Opinion
Civil No. 03-3460 (PAM/JSM).
August 26, 2004
ORDER
The above matter came on before the undersigned upon plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Subpoena [Docket No. 7] and plaintiffs' informal motion for financial Information, submitted by the parties via letter and phone conference with the Court on March 24, 2004. At the hearing on the Motion to Enforce Subpoena, Leslie Lienemann, Esq. and Lisa Stratton, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiffs; Steven Weintraut, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendant; and David Mitchell, Esq. appeared on behalf of third party Taylor Martin. Lisa Stratton, Esq. and Steven Weintraut, Esq. appeared on behalf of their respective clients at the phone conference on March 24, 2004.
The Court, upon all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, now makes and enters the following Order.
On January 9, 2004, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with the Honorable Judge Magnuson. Related to the motion for summary judgment, defendant also brought a motion requesting a stay of discovery before Judge Magnuson. On February 6, 2004, this Court ordered that the decision on plaintiffs' motion to enforce the subpoena was stayed pending the outcome of the motions for summary judgment and to stay discovery. On February 23, 2004, Judge Magnuson denied defendant's motion to stay discovery, rendering the motion to compel ripe for decision.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena [Docket No. 7] is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
a. As to Request Nos. 2-10, the motion is granted.
b. As to Request No. 11, the motion is denied.
c. All information produced by Taylor Martin under this Order shall be governed by a protective order, as enunciated in the accompanying memorandum.
2. Plaintiff's informal motion for financial information is granted in part and denied in part.
3. Defendant and Taylor Martin shall comply with this Order within 10 days of the date of this Order.
4. For the purpose of this Order, the deadlines imposed for service of documents in this Order shall mean that the party shall have received the submission by this date.
MEMORANDUM FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs brought the instant lawsuit alleging that defendant had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA") arising from questions in its employment applications. The facts underlying the Complaint as alleged by plaintiffs are as follows: in March 2002, plaintiffs applied for a driver position with defendant. When plaintiffs applied, defendant gave plaintiffs, and other applicants, an employment application containing illegal questions regarding disabilities, age, work injuries and workers' compensation claims, and a release of medical records. Defendant refused to hire both plaintiffs. According to plaintiffs, it is defendant's practice to use the same or similar application to hire truck drivers as the one that was given to plaintiffs.After filing the Complaint, defendant decided to sell its long-haul trucking aspect of its business and focus on its gas station business. In this regard, defendant planned to auction equipment used in its long-haul trucking business in August 2003. Defendant reached an agreement with third party Taylor Martin, a nationwide over-the-road truck and trailer auctioneering and remarketing company, to conduct the auction.
In August 2003, plaintiffs' counsel obtained an auction catalogue for Taylor Martin's auction of defendant's assets from the internet. This catalogue listed defendant's assets for public auction to occur August 14, 2003. Taylor Martin conducted the auction of these assets at defendant's office in Elko, Minnesota. After learning that this auction was going to take place, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to defendant's counsel seeking assurances that defendant did not intend to liquidate its assets. Defendant's counsel did not respond to plaintiffs' counsel with such an assurance.
On August 14, 2003, the day of the auction, plaintiffs served a subpoena on Taylor Martin for production of the records related to the auction of defendant's assets, including the amount of money collected from the sale and identification of the buyers. Specifically, the subpoena requested the production of the following documents:
1. Detailed description of all property available for auction, including all property described in Attachment B;
2. The expected sale price of all property;
3. The actual sale price of property sold;
4. All sales receipts;
5. All contracts between GT Trucking Co. and any buyer;
6. All contracts between Taylor Martin, Inc. and any buyer from the August 14, 2003 sale;
7. All details of absentee bidding;
8. Identification of all buyers and property purchased;
9. Identification of all bidders at said auction;
10. All contracts between GT Trucking Co. and Taylor Martin, Inc.; and
11. Any other documentation related to said auction.
Declaration of Leslie Lienemann ("Lienemann Decl.") Exh. 2, Attachment A.
