Opinion
C/A No. 8:21-cv-00250-JFA-JDA
03-16-2021
John Babb, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center, Chuck Wright, J. Cox, M. Pieklo, John Doe, Jane Doe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
John Babb ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the above-named Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff filed this civil rights action alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. [Id. at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants denied him access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment, denied him due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Id. at 3.]
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested in July 2020 and has been incarcerated since then at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff has not been given bond while awaiting his jury trial. [Id.] At the Detention Center, Plaintiff is forced to live in a cell with three other inmates. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that placing four inmates in a cell together is unlawful. [Id.] However, Plaintiff cannot access any legal information, authority, or law books to challenge the conditions of his confinement. [Id. at 5-6.] Plaintiff has repeatedly requested law books and legal materials, but Detention Center staff has stated the Detention Center does not have any legal books. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends the lack of legal books violates his constitutional right of access to the courts. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that he is required to remain in his cell with three other inmates for most of the day with breaks only to use the shower, phone, and electronic kiosk system. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff contends Defendants' actions in forcing him to be housed in the four-person cell is inhuman and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. [Id.] Plaintiff asserts that he has not been permitted to seek redress for the severe overcrowded conditions at the Detention Center. [Id.] As a result, Plaintiff contends, he has suffered psychological, emotional, and physical suffering. [Id.] Plaintiff contends the conditions of his cell are unsanitary. [Id. at 8.] According to Plaintiff, the toilet in the cell flushes only two times every hour. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has suffered psychological, emotional, and physical injuries due to being subjected to extreme overcrowding. [Id. at 13.] Plaintiff further contends he has been denied access to the Courts because Defendants have not provided him with law books and legal materials. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, a jury trial, injunctive relief ordering Defendants to stop subjecting him to overcrowded conditions, injunctive relief ordering Defendants to provide Plaintiff with legal books, actual damages in the amount of $50,000, and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000 against each named Defendant. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendants are entitled to dismissal
Spartanburg County Detention Center
It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Spartanburg County Detention Center is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a "person" in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds by 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."); Williams v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., 987 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696 (D.S.C. 2013); Morrison v. Greenville Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Likewise, as noted, buildings and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 F. App'x at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building—the detention center—is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a "person" under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, the Spartanburg County Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Defendants Wright , Cox , and Pieklo
Additionally, Defendants Wright, Cox, and Pieklo are subject to summary dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no specific factual allegations against these Defendants to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Weller, 901 F.2d at 397 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations against defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018) (finding summary dismissal proper where "the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant"). "Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed." Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014). Therefore, Defendants Wright, Cox, and Pieklo are entitled to summary dismissal from this action.
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal.
Access to Legal Materials and Courts Claims
Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the First Amendment by denying him access to legal materials and denying him access to the courts. Both claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
Plaintiff's access to legal materials clam is subject to summary dismissal because the lack of access to legal materials by a pretrial detainee does not rise to the level of a deprivation of a constitutional right. "[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously held that local jails, designed for temporary detainment, are generally not required to have a law library. See Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing applicability of Bounds, 430 U.S. 817, to pretrial detainees).
Here, Plaintiff is being temporarily held in a county detention center awaiting trial on criminal charges. The law is clear that those being temporarily detained in county facilities awaiting criminal trials do not have a constitutional right to a law library, and so Plaintiff's claim therefore fails as a matter of law. Jones v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., 586 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (D.S.C. 2008). A careful review of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint shows that his contentions do not raise a plausible federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because there is no constitutional right to a law library in a local, short-term detention facility. Furthermore, Plaintiff has made no allegations of any real injury and/or prejudice that Plaintiff suffered or is likely to suffer as a result of the alleged inadequate access to legal materials while in pretrial detention. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (explaining a plaintiff must allege actual injury resulting from allegedly inadequate jail library in order to state a claim under § 1983). In the absence of an alleged actual injury and prejudice to a constitutional right resulting from Plaintiff's lack of access to legal materials, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants on which this Court may grant relief. See, e.g., Payne v. Lucas, No. 6:11-cv-01767-DCN, 2012 WL 988137, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988133 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012); Crawford v. Nash, No. 4:08-cv-4092-GRA-TER, 2009 WL 580348, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2009).
