Opinion
No. 04-04-00196-CV
Delivered and Filed: March 30, 2005.
Appeal from the 229th Judicial District Court, Jim Hogg County, Texas, Trial Court No. CC-03-85, Honorable Alex W. Gabert, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Carmen Avila appeals from the final decree of divorce signed by the trial court on February 25, 2004. Carmen presents three issues for review: (1) the trial court erred in concluding that a claim for economic contribution is an equitable remedy; (2) the court erred in not finding that the Appellant made an economic contribution of $7,294.98 benefitting the Appellee's estate; and (3) the trial court erred in concluding that it could not calculate her claim for economic contribution under section 3.403(b) of the Texas Family Code. We overrule all three issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Carmen and Ynocencio married on July 18, 1995, and ceased to live together as husband and wife on or about August 1, 2003. Each party brought substantial separate property assets into the marriage. Specifically, Ynocencio owned two pieces of property in Jim Hogg County, a 10.2 acre tract of land known to the parties as "El Ranchito" and another tract known to the parties as "Loma Blanca."
On the "El Ranchito" property, Ynocencio owned a home whose fair market value was approximately $63,000 at the time the parties were married. The home was encumbered by a lien from an existing note. Prior to the parties' marriage, the balance of that note was $29,000.00, and Ynocencio held equity in the home of well over $34,000.00.
Following Ynocencio and Carmen's marriage, in approximately 1996 or 1997, Carmen proposed that they tear down the existing home on the "El Ranchito" land and erect a much larger, dream home. Although initially reluctant to the idea, Ynocencio ultimately contracted to have the old structure demolished and began the construction of the new residence. Ynocencio and Carmen executed a 30-year mortgage loan on the new home for $182,047.00. Following its completion, both parties lived in the home until Carmen moved to San Antonio in August of 2003.
Upon divorce, the trial court found that the new marital home erected on the "El Ranchito" property was Ynocencio's separate property. In addition, the trial court found that the "Loma Blanca" property remained part of Ynocencio's separate estate. In her First Amended Petition to the trial court, Carmen requested that the court grant her claim of economic contribution for monies she expended for the benefit of Ynocencio's separate property. In its final decree of divorce, the trial court denied Carmen's claim for economic contribution due to the absence of information necessary to make a calculation of economic contribution. Carmen appeals from this decision of the trial court.
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
In three issues on appeal, Carmen contends that the trial court erred in failing to award any economic contribution for payments made by her separate estate for the benefit of Ynocencio's separate estate. A marital estate that makes an economic contribution to property owned by another marital estate has a claim for economic contribution with respect to the benefitted estate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Nevertheless, economic contribution does not equal to the amount of money paid by one estate to another estate. See generally DON KOONS, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 10.25 (2002). Instead, by statutory definition, economic contribution reflects a betterment of one marital estate by an advancement made by another marital estate and concerns sharing between estates any enhanced value which the contributing estate helped create. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Specifically, it must reduce the principal amount of a debt secured by the property, refinance such debt to the extent it reduces the principal amount, or make capital improvements to the benefitted estate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(a)(1), (5), (6) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). After an economic contribution has been established, we apply a mathematical formula to determine the allocation of the enhanced value between the contributing and benefitting estates. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); LaFrensen v. LaFrensen, 106 S.W.3d 876, 879 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
The amount of a claim for economic contribution is determined by multiplying the equity in the benefitted property on the date of the divorce by a fraction. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). The fraction's numerator is the amount of economic contribution to the property owned by the benefitted marital estate by the contributing marital estate; its denominator is equal to the sum of that same economic contribution by the contributing marital estate and the contribution by the benefitted estate to the equity in the property owned by the benefitted estate. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Carmen made substantial disbursements from her personal checking and retirement accounts during the parties' marriage. Carmen failed, however, to meet her burden of showing that these disbursements were made either to reduce the principal amount of debt or to make capital improvements to the property. See Langston v. Langston, 82 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.). Moreover, Carmen failed to bring forth sufficient evidence for the court to make the calculations necessary to determine the allocation of the enhanced value between the contributing and benefitting estates. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). In most instances, three items will be needed to calculate the claim for economic contribution: (1) the equity value of the property at the date of marriage, or the value on the date contribution was started or made, if later; (2) the equity value of the property at the date of divorce; and (3) the dollar amount of the economic contribution. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Here, however, Carmen failed to present evidence to the trial court regarding the equity values of the properties as of the date of the first contribution to those separate properties, as well as any evidence of the additional contribution to the equity by Carmen's estate from that point forward. Thus, we cannot make the calculations required by law without speculating as to the pertinent values. Accordingly, we overrule all issues on appeal.
In particular, Carmen presented evidence of a check she wrote to Hebbronnville State Bank in the amount of $8,000.00 on March 7, 1997; evidence of an annuity surrender in the amount of $10,000.00 that was deposited in the Avilas' joint bank account on June 23, 1997; evidence of a check she endorsed to Ynocencio in the amount of $12,150.00 on June 21, 1998; evidence of another annuity surrender in the amount of $12,815.25 that was also deposited in the Avilas' joint bank account on July 17, 1997; and evidence of another check she wrote to Hebbronnville State Bank in the amount of $7,294.98 on March 7, 1997. Carmen also presented evidence of miscellaneous checks that were allegedly written for various items that went into the home, such as plumbing fixtures, lighting fixtures, and other items not covered by the construction contract.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.