Taylor Martin objected to the subpoena on grounds that it required the production of confidential information relating to its clients that it has developed over the last forty years. Based on this objection, Taylor Martin did not comply with plaintiffs' subpoena.
Subsequently, plaintiffs brought the instant motion to enforce the subpoena directed to Taylor Martin. In support of the motion to enforce the subpoena, plaintiffs argued that the documents sought are discoverable because they are relevant to defendant's assets. In this regard, plaintiffs argued that, given defendant's recent sale of its trucking assets, the nature and amount of defendant's assets and its ability to satisfy a judgment in this case are relevant to plaintiffs' ability to pursue an attachment order to preserve defendant's assets. Plaintiffs represented to the Court that, despite counsel's repeated attempts to secure an assurance from defendant that it was not liquidating its business, no such assurance has been given.
When the motion to enforce the subpoena was brought, the only plaintiff in this case was Lawrence Baer. On April 1, 2004, an Amended Complaint was filed and Craig Kraft was added as a named plaintiff to this suit. While Kraft was not yet a plaintiff at the time this motion was submitted to the Court, as he is now, the Court will refer to both plaintiffs in its Order.
In addition, plaintiffs argued that this information was also relevant to their class action lawsuit. In this regard, plaintiffs argued that, when courts determine whether to accept a proposed class action settlement, they weigh the benefits of the settlement against the likely rewards of continued litigation, considering factors such as the defendant's financial condition and ability to pay a larger judgment. In support of this position, plaintiffs cited Grunin v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1975).
Further, plaintiffs argued that the documents sought by the subpoena are not confidential or proprietary. In this regard, plaintiffs argued that the subpoena only requested documents regarding the auction conducted of defendant's assets on August 14, 2003, a public auction that was advertised to the public via the internet. Plaintiffs contended that, given the public nature of the auction, documents responsive to the subpoena cannot now be labeled confidential. Moreover, plaintiffs asserted that the requests are not so broad to warrant the objections based on burdensomeness because the subpoena seeks documents related to the auction of defendant's assets on August 14, 2003 and, as such, is narrowly tailored so as to encompass only documents relevant to this lawsuit.
In opposition to the motion to enforce the subpoena, defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that the documents sought by the subpoena are not relevant to plaintiffs' claims. In this regard, defendant and Taylor Martin argued that discovery inquiries into a party's financial status are generally not permitted. Specifically, defendant and Taylor Martin argued that plaintiffs' inquiries into defendant's ability to pay a judgment only become relevant if, and when, a judgment has been entered against defendant.
In addition, defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that the subpoena requests seek documents that are confidential, proprietary, and contain trade secrets and other confidential commercial information, which are only discoverable if the party demonstrates a substantial need for the information that cannot be met any other way without undue hardship. Defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that plaintiffs have not met this burden. In this regard, defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that Request Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 require production of trade secrets and confidential commercial information: Request No. 2, 7, and 10 relate to Taylor Martin's methods and techniques and Request Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 involve confidential information about Taylor Martin's customers, such as their identity, the items they bid on, the items they purchased, and the terms of such purchases. Defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that this information has economic value to Taylor Martin because it enables the firm to "anticipate the needs of its customers and relay information on upcoming auctions to those customers most likely to be interested in the items for sale at those auctions" and was acquired after "many years of hard work." Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena ("Opp. Memo."), p. 9. Moreover, Taylor Martin asserted that it would be damaged by the disclosure of this confidential information because its industry is highly specialized and competitive and its relationship with its clients would be damaged if it were discovered that Taylor Martin had disclosed information about its clients.
Finally, defendant and Taylor Martin argued that complying with the subpoena would impose an undue hardship on, and significant expense and inconvenience to, Taylor Martin. Defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that Taylor Martin is not a party to this lawsuit and, as such, its burden should be given special weight.
At the hearing on the instant motion, the parties resolved some of the disputes related to plaintiffs' subpoena requests. Specifically, Request No. 1 — relating to the catalogue of items available at the auction — was resolved when Taylor Martin agreed to produce the auction catalogue in response to this request. Request No. 3 — relating to the price of items sold at the auction — was also partially resolved by defendant's agreement to produce the total price of all property sold at the auction, but not the price of individual items sold.
