form (Request Slip) to Bashor, asking for an update on the PREA complaint and investigation. Baez told Bashor that in doing so, he feared retaliation from Mooney as she told him not to pursue the matter. Bashor did not respond to Baez, but she did respond to Houck, indicating that there was no PREA investigation underway against him. Bashor sent the Request Slips to Mooney.
On August 1, 2019, Mooney called Baez into her office and asked him why Bashor sent several request slips to her inquiring about a PREA investigation. Baez alleges:
Mooney reminded [me] that she told [Baez] and others not to write to anyone and inquiry about it, and now she has to file an incident report in order to protect herself. Mooney then tells [Baez] that the actual reason he was moved from the back to the front [of the shop] is because she allegedly received a Request Slip from another inmate saying that the plaintiff was stealing and that she lied about the PREA complaint and investigation.ECF No. 26, pp. 2-3. When Baez reported for work on August 6, 2019, he was sent back to his housing unit. He was told he could return the next day and that Defendant Brian Martin (Martin), a C.I. Shop Supervisor, would “deal with the situation.” Id., p. 3. Baez returned to his job the next day and was met by Martin, who told him that he was suspended from his job until further notice. None of the other inmates implicated in the fake PREA complaint were suspended from their work assignments.
On October 1, 2019, a meeting took place among Baez, Martin, Defendant Laura Giles (Giles), who worked in “Inmate Employment, ” and a counselor to discuss “staffing.” Martin told Baez that the reason for the meeting was that Baez disrupted the workplace. Baez responded that Martin was referring to Baez's submission of a Request Slip asking about the PREA claim against him. On October 2, 2019, Baez received notification that he was removed from his work assignment with Corrections Industries.
B. Standard of Decision
1. Motions to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewics, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ref. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 48 U.S. at 286). See also McTeman v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
2. Pro Se Filings
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); Dmted States ex rel. Montgomery v, Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”). Thus, the Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate. But “any pleading must still contain sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed.Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
III. Discussion and Analysis
Construed liberally, Baez's Complaint asserts the following claims against the Defendants: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim based upon Baez's removal from, his C.I. Shop job following his submission of a DC-135A Request Slip; (2) an Eight Amendment claim based on Bashor and Mooney's disclosure of the identity of the inmate who submitted the PREA Complaint against him and other inmates, thereby creating the potential for conflict among the inmates; and (3) a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against all Defendants based on Baez being the only inmate removed from his employment after requesting information concerning the status of the PREA investigation. ECF No. 26, pp. 5-11.
In support of there motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that Baez has not alleged facts to support any of his claims as required by the pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal In addition, and more specifically, the Defendants argue that (1) the Complaint does not allege facts to demonstrate the personal involvement of any Defendants in his vaguely stated claims; (2) the submission of a request for information slip regarding the alleged PREA complaint is not protected conduct necessary to support Baez's First Amendment retaliation claim; (3) Baez's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim legally fails because Baez has no property right to or liberty interest in a prison job; and (4) the Defendants' alleged failure to provide information to Baez during the PREA investigation does not support a constitutional violation. ECF No. 18, pp. 3-7. Each of Baez's claims will be addressed in turn, beginning with Baez's First Amendment retaliation claim.
A. The First Amendment retaliation claim should survive Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Baez asserts that the Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by removing him from his prison work assignment in retaliation for his filing of a DC-135A Request Slip. ECF No. 26, pp. 5-6. The Defendants argue that this claim fails as a matter of law. They reason that Baez's inquiry into the PREA investigation concerning which he was not the complainant was not constitutionally protected because it was “of a personal nature and did not speak on a matter of public concern.” ECF No. 18, p. 6. Defendants also assert that Baez was removed from his prison work assignment for disrupting the workplace, so he would have lost his employment “even if Plaintiff had not inquired about the ongoing PREA investigation.” Id.
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, “an inmate must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) that an adverse action was taken against him by a prison official; and (3) that there is a causal connection between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 786 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.2003)). The inmate may show retaliatory motive by either “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016). If retaliation is established, the burden then shifts to the defendant prison officials to “establish that 'they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.'” Id. (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Baez has pleaded facts sufficient to state a retaliation claim. First, the filing of a request slip is a protected activity. See Alex v. Wetgel, 2015 WL 433667, *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2015) (filing of inmate request slip is a protected activity for purposes of a First Amendment claim); see also Rosa-Diag v. Overmyer, 2018 WL 3850732, *6 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 2018); Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Deft of Corr., 2016 WL 7029385, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7031778 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016). Although Baez was not the PREA complainant, he had a legitimate interest in the status of the investigation because he was allegedly one of its subjects. And the loss of a prison industries job is an adverse action sufficient to support this claim. See, e.g., Ali v. Carney, 2020 WL 7335466, *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2020) (allegation that Plaintiff lost his prison job due to his protected activity is sufficient to allege a plausible retaliation claim).
The Defendants' argument that the filing of the Request Slip is not a protected activity because it does not involve a matter of public concern misses the mark. For certain, when a prisoner speaks on a matter of public concerns, such as prison conditions or corruption, that speech is protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Simon v. Mullgrav, 2018 WL 4562767, *4 (V-L Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2018); Turzanski v, Cty. of Burlington, 2018 WL 5874073, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2018) (letters to the press regarding prison conditions); Brown v. Depl of Corr., 2019 WL 8683036, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2193466 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2020) (prison corruption). But it is also “well settled” that the filing of grievances and request slips is also a protected activity under the First Amended and the Defendants have pointed to no authority to the contrary. Mearin v. Vidonish, 450 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2011).
