Opinion
No. 04-07-00244-CV
Delivered and Filed: September 5, 2007.
Appeal from the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas, Trial Court No. 06-2079-CV, Honorable Paul Davis, Judge Presiding.
AFFIRMED.
Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Justice, KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Ronald Avery appeals from the trial court's orders granting appellees Guadalupe County Tax Assessor-Collector Tavie Murphy, Guadalupe County Tax Office, and Seguin Independent School District's pleas to the jurisdiction, which challenged Avery's standing to bring the underlying cause of action. We affirm.
Background
As a property owner in Guadalupe County, Texas, Avery received a tax statement for the 2005 tax year from the Guadalupe County Tax Assessor-Collector that included an assessment for school property taxes for the Seguin Independent School District (the "SISD"). When Avery received his tax statement, he notified the Guadalupe County Tax Office and the Tax Assessor-Collector (collectively "Guadalupe County") that Guadalupe County's assessment of school property taxes for the SISD was unconstitutional and that he refused to pay such taxes. Avery warned Guadalupe County that he would take legal action against the county if it insisted on assessing and collecting the unlawful school property taxes.
Avery subsequently remitted a partial tax payment to Guadalupe County for his 2005 taxes. Guadalupe County, however, refused to accept Avery's partial payment because Avery failed to designate how he wanted the county to allocate the partial payment amongst the various taxing units. Upon learning of Guadalupe County's need for clarification regarding the allocation of his partial tax payment, Avery directed Guadalupe County to allocate his payment amongst all of the taxing units included in his tax bill except for the SISD.
Following Avery's partial payment of his taxes, Guadalupe County notified Avery about his remaining tax balance and the penalties he would incur for refusing to pay the balance owed. Avery responded to Guadalupe County's delinquent tax notice by paying off his outstanding balance. He then filed suit against Guadalupe County and the SISD, seeking, inter alia, damages for Guadalupe County and the SISD's "unlawful" assessment and collection of school property taxes. Guadalupe County and the SISD responded by filing pleas to the jurisdiction, asserting, among other grounds for dismissal, Avery lacked standing to pursue his claim. The trial court granted the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by Guadalupe County and the SISD, and Avery brought this appeal.
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party challenges a court's authority to determine the subject matter of the action. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); Mahew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts that show the district court has subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we construe the pleadings in favor of the pleader and look to the pleader's intent. Id.
Standing
Avery claims the trial court erroneously granted the pleas to the jurisdiction because his pleadings demonstrate he has standing to pursue his claim. Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, and is essential to a court's power to decide a case. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001); Bland Indep. School Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 553-54. Unless a particular statute conveys standing, a plaintiff who sues to challenge governmental decision-making must demonstrate that he has an interest in a conflict separate from that of the general public, and that the defendants' actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury. Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 178-79; Bland Indep. School Dist, 34 S.W.3d at 555-56.
Avery does not allege a particular statute conveys standing. Rather, Avery asserts he has standing as a citizen with a peculiar interest adversely affected by the actions of Guadalupe County and the SISD. According to Avery, he has the right to bring suit against Guadalupe County and the SISD because he has sufficiently pled a particularized injury by claiming that he was forced to pay "unlawful" school property taxes and was precluded from securing a building permit for the development of his property until such taxes were paid.
There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that Avery was treated any differently than any other property owner or suffered an injury peculiar to himself. It is evident from Avery's pleadings that the purportedly unlawful school property taxes were assessed against all property owners within the SISD, not just Avery. Moreover, it is clear that the county regulation that prevented Avery from obtaining a building permit until he paid his delinquent taxes applied not only to Avery, but to all property owners alike. Because Avery's pleadings fail to demonstrate his standing as a taxpayer, we hold the trial court properly granted Guadalupe County and the SISD's pleas to the jurisdiction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.