Opinion
05-22-01008-CR
05-31-2023
BEATRICE BACA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(B)
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 002-87112-2021
Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN, JUSTICE
Beatrice Baca appeals her criminal mischief conviction. A jury found appellant guilty and, by agreement of the parties, the trial court sentenced her to 120 days' confinement, probated for twelve months. In two issues, appellant complains the trial court erred in denying appellant's request that the jury charge include a definition of "clear and convincing evidence" and an instruction that the State's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof constituted a higher burden of proof than the standard of "clear and convincing evidence." We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In November 2021, appellant was charged by information with the offense of criminal mischief. Specifically, the information alleged appellant damaged a vehicle belonging to Chase Walpole by striking the vehicle on the hood with a cell phone and causing pecuniary loss in an amount of $100 or more but less than $700.
At a jury trial in August 2022, following the presentation of evidence, appellant's counsel, noting he realized he was "going to be fighting the uphill battle on this one," requested that a definition of clear and convincing evidence be included in the jury charge and that "the charge tell the jury beyond a reasonable doubt is a higher standard than clear and convincing." The trial court stated that defense counsel could "argue that in closing argument" but denied counsel's request to include a definition of clear and convincing evidence or a reasonable doubt instruction in the charge.
The jury found appellant guilty of criminal mischief. Following the jury's guilty verdict, the trial court asked if "both sides want[ed] to see if they agree as to a proposed punishment." Following a brief conference, the parties agreed on a 120-day sentence, probated for twelve months, a $300 fine plus court costs, and $250 in restitution. This appeal followed.
In two issues, appellant complains the trial court erred in denying appellant's request that the jury charge include a definition of "clear and convincing evidence" and an instruction that the State's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof constituted a higher burden of proof than the standard of "clear and convincing evidence."
In making these arguments, appellant relies on Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), in which the court determined that it "was appropriate for the appellant to explain the contrast among the various standards of proof" during voir dire and inquire "whether a prospective juror understands that proof beyond a reasonable doubt must at least constitute a more onerous standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 587-88. Appellant asks us to apply the rationale in Fuller applicable to questioning during voir dire and conclude this rationale requires an instruction in the jury charge contrasting the clear and convincing standard of proof with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. We decline appellant's invitation to apply Fuller's rationale to the jury charge; instead, we follow the court of criminal appeals' holding in Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), which overruled prior caselaw requiring trial courts to instruct juries on the definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt." We note that, quoting Paulson, the court in Fuller stated "that the better practice is to give no definition of reasonable doubt at all to the jury." Fuller, 363 S.W.3d at 586. In light of these authorities, we conclude the trial court did not err in excluding from the jury charge a definition of "clear and convincing evidence" and an instruction regarding the State's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. See id.; Paulson, 28 S.W.3d at 573. We overrule appellant's first and second issues.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.