Opinion
3:23-cv-00896-YY
04-10-2024
AVENUE 33, LLC, a New York limited liability company, Plaintiff, v. AVENTURINE CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND ORDER RECOMMENDATIONS
Youlee Yim You, United States Magistrate Judge.
FINDINGS
In this action, plaintiff Avenue 33, LLC, alleges that defendant Aventurine Capital Group, LLC, is in breach of contract for failing to pay pursuant to a settlement agreement that the parties reached to resolve a state court case, Multnomah County Circuit Court case, Avenue 33, LLC, v. Aventurine Capital Group, LLC, Case No. 22CV16101. Compl., ECF 1. Defendant has failed to appear in this action, and the clerk entered a default on October 11, 2023. ECF 12; see FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs (ECF 15), which should be granted in part and denied in part as discussed below.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because of diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Also, under the terms of the Promissory Note that defendant signed, defendant consented that “[a]ny action or proceeding arising out of” the note would be “litigated in courts located in Multnomah County, Oregon,” including “any local, state, or federal court.” Compl., Ex. 1 at 2, ECF 1-1.
II. Personal Jurisdiction
A district court “has an affirmative duty” to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant before entering a default judgment. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). “A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over the parties is void.” Id.
As noted, defendant has consented for “[a]ny action or proceeding arising out of” the Promissory Note to be litigated in this court. Compl., Ex. 1 at 2, ECF 1-1. “[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a ‘variety of legal arrangements' by which a litigant may give ‘express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.'” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.14 (1985) (citation omitted). This includes “stipulat[ing] in advance to submit their controversies for resolution in a particular jurisdiction,” which defendant has done here. Id. at 472 n. 14 (citing Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court[.]”)).
III. Service of Process
Before entering a default judgment, the court must “assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default is requested.” Bank of the West v. RMA Lumber Inc., No. C 07-06469 JSW, 2008 WL 2474650, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2008). “[I]n the absence of proper service of process, the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant's person or property unless the defendant has . . . waived the lack of process.” S.E.C.v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2007).
Here, plaintiff attempted service on defendant's registered agent in Eugene, Oregon, and Palo Alto, California, but both locations were vacant. See Aff. Service, ECF 10, Ex. 4, ECF 10-4 (“found the residence to be vacant (no furniture inside)”); id, Ex. 5, ECF 10-5 (“This address is a house and is visibly vacant. There is a realtor lock box on the front door.”). Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel asked defendant's counsel if defendant would waive service; one attorney responded that his firm no longer represented defendant, and the other attorney responded that he was not authorized to waive service. Id., Exs. 2 and 3, ECF 10-2, 10-3.
Accordingly, plaintiff turned to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), which allows for service on an individual within a judicial district of the United States by “following state law,” and effectuated service on the Oregon Secretary of State in compliance with Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 7 D(3)(c)(ii)(D), which provides that service may be made “on the Secretary of State in the manner provided in ORS 63.121.” O.R.S. 63.121(2) states that the “Secretary of State shall be an agent of a limited liability company . . . upon whom any such process, notice or demand may be served . . . whenever the limited liability company's registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered office.” In that situation, “[s]ervice shall be made on the Secretary of State by . . . mailing to the office a copy of the process, notice or demand and the required fee for each party being served by certified mail or registered mail.” O.R.S. 63.121(3)(a). In September of 2023, plaintiff served the Secretary of State by certified mail in compliance with O.R.S. 63.121(3)(a). FRCP 4(1) Aff. Service, ECF 10; Id., Ex. 13, ECF 10-13. Therefore, service is valid and complete.
Moreover, defendant is otherwise aware of this lawsuit. On July 19, 2023, plaintiff's CEO, Rebecca Berrebi, emailed defendant's three partners and referenced the federal case that had been filed. Berrebi Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 18; Id., Ex. 1 at 2, ECF 18-1. On July 21, 2023, one of defendant's partners, David Van Wie, emailed Berrebi a response, in which he copied defendant's two other partners, and explained “a little bit of context” for why payment had not been made. Berrebi Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 18; id., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF 18-1. Thereafter, on August 14, 2023, Van Wie called Berrebi to say that the settlement funds were not yet available, id. ¶ 4, and on September 15, 2023, Van Wie emailed Berrebi to discuss the amounts owed. Id. ¶ 5. On September 19, 2023, Berrebi again spoke with Van Wie, who represented that defendant was not in a position to pay the funds, and Berrebi responded that she would continue to pursue the federal court litigation. Id. Thus, not only has service been properly effectuated under Rule 4, but defendant has “sufficient notice” of the complaint. See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint.”).
