Opinion
No. 1065 C.D. 2014
02-26-2015
Frederick Badio, Appellant v. Philadelphia Parking Authority
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
Frederick Badio (Badio) appeals pro se an order of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania (trial court) granting the Philadelphia Parking Authority's (Authority) motion for summary judgment, finding that because he failed to timely appeal the trial court's orders authorizing the sale of and extinguishing his right to his 1998 Mercedes Benz (Vehicle), he could not bring an action for money damages caused by the sale of the Vehicle against the Authority. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On September 10, 2012, Badio was stopped by a Philadelphia Police Officer and because he was unable to provide current insurance and registration, his Vehicle was towed and impounded by the Authority pursuant to Section 6309.2 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. 75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2. He was then informed that before he could retrieve his Vehicle, he had to pay $1,621.00 because there was several outstanding "red light tickets attributable to the operation of his Vehicle." He did not attempt to pay the fines or otherwise retrieve the Vehicle.
On October 1, 2012, the Authority filed a Petition for Leave to Sell with the trial court to sell the Vehicle at public auction, which the trial court, by order, approved. On October 18, 2012, Badio's Vehicle was sold at public auction. Following the sale, on October 31, 2012, the trial court issued an order finding that Badio's legal interest in his Vehicle was extinguished. Badio did not appeal any of the aforementioned orders.
Instead, on February 19, 2013, Badio brought a claim in the Philadelphia Municipal Court (Municipal Court) alleging that the Authority improperly sold his Vehicle and requested money damages. The Municipal Court sustained the claim and awarded him $5,078.50 in damages. The Authority then filed an appeal to the trial court as well as a Rule to File a Complaint on Badio. Eventually, Badio filed an amended complaint which merely reiterated that the Authority should be required to pay filing fees before being allowed to proceed in its appeal and that the Municipal Court's order be upheld.
Before filing his amended complaint, Badio filed a notice to dismiss the Authority's appeal because it failed to pay the appropriate filing fees and asked that the Authority be precluded from filing appeals "in the future without paying the appropriate filing fees because of [the Authority] misleading the court about its income and earnings[,]" and requested that the Authority "provide full disclosure of the financial statement for requesting a fee weaver [sic] from the court." See Notice of Filing at 3. In response, the Authority filed preliminary objections to Badio's complaint, arguing that Badio's complaint failed to comport with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Nos. 1019(a) and 1028(a)(4), and, thus, the complaint must be dismissed. The Authority's preliminary objections were marked moot after Badio filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2013. Badio requested in his amended complaint that the Authority pay filing fees before being allowed to proceed in its appeal and that the Municipal Court's order be upheld.
The Authority filed preliminary objections to Badio's amended complaint arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Badio had not contested the trial court's earlier orders authorizing that sale and extinguishing his rights to the Vehicle, that his claims had already been litigated, and that the Authority was immune from suit under Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa. C.S. §§8541-8564. The trial court overruled the Authority's preliminary objections.
The Authority then filed an answer to Badio's complaint, denying his allegations and raising as new matter, among other things, the Authority's governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act, comparative negligence, and the statute of limitations.
The case proceeded to arbitration and a panel of arbitrators entered an order and awarded Badio $6,417.00. The Authority appealed and then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that: (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because Badio failed to contest the court's October 1 and October 31, 2012 orders within 30 days; (2) Badio's claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; and (3) it was immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the Authority's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Subsequently, on June 2, 2014, Badio filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court grant his motion based on his failure to respond to the Authority's motion for summary judgment. On June 9, 2014, the trial court denied Badio's motion for reconsideration.
Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting summary judgment is plenary. Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 860 (Pa. 2004). We will reverse the order only where the trial court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. Id. In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we "must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party." Id. at 860-61 (internal citations omitted).
On appeal, without any citation to authority or evidence to support his claims, Badio contends that trial court abused its discretion by awarding the Authority its motion for summary judgment because granting a summary motion violates his due process rights and that the trial court was biased against him.
Badio simply states that:
There was an abuse of discretion by Judge Padilla overturning 3 judge's [sic] ruling and 3 arbitrators [sic] decisions based on the Parking Authority [sic] summary request. The same issue was already decided in the lower court and there was no new evidence provided by the Appellee in this matter.
Each of those issues were thoroughly addressed by the Honorable Nina Wright Padilla of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, and we adopt the sound reasoning contained in that opinion and affirm the trial court's order granting the Authority's motion for summary judgment.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of February, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania dated May 22, 2014, in this matter is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
See Appellant's Brief at 16. Moreover, Badio contends that the trial court's grant of summary judgment "is a classic demonstration of judge's bias and abused [sic] of discretion, in which a judge realized that a 'Pro se' [sic] party is not represented by an attorney therefore he or she is not subject to the law." Id. at 17.