In addition, plaintiffs agreed to narrow the scope of the following requests: Request No. 6 — plaintiffs agreed to limit this request to the items owned by defendant and sold on its behalf by Taylor Martin; Request No. 9 — plaintiffs agreed to limit this request to the bidders who bid on items auctioned on behalf of defendant; and Request No. 10 — plaintiffs agreed to limit this request to the auction conducted by Taylor Martin of items owned by defendant.
After the hearing, both parties submitted supplemental letters to the Court. According to plaintiffs, in addition to its previous arguments to the Court, defendant's financial information is relevant and discoverable where punitive damages are sought.
On the other hand, according to defendant, when punitive damages are sought by a plaintiff, general financial information is discoverable, but only after the issue of punitive damages has been resolved by the trier of fact. Moreover, defendant asserted that, even in the context of punitive damages, only general financial information relating to net worth is discoverable, not details of specific financial transactions because such information is not relevant to the issue of punitive damages. In this letter, defendant conceded that a majority of federal courts permit discovery of the defendant's financial status where the plaintiffs have sought punitive damages, but also asserted that plaintiffs have sought punitive damages under Minnesota law and, since under Minnesota law a separate proceeding is held on punitive damages after the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, there is a conflict between federal and state law in this case and, as such, federal cases would not apply.
In this regard, defendant asserted that none of the cases cited by plaintiffs address the same type of financial information sought by plaintiffs or the scope of such information — that is, plaintiffs may be entitled to general financial information, such as tax returns, but not the detailed information about specific transactions that plaintiffs seeks from Taylor Martin.
Defendant also argued that, assuming that the Court concludes that the financial information is discoverable, the Court should follow the Gillis court in balancing the interests of the parties in that, if defendant's net worth becomes relevant in this case, plaintiffs may obtain such information at that time. See Wilson v. Gillis Advertising Co., 145 F.R.D. 578 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
Subsequently, on March 23, 2004, plaintiffs and defendant submitted an informal discovery request to the Court via letters and telephone regarding plaintiffs' discovery of defendant's financial information prior to trial. At issue was plaintiffs' request for documents relating to defendant's finances and right to pursue deposition questions of defendant's principals regarding defendant's finances from 1998 to the present. In support of plaintiffs' requests, they argued that they have the right to discovery of such information in light of defendant's recent liquidation of a substantial portion of its assets, in connection with its decision to cease its trucking operations. In addition, plaintiffs asserted that such information is also relevant to the inquiry into defendant's ability to satisfy a judgment in this case, and to plaintiffs' request for punitive damages.
During the informal telephone conference on this issue, plaintiffs agreed to narrow their request to this time frame.
In opposition to the request, defendant asserted that such financial information is not relevant to plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit and was only being sought to embarrass and harass defendant.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce SubpoenaFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that "parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). "Generally, discovery may inquire into all information, not otherwise privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the action, provided that it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Minnesota Specialty Crops, Inc. v. Minnesota Wild, 210 F.R.D. 673, 675 (D. Minn. 2002) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)); see also Burns v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23662, *2 (D. Minn. 2002).
At issue in this case are plaintiffs' Request Nos. 2-11. With the above principles in mind, the Court will analyze these contested requests.
As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects Taylor Martin's general objection to the subpoena based on the undue burden of compliance. In this regard, defendant and Taylor Martin argued that plaintiffs' subpoena should not be enforced because of the substantial burden and high cost to Taylor Martin of complying with the subpoena since Taylor Martin is not a party to this lawsuit. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts may quash or modify a subpoena if it "subjects a person to undue burden." FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3). However, other than stating that the subpoena would be a substantial burden and costly to Taylor Martin, it did not give the Court any factual support for this claim. Broad allegations of burdensomeness, without more, will not suffice. See Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 610 (D. Neb. 2001) (holding that "an objection that discovery is overly broad and unduly burdensome must be supported by affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden and why the discovery is objectionable. It is not sufficient to simply state that the discovery is overly broad and burdensome, nor is a claim that answering the discovery will require the objecting party to expend considerable time and effort analyzing `huge volumes of documents and information' a sufficient factual basis for sustaining the objection) (citing Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296-97 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). Given the subpoena is narrowly tied to one auction, for one client, the Court concludes that the cost of compliance is not significant.