Baez has also sufficiently pleaded the third requirement of the retaliation claim: the protected conduct was a motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Here, Baez pleads that he lost his position less than a month after the filing of his inquiry into the PREA allegation against him. This adverse action is sufficiently proximate to the submission of the Request Slip to support causation. While the Complaint is somewhat vague concerning the precise role of each Defendant in the removal of Baez from his prison job, it does allege that all Defendants participated in the meeting that occurred on the day before Baez's removal and that the submission of his Request Slip was discussed during that meeting. These allegations are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to support the personal involvement of each Defendant. Further, although the Defendants argue that Baez was removed from his job for legitimate penological reasons, the Court cannot make such a finding based upon the Complaint alone. Once the record is more complete, Defendants are free to reassert this position by way of a motion for summary judgment. As the record stands now, Baez's retaliation claim should survive to the next stage of the litigation.
B. The Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
Baez claims that Bashor and Mooney mishandled the PREA Complaint by informing other inmates of the name of the complainant, essentially labeling that person a “snitch” and “caus[ing] tension and a potentially violent situation amongst all inmates involved, including Plaintiff.” ECF No. 26, pp. 8-9. The Defendants' attack upon the legal sufficiency of this claim focuses on the absence of facts to show an actual Eighth Amendment violation or the personal involvement of any of the Defendants in such a violation. ECF No. 18, pp. 4-5). The Defendants are correct that the allegations of the Complaint fall far short of supporting an Eighth Amendment violation. Most fundamentally, Baez has not suffered any inhumane conditions of confinement or other constitutional injury to support his claim. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation, “prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities'”). To the extent his claim is based on the Defendants' labeling of “Inmate Bennitt” a “snitch, ” Baez lacks standing to bring it. Compare, Hailey v. Beard, 2020 WL 406654, *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2020). While it is plausible that the Defendants' alleged labeling of Bennitt a prison “snitch” could have subjected Bennitt to potential harm, see, Doe v. United States, 2020 WL 307805 *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2020) (citing Miller v. Feathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1088 n.l (4th Cir. 1990), Baez does not allege that he was so labeled or exposed to the risks associated with that label. To the extent Baez is claiming that the labeling of Bennitt as a “snitch” caused tension or potential conflict among a group of inmates, he likewise has failed to allege a constitutional injury. See North v. White, 152 Fed.Appx. Ill. 113 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “absent any personal deprivation or harm to him, [plaintiff s] general allegations of tension, stress, and fear of increased hostility and injury [as a result of triple celling of inmates] failed to constitute the kind of serious deprivation of basic human needs required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation”); DiPietro v. Meinert, 2019 WL 338996, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom. DiPietro v. Dep't of Corr., 2019 WL 3798069 (3d Cir. June 26, 2019) (citing Robinson v. Danberg, 673 Fed.Appx. 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2016) (plaintiff failed to show he suffered “bodily harm” or “liv[ed] in constant fear of retaliation from other inmates” from being labeled a snitch)). Thus, Baez's Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
In Hailey, a corrections officer told other inmates that the Plaintiff was a “snitch.” 2020 WL 460654, *3. See also Doe v. United States, 2020 WL 307805, at *4 (M-D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2020) (Plaintiff, not other inmates sued when Unit Manager at USP Lewisburg told other inmates that Plaintiff is a “rat” and a rapist).
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim should survive Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Baez also alleges that the Defendants violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when, despite being similarly situated to other inmates who filed DC-135A Request Slips, he was the only inmate removed from his work assignment or otherwise punished for this conduct. ECF No. 26, pp. 9-10. Defendants respond by stating that Baez has no constitutionally protected interest in a prison job and therefore cannot state an equal protection claim. ECF No. 18, p. 6. They also contend that Baez lost his position because he disrupted the workplace. Id.
A plaintiff may bring an equal protection claim under two legal theories: (1) by alleging a defendant treated him differently from other similarly situated individuals because of his membership in an identifiable or protected class, such as race, religion, sex, or national origin, Mack v. Warden Loretto PCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305, n.112 (3d Cir. 2016); or (2) in a “class of one”, by alleging a defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated for arbitrary or irrational reasons, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 243. Baez appears to be attempting to allege a “class of one” equal protection claim as the Complaint does not allege his membership in a protected class.
To plead a “class of one” violation under the Equal Protection Clause, Baez must “at a minimum allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by the defendant and that there was no rational basis for such treatment.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243. The Defendants are incorrect that Baez must also demonstrate a property interest in his prison position to state an equal protection claim. While a property or liberty interest is necessary to support a procedural due process claim, it is not required for an equal protection claim. See Watson v. Wingard, 2018 WL 2108316, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2107773 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2018), affd, 782 Fed.Appx. 214 (3d Cir. 2019).
Although its factual allegations are somewhat thin, the Complaint states a “class of one” equal protection claim. Baez asserts that he alone lost his prison job among the other inmates who requested information concerning the ongoing fictitious PREA investigation. He further pleads that Mooney acted intentionally when she “called me into her office, ” singled him out for an incident report because he inquired about the bogus PREA report and investigation, and indicated that because of his actions alone, she needed to “protect herself.” ECF No. 7, pp. 3-4. Finally, Baez contends that there was no rational basis the treatment he received. In essence, he alleges that inquiring about a PREA complaint is not rationally related to the loss of his prison job. These allegations, at this early stage of litigation, are enough to overcome the Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Again, the Complaint is somewhat vague concerning each Defendant's role in the removal of Baez from his prison job, but its factual allegations are sufficient to show the personal involvement of each and thereby survive dismissal. Further, the Defendants' argument that Baez was removed from his job for legitimate penological reasons relating to his disruption of the workplace will also have to await a more complete record. Therefore, the Court should conclude that Baez has stated a “class of one” equal protection claim and deny the Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Baez' Eighth Amendment claim but denied as to his First Amendment retaliation claim and his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
V. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).