Likewise, Plaintiff's claim that he is being denied access to the courts also fails. To state a claim for denial of court access, a plaintiff must allege that he has been prejudiced in pursuing non-frivolous litigation concerning his conviction or prison conditions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-53. The right of access to the courts is the "right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to present," and violations of that right occur only when an inmate is "hindered [in] his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. at 343. In order to state a prima facie case of denial of access to the courts, an inmate cannot rely on conclusory allegations; he must identify with specificity an actual injury resulting from official conduct. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-24 (4th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants caused actual injury, such as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353-54. The actual injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim, but instead requires that the inmate demonstrate that his "non-frivolous" civil rights legal claim has been "frustrated" or "impeded." Id. at 353-55.
Here, Plaintiff simply alleges that he has been denied access to legal materials and access to the court, but fails to allege any specific facts as to how any legal matter has been adversely affected due to his denial of access to the court or to legal materials. Plaintiff has failed to identify in the Complaint in this case any specific instances in which any Defendant has denied him access to the court or legal materials, beyond making bald assertions and conclusory allegations. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have subjected him to overcrowded conditions at the jail by placing him in a cell with three other inmates. According to Plaintiff, Defendants denied him due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
A pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement claim is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Unlike convicted inmates, pretrial detainees have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime and may not be subjected to any form of "punishment." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir.1988). In any event, "[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Id. at 870. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, protection against cruel and unusual punishment includes protection against inhumane conditions of imprisonment. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).
During the time period set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff was a prisoner in a county detention center, not a guest in a hotel, and it should be expected that conditions in such a setting are often less than ideal. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) ("[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 'punishment.'"); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir.1988) ("Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel."). As to Plaintiff's claim regarding four prisoners in one 8x11 cell [Doc. 1 at 4], the Fourth Circuit has noted that confinement in a 7x9 cell of three total prisoners, while unpleasant, did not reach a constitutional magnitude of cruel and unusual punishment. Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1976). Instead, to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the overcrowding combined with other substandard conditions of confinement "have a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise," or that the overcrowding created an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, and that the defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir.1991); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993). Here, Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations regarding overcrowding and has failed to allege facts showing that any conditions of overcrowding have created an unreasonable risk of harm to his health or that Defendants deliberately disregarded that risk.
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to identify a compensable injury. Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered "severe psychological, emotional and physical injury." [Doc. 1 at 13.] However, "[t]here is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, psychological stress, or mental anguish; hence, there is no liability for compensatory or punitive damages under § 1983 regarding such claims." Khan v. Stirling, No. 9:18-cv-3130-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 3976626, at *5 (D.S.C. July 24, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3973708 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2019). Plaintiff's claims for money damages are governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), which expressly prohibits the filing of civil actions by prisoners "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Although the PLRA does not define physical injury, "courts have held that the 'physical injury' referenced by the Act need not be significant, but must be more than de minimis." Wilson v. United States, 332 F.R.D. 505, 520 (S.D.W. Va. 2019) (collecting cases). "A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress cannot rely on 'conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress [or] the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred,' but, rather, 'the testimony must establish that the plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated.'" Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996)). Courts have found that "generalized claims of adverse mental health" are not sufficient to establish a significant mental injury without some further specification. Germain v. Bishop, No. TDC-15-cv-1421, 2018 WL 1453336, at *13 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018); see also Powell v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:08-cv-00199, 2009 WL 3160124, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 25, 2009) ("Plaintiff merely alleges that she has suffered 'mental anguish' as a result of the above conditions of confinement," which is not sufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim); In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (inmates failed to sufficiently specify a mental injury where they said only that "the overall conditions of their confinement [placed] them under 'great stress' and caused them 'great emotional and physical suffering.' "). Here, Plaintiff fails to identify any physical injury he has suffered and fails to allege facts showing that any of his constitutional or statutory rights were violated such that he could recover money damages for an emotional injury.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015); Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge March 16, 2021
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).