We disagree with Special Term's determination that the petitioner was denied his right to due process. The petitioner was accorded every right to which he was entitled in the context of a disciplinary proceeding instituted by a private university (see, Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 70 A.D.2d 934, 935, revd on other grounds 49 N.Y.2d 652; Ayton v. Bean, 80 A.D.2d 839, 840). Moreover, since the determination to suspend the petitioner was rendered in accordance with the university's published regulations (see, Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., supra; Matter of Fain v. Brooklyn Coll., 112 A.D.2d 992), and was based upon the exercise of honest discretion after a full review of the operative facts, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious so as to warrant judicial intervention (see, Matter of Harris v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 62 N.Y.2d 956, revg 98 A.D.2d 58, 67-73, for reasons stated in dissent of Kassal, J., at App.

On July 31, 1980 Special Term granted petitioner her requested relief to the extent that the appellant university was ordered to "conduct a due process hearing at which petitioner can examine her papers, give testimony and cross examine witnesses" and "that no decision to terminate petitioner's status in the nursing program can be made by [appellant university] except by the appropriate committee after a full due process hearing". Appellants appealed to this court, and on March 9, 1981, we reversed the July 31, 1980 judgment and dismissed the proceeding on the merits ( Ayton v. Bean, 80 A.D.2d 839). From our order of reversal, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Prior to submitting the record to the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved, at Special Term, for an order allowing her to file, nunc pro tunc as of May 9, 1980 (the return date of her petition), certain documents evidencing service, including an affidavit of service of her notice of petition and petition upon an individual, allegedly authorized to accept service on behalf of appellants, and an acknowledgement, by the same authorized individual, of service, and that said proof of service be included in the judgment roll. Petitioner, by her attorney, affirmed that she had inadvertently failed to submit to Special Term, at the time said court made its determination of July 31, 1980, the afore-mentioned documents evidencing service. Special Term granted petitioner's motion and this appeal followed. It is well settled that the Supreme Court has the power, after an appeal to the Court of Appeals has been taken and pri

Petitioner received adequate notice of the committee's hearing, as well as a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the hearing. Moreover, petitioner was accorded every right to which he was entitled in the context of a disciplinary proceeding instituted by a private university (see, Tedeschi v Wagner Coll., 70 AD2d 934, 935 [1979], revd on other grounds 49 NY2d 652 [1980]; Ayton v Bean, 80 AD2d 839, 840 [1981]). Moreover, since the determination to expel petitioner was rendered in accordance with the university's published regulations (see, Tedeschi v Wagner Coll., supra.; Matter of Fain v. Brooklyn Coll., 112 AD2d 992 [1985]), and was based upon the exercise of honest discretion after a full review of the operative facts, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious so as to warrant judicial intervention (see, Matter of Harris v Trustees of Columbia Univ., 62 NY2d 956, revg 98 AD2d 58, 67-73, for reasons stated in dissent of Kassal, J., at App Div; Matter of Patti Ann H. v. New York Med. Coll., 88 AD2d 296, 301, affd 58 NY2d 734; Matter of Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 AD2d 632, 634, affd 12 NY2d 802).