A. Request No. 2
Request No. 2 asked for "[t]he expected sale price of all property."
Plaintiffs argued that this request was relevant to determine if defendant conducted "phony transfers" to lower the value of its assets for a judgment in this case.
Defendant and Taylor Martin objected to this request based on confidentiality. In this regard, they stated that such information is generated internally by appraisers and is not known to the public. In addition, they argued against plaintiffs' assertion that, if there were bidders related to defendant at the auction such that the transfers were "phony," such related bidders would, in fact, drive the sale price up, not down.
The Court finds that this argument is not persuasive. The Court concludes that, if the transfers at the auction were indeed "phony," it is equally probable that related bidders would either attempt to inflate the price, to benefit defendant in receiving more money for its assets, or attempt to purchase items for a lower price under an agreement with defendant that would render the transfer be a "sham."
The Court concludes that the information sought by this request is relevant to plaintiffs' inquiry into whether defendant has transferred its assets so as to avoid any potential liability in this case and, as such, is discoverable now. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ian Schrager Hotels, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21501, *13-14 (D.C. Cal. 2000) (holding that, in permitting the plaintiff to seek financial information of the defendant and its parent or affiliated companies, "[c]learly, plaintiff may obtain defendants' financial information, to the present, to determine whether defendants have attempted to transfer, or have transferred, income or assets to others to avoid potential liability if defendants lose the pending litigation. Such information is relevant under Rule 26(b) to plaintiff's claims for damages and punitive damages") (citing Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 286 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 376, 386 n. 9 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Bessier v. Precise Tool Eng'g Co., Inc., 778 F.Supp. 1509, 1514 (W.D. Mo. 1991)). Here, in light of the recent auction of defendant's assets, this information is relevant plaintiff's inquiry into defendant's transfer of assets, to determine if defendant is attempting to avoid paying a judgment in this case.
Since the Court has found that such information is discoverable based on plaintiffs' inquiry into the legitimacy of defendant's transfer of assets, the Court need not address the parties remaining arguments regarding discovery of such information based on plaintiffs' punitive damages claim or the class action nature of this lawsuit. However, the Court does observe that the information is also relevant to the evaluation of defendant's financial condition, among other factors, in assessing proposed settlement agreements of class action lawsuits. Grunin, 513 F.2d at 124. However, while the Court agrees that a defendant's financial condition is relevant to punitive damages and, as such, is discoverable while pre-trial discovery is pending, the appropriate party from whom this information should be garnered is defendant, not a third-party who performed transactions for that defendant.
Defendant did not address this argument in its submissions to the Court.
In addition, the Court finds that the confidentiality concerns articulated by Taylor Martin can be adequately addressed by a protective order, which the Court has addressed later in this Order. See, c.f., Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan of Minnesota, 517 F.Supp. 574 (D. Minn. 1981) (discussing pre-trial discovery of financial information of non-parties and concluding that "[t]he better approach is to permit discovery prior to trial under appropriate protective orders").
As such, Taylor Martin shall produce all documents reflecting the expected sale price of each item sold on behalf of defendant within ten days of the date of this Order.
B. Request No. 3
Request No. 3 requested "[t]he actual sale price of property sold." As discussed above, this request was partially resolved by defendant's agreement to produce the total price of all property sold at the auction, but not the price of individual items sold.
Plaintiff argued that, as this request relates to the sale price of individual items sold at the auction, it is relevant to determine if defendant conducted "phony transfers" to lower the value of its assets. Defendant and Taylor Martin objected to this aspect of the request based on confidentiality.
The Court finds that, for the reasons discussed above, this information is relevant to plaintiffs' inquiry into defendant's transfer of its assets and, as such, is discoverable at this stage of the litigation.