IV. Eitel Analysis
The district court must exercise its discretion in determining whether to enter a default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In doing so, the court considers the following factors under Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986):
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.Id. at 1471-72. The Eitel factors weigh heavily in favor of default judgment in this case.
A. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff
In assessing the possibility of prejudice, courts have considered whether a plaintiff would be without recourse for recovery if the motion for default judgment is not granted. See, e.g., J &J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Cardoze, No. C 09-05683 WHA, 2010 WL 2757106, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2010); PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, defendant has not paid on the Promissory Note, and plaintiff has no recourse for recovery other than to file a civil action to obtain a judgment.
B. Factors Two and Three: Merits of Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint
Upon entry of default, this court must take the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true. See Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In reviewing a default judgment, this court must take the well-pleaded factual allegations of [the complaint] as true.”); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”).
Plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint alleges facts establishing a breach of contract claim. The complaint alleges that plaintiff filed suit against defendant in Multnomah County Circuit Court. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF 1. The state court found that the parties had reached a valid settlement agreement and ordered defendant to sign the Promissory Note. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant has not paid plaintiff under the terms of the note. Id. ¶ 7. These facts are sufficient to establish plaintiff's breach of contract claim.
C. Fourth Factor: Sum of Money at Stake
Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of [defendant's conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176-77; see also J & J Sports, 2010 WL 2757106 at *5 (“a large sum of money at stake would disfavor default damages,” such as a request for $114,200 in damages); Board of Trustees of the SheetMetal Workers v. Vigil, No. C 07-01508 WHA, 2007 WL 3239281, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (“[D]efault judgment is disfavored if there were a large sum of money involved.”).
Under the terms of the Promissory Note, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff $61,000 on or before July 5, 2022. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF 1. Because defendant failed to pay that amount by the deadline, the principal increased to $84,406.90 plus 12% interest. Id. As of June 1, 2023, when the complaint in this case was filed, the principal and interest totaled $293,613.66. Id. ¶ 8. The amount of money owed by defendant is not small, but it is also not exceedingly large.
D. Fifth Factor: Possibility of Dispute Over Material Facts
In addressing the fifth factor, the court considers the possibility that there is a dispute concerning material facts. “The fifth factor . . . weighs in favor of default judgment when the claims in the complaint are well-pleaded.” Joe Hand Prods. v. Holmes, No. 2:12-cv-00535-SU, 2015 WL 5144297, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 31, 2015). “Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists.” Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Here, the Promissory Note unequivocally shows that defendant agreed to pay plaintiff, and plaintiff has presented evidence showing that the note has not been paid and that defendant's partners are aware it has not been paid.
E. Sixth Factor: Excusable Neglect
The sixth factor pertains to the possibility that the default resulted from excusable neglect. “This factor favors default judgment where the defendant has been properly served or the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant is aware of the action.” Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1082 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012). Again, defendant was properly served and defendant's partners are aware of this lawsuit. There is no indication of excusable neglect.
F. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits
Factor seven is “the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits,” specifically the policy that “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. However, “this policy, standing alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Machuca, No. 2:13-cv-1228 GEB KJN, 2014 WL 1330749, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014). Where a defendant has failed to answer a complaint, this “makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. “[T]he mere existence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) indicates that ‘this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.'” Id. “Thus, the preference to decide cases on the merits does not preclude a court from granting default judgment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Here, a decision on the merits is impossible because defendant has failed to appear, plead, or defend this action. But, as noted, that factor is not dispositive. All of the other Eitel factors support the court's exercise of discretion in entering a default judgment.
V. Attorney's Fees and Costs
A. Relevant Law Regarding Attorney's Fees and Plaintiff's Burden
“The customary method of determining fees . . . is known as the lodestar method.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) (holding “the lodestar approach” is “the guiding light” when determining reasonable fees). The “lodestar” is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. McGrath v. Cnty. of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995). The court excludes hours “that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
“[T]here is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 556. The court may “assess whether the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure should be adjusted on the basis of Kerr factors not already subsumed in the initial calculation.” McGrath, 67 F.3d 248 at 252. The Kerr factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds, City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
As the moving party, plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). In determining the “reasonable hourly rate,” the court looks to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant community “is one in which the district court sits.” Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991). This court uses the most recent Oregon State Bar Economic Survey as a benchmark for comparing an attorney's billable rate with the fee customarily charged in the locality. Precision Seed Cleaners v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 976 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1244 (D. Or. 2013); see also Copeland-Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-cv-37-HZ, 2012 WL 92957, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2012) (same). The Economic Survey sets forth rates charged by Oregon attorneys in the relevant year, including rates specific to communities, such as the Portland area.
