Opinion
16-P-473
04-27-2017
Michael AUGUST v. Kelly RYAN& another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correction Institution in Shirley, asks that we reverse the dismissal of his certiorari complaint brought pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. Because the plaintiff's complaint fails to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Iannacchino v. Ford MotorCo., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), we affirm.
We draw the facts from the complaint, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Michael August. August was accused of participating in a group demonstration on July 10, 2014, by refusing to "lock into" his cell because he had no water. A disciplinary report issued in August, 2014, charging August with violating 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.24(2-10) (2006). Defendant Jonathan Toloczko, the disciplinary hearing officer, found August guilty of the offense and imposed a sanction of ninety days' loss of canteen privileges. August appealed to the superintendent, defendant Kelly Ryan. In that administrative appeal, August raised the fact that the regulation at issue had two years earlier been declared facially unconstitutional by a judge of the Superior Court in an unrelated case. Kelly nonetheless affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
It should be noted that the ruling in Muise v. Roden, SUCV 2011-00869-G, relates to the version of the regulation under which August was charged. The defendants represent that the regulation has subsequently been changed to cure the constitutional infirmity of the earlier version.
In November, 2014, August filed the underlying certiorari complaint, seeking (1) a declaration that the actions of the defendants violated the due process provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions, (2) an order expunging the disciplinary conviction from his prison records and restoring him to his previous institutional privileges, (3) damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and (4) attorney's fees and costs.
August does not argue that the judge erred in dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim or any claim under its State analog (which was not explicitly pleaded in the complaint).
After reviewing the complaint, the director of the central inmate disciplinary unit for the Department of Correction made an "administrative decision" to dismiss the disciplinary report and to expunge August's disciplinary file. The defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was moot and that it failed to state a claim. That motion was allowed; this appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, August's claims regarding the disciplinary report, the unconstitutionality of 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.24(2-10), and irregularities in the conduct of the administrative process relating to the disciplinary report, seeking dismissal of the report and expungement of his record, are all moot. There is simply no live controversy, nor any further relief available beyond that which August has already obtained as a result of the administrative dismissal by the Department of Correction. See Pidge v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 19-20 (1992). Thus, the motion judge correctly dismissed those aspects of the complaint.
The judge also correctly dismissed August's due process claim because he holds no liberty interest in canteen privileges, in his placement in a single cell, or in the prison work program. See Hastings v. Commissioner of Correction, 424 Mass. 46, 52 (1997) ; Murphy v. Cruz, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 319 (2001).
Like the motion judge, we note with concern that August was held a lengthy period in segregation, with attendant collateral consequences (loss of prison job and loss of single cell) while on "awaiting action" status (and beyond) where the regulation he was charged with violating had two years earlier been declared unconstitutional. Although we agree with the motion judge that, given the administrative dismissal and expungement, there is no further relief available to August and the matter is moot, it should be acknowledged August did not obtain that relief until after he had already suffered significant consequences.
Judgment affirmed.