As such, Taylor Martin shall produce all documents reflecting the actual sale price of each item sold on behalf of defendant within ten days of the date of this Order.
These requests are as follows: (1) Request No. 4 sought "[a]ll sales receipts" from the auction; (2) Request No. 5 asked for "[a]ll contracts between GT Trucking Co. and any buyer;" (3) Request No. 6 sought "[a]ll contracts between Taylor Martin, Inc. and any buyer from the August 14, 2003 sale" (at the hearing on this motion, plaintiffs agreed to narrow this request to items owned and sold for defendant); (4) Request No. 7 requested "[a]ll details of absentee bidding;" (5) Request No. 8 asked for the "[i]dentification of all buyers and property purchased;" and (6) Request No. 9 requested the "[i]dentification of all bidders at said auction" (at the hearing, plaintiffs narrowed this request to all bidders who bid on defendant's items).
In these requests, plaintiffs have requested documents reflecting the following information from Taylor Martin regarding the auction held of defendant's assets: the sales receipts; the contracts between defendant and the buyers and Taylor Martin and the buyers of defendant's property; the identification of both the buyers and the items purchased; the details of absentee bidding; and the identity of all the bidders who bid on defendant's assets at the auction.
In support of these requests, plaintiffs asserted that such information was discoverable during this litigation to determine if defendant was improperly attempting to transfer its assets to avoid paying a judgment in this case. In this regard, plaintiffs asserted that these requests were relevant to determine if fair prices were paid for defendant's assets, when defendant decided to sell its assets, and if defendant conducted "phony transfers" to lower the value of its assets for a judgment in this case, and were necessary to provide plaintiffs with admissible evidence if defendant's assets became an issue at trial. In addition, plaintiffs asserted that defendant's financial information is discoverable at this stage of the litigation because such information is relevant and discoverable where punitive damages are sought and where the Court must evaluate defendant's condition in approving any proposed class settlement.
Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the request for the contracts was relevant to whether defendant had "buy-back" provisions in any of the auction contracts, which would suggest that the transfers were not legitimate.
In opposition to these requests, defendant argued that plaintiffs are not entitled to information bearing on its ability to pay a judgment, or any alleged attempts to transfer assets to avoid paying a judgment, until after a verdict has been reached against defendant. In support of this position, defendant argued that, even in the context of punitive damages, only general financial information relating to net worth is discoverable, not details of specific financial transactions because such information is not relevant to the issue of punitive damages. In addition, defendant and Taylor Martin argued that, although a majority of federal courts permit discovery of the defendant's financial status where a plaintiff has sought punitive damages, in this case plaintiffs have sought punitive damages under Minnesota law and, under Minnesota law, a separate proceeding is held on punitive damages after the trier of fact has determined that punitive damages should be awarded and, as such, these federal cases would not apply.
Defendant and Taylor Martin also objected to these requests based on confidentiality. In this regard, they stated that such information is confidential commercial information generated internally by appraisers and is not known to the public and disclosure of such information would harm Taylor Martin and jeopardize its market share in the auction business. In support of this objection, Taylor Martin stated that this industry is very competitive and clients are extremely concerned about confidentiality because of the inferences drawn from auctioning assets. In addition, defendant and Taylor Martin argued that entities unrelated to defendant and defendant's auction items should be protected from disclosure in this case and that, since defendant had not consented to the release of its contract with Taylor Martin, Taylor Martin was not permitted to disclose it.
The Court concludes that, for the reasons discussed above, that all of the information sought by plaintiffs in response to Request Nos. 4-6, and 9-10 (as modified by plaintiffs), are relevant to plaintiffs' inquiry into defendant's transfer of its assets and, as such, is discoverable at this stage of the litigation. However, the Court finds that Request No. 7, as written, goes beyond what is relevant to such an inquiry in seeking information about all absentee bidders and, as such, the Court shall limit this request to any absentee bidders who bid on defendant's property at the auction.
As such, Taylor Martin shall produce documents responsive to Request Nos. 4-10, as modified by plaintiffs and this Court, within ten days of this Order.