B. Promissory Note Provision
Paragraph 15 of the Promissory Note contains the following provision that allows for reasonable fees, costs, and expenses:
If any litigation is instituted to interpret, enforce, or rescind this Note, including but not limited to any proceeding brought under the United States Bankruptcy Code, the prevailing party on a claim will be entitled to recover with respect to the claim, in addition to any other relief awarded, the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees and other fees, costs, and expenses of every kind, including but not limited to the costs and disbursements specified in ORCP 68 A(2), incurred in connection with the litigation, any appeal or petition for review, the collection of any award, or the enforcement of any order, as determined by the court.
Compl., Ex. 1, ECF 1-1. Plaintiff has brought this suit to enforce the terms of the Promissory Note; therefore, plaintiff is entitled to reasonable fees, costs, and expenses “incurred in connection with the litigation . . . [and] the collection of any award.” Id.
C. Withdrawn Requests
In the underlying state court action, the judge found that the parties had negotiated a valid settlement agreement, granted plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and ordered defendant's designee to sign the Promissory Note. Avenue 33, LLC v. Aventurine Capital Group, LLC, Case No. 22CV16101, Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (December 22, 2022). Pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note, payment was due on July 5, 2022. Compl., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF 1-1. The billing records that plaintiff has submitted in support of the fee petition in this case begin on July 6, 2022, one day after payment was due under the note.
The state court judge, in her order granting plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, directed plaintiff to file a general judgment of dismissal. See Stone Decl., Ex. 4, ECF 17-4. Instead of filing a general judgment of dismissal, plaintiff filed a motion for entry of a general judgment to enforce the terms of the Promissory Note, which the state court judge found was improperly filed and denied. See Avenue 33, LLC v. Aventurine Capital Group, LLC, Case No. 22CV16101, Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of a General Judgment 3 (March 23, 2023).
The state court judge found that “entry of a judgment for the money owed by Defendant in this case is not appropriate because the claims filed by Plaintiff were resolved under the terms of the settlement agreement” and “there is no longer a controversy in this case between the parties because Plaintiff waived all claims against Defendant under the terms of the settlement agreement.” Avenue 33, LLC, v. Aventurine Capital Group, LLC, Multnomah County Circuit Court Case No. 22CV16101, Order 3-4, March 23, 2023.
The billing records that plaintiff originally submitted in support of its motion for default judgment included time that was spent pursuing the unsuccessful motion for entry of a general judgment. On December 19, 2023, this court issued an order in which it observed that the fees related to the unsuccessful state court motion did not appear compensable, see Order 1-3, ECF 19, and in a December 22, 2024 letter to the court, plaintiff withdrew its request for fees related to that motion.
Plaintiff also withdrew its request for .7 hours reflected in an October 14, 2022 billing entry that contained a reference to the “County.” As the court observed in its December 19, 2023 order, there is no indication that any county is involved in this matter, see Order 3, ECF 19, and plaintiff has corrected that error.
D. Attorney's Fees
Plaintiff has submitted detailed billing records reflecting that the attorneys at Markowitz Herbold charged the following rates:
Jeffrey Edelson
$735
Dallas DeLuca
$600
Chad Colton
$630
April Stone
$348.55
David Fauria
$390
Edelson, DeLuca, and Colton are partners and have been practicing for 38, 14, and 17 years respectively. Edelson Decl. ¶¶ 3, 15, 19, ECF 16. Stone and Fauria are associates and have been practicing for four and six years respectively. Id. ¶¶ 13, 23. The attorneys' hourly rates fall within the range of rates for attorneys in the Portland area with the same years of experience and area of practice (business/corporate litigation), as set forth in the 2022 Economic Survey. Oregon State Bar, 2022 Economic Survey 42-43 tbl. 36, 44 tbl. 37 (2022); Edelson Decl., Ex. 7, ECF 16-7.
Finally, the billing records show that reasonable amounts of time were spent by the attorneys performing services relevant to the litigation and collection of the amount due under the Promissory Note, such as reviewing and researching legal issues, drafting legal documents, conferring with their client, and filing the complaint and motions in this case. Edelson Decl., Ex. 6, ECF 16-6. The entries are not duplicative and the time spent is not excessive. There is no reason to deviate from the “presumptively reasonable lodestar” amount “on the basis of Kerr factors not already subsumed in the initial calculation.” McGrath, 67 F.3d 248 at 252. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to its requested attorney's fees.
