Opinion
Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 1974.
Dosh, DeMoulin, Anderson & Campbell, William P. DeMoulin, Denver, for respondents The Lange Company and St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
Carroll, Bradley & Ciancio, Rebecca L. Bradley, Denver, for petitioner.
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Commission of Colorado.
COYTE, Judge.
Petitioner seeks review of an order of the Industrial Commission awarding him compensation for total blindness in his right eye. He contends on appeal that the commission abused its discretion in awarding him the amount of scheduled loss under C.R.S.1963, 81--12--4(1), (hh), instead of rating his disability as a percentage of function of the body as a working unit under C.R.S.1963, 81--12--9. We disagree and affirm.
Petitioner, a welder working for Respondent Lange Company, was injured on July 6, 1970, when a piece of resin or metal lacerated his eye. Lange filed a general admission of liability. In September 1970, petitioner returned to work but his vision was so impaired that he was unable to weld. He received a cornea transplant in February 1972 which did not restore his vision sufficiently for him to resume welding. Thereafter, he founded his own company where he supervised other welders.
In 1973, after his doctor had determined that petitioner's vision had reached maximum improvement, a hearing was held to determine the amount of permanent partial disability suffered by him. His doctor testified that the claimant suffered a 100% Loss of vision in the eye and a 40% Loss of function of the body as a working unit. Evidence was also presented as to petitioner's education, training, and present occupation. The referee found that compensation should be awarded for total blindness in one eye under the scheduled loss provisions of the statute. This finding was adopted by the commission in its final order. Under 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 81--12--4(7), the commission may determine, in its discretion, disability under the schedule which provides compensation for the loss of a body member, or rate the claimant under the percentage of the body as a working unit under C.R.S.1963, 81--12--9. Cosmopolitan Hotel v. Henry, 172 Colo. 279, 472 P.2d 134; Industrial Commission v. Seastone, 167 Colo. 571, 448 P.2d 963.
Here, the record supports the commission's use of the schedule alone in determining the proper method of compensating petitioner, and thus we find no abuse of its discretion. See Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 32 Colo.App. 270, 511 P.2d 921.
Order affirmed.
PIERCE and SMITH, JJ., concur.