D. Request No. 11
Request No. 11 requested "[a]ny other documentation related to said auction." At the hearing, plaintiffs narrowed this request to documentation relating to property owned by defendant at the auction.
Plaintiff argued that this request was a "catch-all" to cover all documents related to the auction. In this regard, plaintiffs stated that this request was designed to include information related to the auction but that counsel had "not thought of" or was not encompassed by the other requests because counsel used the "wrong words."
In opposition to this request, defendant and Taylor Martin asserted that it is overly broad and that, since each auction generates a large amount of paperwork, Taylor Martin would be unduly burdened in responding to this request.
The Court concludes that this request is overly broad, and that plaintiffs have not provided this Court with any basis to conclude that it will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence at trial. Not every document bearing on the sale of defendant's assets is relevant to plaintiffs' claims that defendant transferred assets to avoid payment of a judgment, punitive damages, or settlement of a class action. If plaintiffs cannot articulate what they are looking for, Taylor Martin should not have to figure it out for them.
As such, this Court will not order Taylor Martin to respond to this request.
E. Protective Order
All documents produced by Taylor Martin in connection with plaintiffs' subpoena and in response to this Order, which Taylor Martin deem to be confidential and proprietary, shall be used solely for this litigation and for no other purpose. In addition, these documents shall only be disclosed to the following persons: (1) the Court and its staff; (2) the parties to this litigation; (3) the parties' inside and outside counsel (including counsel's partners, associates, and employees) and outside companies engaged by them, such as independent copying companies, temporary services, computer graphics companies, professional photographers, and/or photographic studios; (4) independent experts, including their staff, retained by the other party and having no permanent employment or permanent consulting relationship with that other party; (5) any person (i) who counsel for a party in good faith believes is likely to be a witness at or who may provide evidence in connection with a deposition, hearing or trial, and (ii) to whom counsel for a party believes in good faith it is necessary that such materials be shown for the purpose of the prosecution and/or defense of this action; (6) any witness while actually testifying at a deposition, hearing or trial, if the disclosing party in good faith deems the disclosure necessary for the purpose of the prosecution and/or defense of this action; and (7) the author or copy recipient of a document.
II. Plaintiff's Informal Motion for Financial Information
In support of plaintiffs' informal discovery motion related to defendant's financial information, plaintiffs indicated that they were seeking documents relating to defendant's finances and to ask questions of defendant's principals regarding defendant's finances. See Letter dated March 23, 2004 to Court from Lisa Stratton. During the phone conversation with counsel on this matter, plaintiffs' counsel indicated that she would narrow the request for information and the inquiry to 1998 to the present. Plaintiffs argued that such information is discoverable during litigation to determine if defendant has transferred, or has attempted to transfer, assets in order to avoid payment of a judgment in this case, and because plaintiffs have pled punitive damages.
Neither plaintiffs, nor defendant, provided the Court with the actual discovery.
In opposition to this informal motion, defendant asserted that its financial information is not discoverable until a verdict has been rendered against defendant, and that plaintiffs are only seeking the information now only to embarrass and harass defendant.
The Court concludes that, for the reasons discussed above, this financial information is relevant to plaintiffs' inquiry into defendant's transfer of its assets and, as such, is discoverable at this stage of the litigation. In addition, it is relevant to plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages under the MHRA and ADA.See, e.g., Mid Continent Cabinetry, Inc. v. George Koch Sons, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 149, 151 (D. Kan. 1990) (string citation omitted). As such, the Court rejects defendant's argument that because Minnesota law is the basis for plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages under the MHRA, which contemplates a separate proceeding to determine punitive damages, because it ignores both plaintiffs' claims under the ADA and plaintiffs' ability to seek attachment of defendant's assets prior to trial.
However, financial information dating back to 1998 is not relevant to either inquiry. As such, defendant shall produce its tax returns and audited financial statements for the period of 2000 to the present, and defendant's principals, Bea and Dan Zwiers, shall answer questions in their depositions regarding the contents of these documents for the period of 2000 to the present.