E. Paralegal Fees
Plaintiff also seeks fees for paralegal services, which are compensable under the Promissory Note, as long as they are reasonable. To determine the reasonable hourly rate for paralegal services, the court looks to the prevailing market rate. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1205. In other cases, this court has relied on the National Utilization and Compensation Survey Report (“NALA Report”) published by the National Association of Legal Assistants and Paralegals. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., No. 3:18-CV-00898-SB, 2018 WL 5993581, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5985671 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2018) (citing Aichele v. Blue Elephant Holding, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2204-BR, 2018 WL 2357533, at *4 (D. Or. May 24, 2018)).
Plaintiff requests compensation for paralegal services at rates ranging from $200 to $260 per hour for paralegals with 10 to 20-plus years of experience. Edelson Decl. 8, ECF 16. The latest NALA Report issued in 2022 indicates that the average rate for paralegals in the Far West region was only $122. NALA Report, Fig. 32 (2022). The average rate does not increase appreciably for paralegals who have higher years of experience. Id., Fig. 34. Importantly, however, the Report indicates that while $122 is the average rate, 25% of paralegals billed at rates of $200 or more. Also, as plaintiff explains, the paralegals in this case performed tasks that attorneys would have had to perform, including preparing pleadings and reviewing documents, but completed them at less than half of the attorneys' billing rates. Thus, the amounts requested by plaintiff for paralegal services are reasonable.
F. Law Clerk Fees
Plaintiff has withdrawn its request for 3.1 hours expended by a law clerk, Michael Swift, on July 13, 2022, for “[r]esearch re motion to enforce settlement timeline.” However, plaintiff did not withdraw its request for 2.3 hours (i.e., $465.75 in fees) that Swift spent the following day, July 14, 2022, for similar “[r]esearch re motion for settlement enforcement timeline.” See Edelson Decl., Ex. 6, ECF 16-6. Nor did plaintiff respond to the court's concerns that no information was provided about Swift's qualifications or how the $225 rate is reasonable based on the prevailing market rate for law clerks in the Portland area. See Order 4, ECF 19. Thus, a further reduction of $465.75 for the July 14, 2022 entry is warranted.
G. Production Assistant Fees
Plaintiff originally requested compensation for work by production assistants at various rates. See Order 4-5, ECF 19. After the court observed that these services appeared to be clerical in nature, plaintiff withdrew its request for these fees. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) (holding that “purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them”); Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that “filing transcript, and document organization time was clerical in nature and should have been subsumed in firm overhead rather than billed at paralegal rates”).
H. Costs
Plaintiff seeks the following costs, totaling $3,935.93:
Legal Research
$3,384.30
Processing and Service Fees
$477.48
Internal Costs
$46.55
Delivery Charges (Judge's Copies)
$25.80
Travel (Parking for hearing)
$1.80
Edelson Decl., Ex. 9, ECF 16-9.
The Promissory Note allows for “costs, and expenses of every kind . . . incurred in connection with the litigation . . . [and] the collection of any award.” Compl., Ex. 1, ECF 1-1. Thus, even though some of the requested costs would not be allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, plaintiff may be entitled to them under the Promissory Note.
Again, however, some of the legal research fees relate to plaintiff's failed motion to obtain a general judgment in the state court case, which was litigated in early 2023 and denied by order on March 23, 2023. See Edelson Decl., Ex. 9 at 2, ECF 16-9. Also, it is unclear what the requested “internal costs” are, as they are unexplained. Therefore, the following reductions are warranted:
Legal Research Fees
January 12, 2023
$43.00
January 13, 2023
$150.50
March 6, 2023
$361.20
$25.80
Internal Costs
$46.55
Total Reductions
$627.05
A billing entry for March 23, 2023, indicates that time was spent on this date reviewing the state court's opinion denying the motion for entry of judgment and case law. Edelson Decl., Ex. 6, ECF 16-6.
I. Total Calculations
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff is entitled to the following fees and costs:
Plaintiff's Revised Request for Fees
$55,975.90
Minus additional reduction for law clerk
-$465.75
Total Fees
$55,510.15
Requested Costs
$3,384.30
Minus reductions
-$627.05
Total Costs
$2,757.25
RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs (ECF 15) should be granted in part and denied in part, in that judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on plaintiff's breach of contract claim for (1) the principal sum of $84,406.90 plus prejudgment interest at 12% per month, compounded monthly, from July 6, 2022, until entry of judgment, (2) attorney's fees of $55,510.15 and costs of $2,757.25, and (3) post-judgment interest at 12% per month on the principal, attorney's fees, and costs from the date of entry of judgment until paid in full. Any further requests for fees and costs have been withdrawn or should be denied.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Tuesday, January 30, 2024. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.