Opinion
No. 5-400 / 04-1539
Filed July 27, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M. Alpers, Judge.
IMT Insurance Company appeals from the trial court's evidentiary ruling excluding evidence of Nina Baetke's medical history in Baetke's action to recover underinsured motorist benefits. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
Rene LaPierre of Klass Law Firm, Sioux City, for appellant.
Daniel Bernstein and William Bribriesco of William J. Bribriesco and Associates, Bettendorf, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On February 10, 2000, Nina Baetke was involved in a two-car accident in or near Davenport. As a result, Baetke was taken to a local hospital where she was treated and released. Baetke received additional treatments for shoulder and hand injuries for several months following the accident.
Baetke claimed Sally Roberts, the driver of the other car, was at fault and Baetke eventually settled with Roberts's liability carrier for the liability limits of Roberts's automobile insurance policy. Baetke then filed this action against her insurance carrier, IMT Insurance Company, to recover underinsured motorist benefits. Baetke's damage claims included past and future medical expenses, past and future loss of bodily function, past and future pain and suffering, and loss of future earning capacity based on her right shoulder and hand pain. Baetke additionally claimed the injuries she sustained in the accident were a source of aggravation of her preexisting depression. Dale Baetke, Nina's husband, also sued for loss of consortium damages.
Prior to trial the Baetkes moved in limine, requesting the court to exclude evidence concerning Nina's pre and post accident medical history. The court granted the Baetkes' motion in part, ordering the exclusion of evidence concerning Nina's history of depression, three post accident hernia operations, and sleep apnea. The trial court reasoned that this evidence was either irrelevant or its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
A jury subsequently returned special verdicts in favor of Nina, awarding her $12,853.58 for past medical expenses, $150 in future medical expenses, $29,000 in loss of future earning capacity, $30,000 in past loss of function of the body, $80,000 for future loss of bodily function, $30,000 for past pain and suffering, and $15,000 for future pain and suffering. The jury declined to award Baetke's husband any damages for loss of consortium.
On appeal IMT challenges the trial court's ruling excluding portions of Nina's pre and post accident medical history.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision concerning the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Sunrise Developing Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 511 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). An abuse of discretion will be found when "the court exercised [its] discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." Waits v. United Fire Cas. Co., 572 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Iowa 1997) (quoting State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997)). "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Shawhan v. Polk County, 420 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa 1988) (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.103).
III. Exclusion of Evidence
The record indicates IMT wanted to introduce Nina's pre and post accident history of back pain, left shoulder pain, and neck pain, along with pre accident history of injuries suffered in a 1992 car accident and the results of her post-operative hysterectomy treatment. IMT argues this evidence was admissible because "the jury did not have a complete and full picture of [Nina's] medical history pre and/or post accident in order to give just consideration and weight to all the evidence in light of the claims made."
Baetke argues IMT's proffered evidence was irrelevant to her damage claims resulting from the injuries to her right shoulder, right hand, and aggravation of her depression. She also argues that even if the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.
A trial court has wide discretion in determining the relevancy of proffered evidence. Spahr v. Kriegel, 617 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact in controversy more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. Even relevant evidence is not admissible "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. "Unfair prejudice arises when the evidence prompts the jury to make a decision on an improper basis, often an emotional one." Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Iowa 2004).
As noted earlier, Nina sought past and future damages for loss of bodily function and for pain and suffering. One factor the jury considers in determining damages for pain and suffering is loss of enjoyment of life. See Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985). "Evidence concerning other medical conditions that have and will impact [Nina's] physical and mental well-being and [her] ability to enjoy life are clearly relevant to [her] damage claims." See Pexa, 686 N.W.2d at 158 (affirming trial court's decision to include plaintiff's pre and post accident history of cancer and treatment in his underinsured motorist claim against his insurer). For the same reasons cited by the court in Pexa, we are unable to find any unfair prejudice from the jury's consideration of Baetke's complete medical history. "The adverse effect of relevant evidence due to its probative value is not unfair prejudice." Id. at 158-59.
We believe IMT's substantial rights have been adversely affected by the trial court's evidentiary ruling excluding Nina's complete medical history. As a result, the jury was given an incomplete view of the factors that may have affected Nina's enjoyment of life. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed, and we remand for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.