Summary
In Augmon v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Civ. Action No. 22-1466, 2022 WL 16966723 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2022), a Magistrate Judge of this Court, Judge Patricia L. Dodge, recently issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the dismissal of very similar claims.
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Civil Action 22-1466
10-25-2022
CHARLES RAY AUGMON, III, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
II. Report
Plaintiff Charles Ray Augmon, III has submitted a Complaint along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court has granted the motion and the Complaint has been docketed. Upon review of the Complaint, however, the Court concluded that it should be dismissed as frivolous.
A. Factual Allegations
In the Complaint, Plaintiff (who states that he “holds domicile in Sacramento, California”) alleges that, on September 3, 2022, he “was traveling in Oakmont, Pennsylvania when confronted by Defendant[']s agent acting as a Police officer, an employee of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6.) At this point, he alleges, the following occurred:
The Plaintiff informed the Officer that he was not a United States citizen informing him of his status correction and expressed his reserved [sic] of rights (14th Amendment Citizen) (116 CFR 433.1(a)) (UCC 1-308).
The Officer inspected the documents and returned to the automobile informing the Plaintiff he would be towing the vehicle for no registration. The Plaintiff presented documents to the Officer showing that the automobile and branded license plate was registered under a UCC 1 finance statement.
The Officer acting on behalf of a state statue [sic] without warrant or court order, had the Plaintiff's automobile towed to an impound lot, and put on hold until it was re-registered under a congress-regulated institution.(Id. ¶¶ 7-9.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process and his right to freedom of movement were violated. He seeks $40,000 “for reimbursement of his time, money spent and cost of unreplaceable property.” (Compl. at 8.)
B. Standard of Review
The in forma pauperis statute provides that:
any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted: “The reference to prisoners in § 1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake. In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons, not just prisoners.” Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 Fed.Appx. 130, 132 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), courts are required to screen complaints at any time where, as is the case here, the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The PLRA provides in relevant part that:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal-
i. is frivolous or malicious;
ii. fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
iii. seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Thus, the Court must screen the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed.
In addition to the Complaint, Plaintiff also submitted a “notice of removal” in which he attempts to remove the traffic citation he was issued to this Court. (ECF No. 2.)A notice of removal is filed by a defendant seeking to remove an action from state court to federal court, not by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (civil actions “may be removed by the defendant or defendants.”) To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to remove a matter based on a citation he received, the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. See Gloria Sun Jung Yun v. New Jersey, 2019 WL 1002944, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019).
Where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint is “to be liberally construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has held that a complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact... [The] term ‘frivolous,' when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
C. Analysis
As Plaintiff's allegations make clear, he contends that his car was towed because a police officer requested his vehicle registration, and that he advised the officer that he instead possessed a “UCC-1 finance statement” which the officer did not accept. These are the hallmarks of a “sovereign citizen” argument. Adherents of this theory contend that they are not subject to various state or federal laws because they are not United States citizens, as Plaintiff alleges herein. They frequently use Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) filings to support their claims, which have been repeatedly rejected as frivolous. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011); Yun v. New Jersey, 2019 WL 3416773, at *6 (D.N.J. July 29, 2019).
The Supreme Court ruled long ago that states may regulate the operation “of all motor vehicles” that drive within their borders, and “may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers” pursuant to their constitutionally protected police power. Perkins v. Ivey, 772 Fed.Appx. 245, 246 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915)). Pennsylvania imposes such requirements. See 75 Pa. C.S. § 1301(a) (“No person shall drive or move and no owner or motor carrier shall knowingly permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle which is not registered in this Commonwealth unless the vehicle is exempt from registration.”); § 1303(a) (allowing nonresident owners of foreign vehicles to operate within Pennsylvania without registering the vehicle in Pennsylvania “provided the vehicle at all times when operated in this Commonwealth is duly registered and in full compliance with the registration requirements of the place of residence of the owner.”); § 1311(b) (“Every registration card shall, at all times while the vehicle is being operated upon a highway, be in the possession of the person driving or in control of the vehicle or carried in the vehicle and shall be exhibited upon demand of any police officer.”) Thus, a vehicle operated in Pennsylvania must have either a valid Pennsylvania registration or a valid registration from another state which must be presented upon demand of a police officer.
Plaintiff contends that these laws do not apply to him. As other courts have concluded: “Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim presumably is based on a misguided belief that motor vehicle registration and licensing laws do not apply to him as a ‘sovereign citizen.' Such a claim is frivolous.” King v. Allison, 2021 WL 2778558, at *2 (D. Neb. July 2, 2021). See also Reed v. Jones, 2021 WL 2913023, at *3 (D. Neb. July 12, 2021) (rejecting this theory as frivolous); Van Horne v. Valencia, 2022 WL 3574299, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2800878 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2022) (same); Hansen v. Nebraska, 2020 WL 3100101, at *2 (D. Neb. June 11, 2020) (dismissing as frivolous claims arising out of plaintiff's arrest, charge and conviction for driving without a registration and proof of insurance based on his being a sovereign citizen to whom the laws did not apply). Therefore, Plaintiff's allegation lacks an arguable basis either in fact or law.
In addition, the existence of “a constitutional right to travel ... does not restrict the State from regulating the use of its roads as a matter of its police powers.” Knox v. Pcobasco, 1986 WL 6310, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1986) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966)); see also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959) (“The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive.”); Carroll v. City of Philadelphia, 1989 WL 114721, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1989) (“It is well established that the police powers constitutionally permit regulation of vehicles traveling the public roadways.”), aff'd mem., 908 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1990); Gloria Sun Jung Yun v. New Jersey, 2019 WL 1002944, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019) (“the fact that Plaintiff had to pay to reinstate her driver's license and register her car does not violate her right to travel.”) Thus, merely because Plaintiff's vehicle was stopped and towed (because he did not have proper registration) does not mean that his constitutional right to travel was impeded.
Thus, on its face, the Complaint alleges non-existent claims: that Plaintiff was deprived of his property without due process of law or his right to travel when his vehicle was towed because he presented a “UCC-1 finance statement” in place of the required vehicle registration. Given these facts, it would be futile for him to amend. Plaintiff's contention that he “is not a United States citizen” and that vehicle registration requirements do not apply to him is rejected as frivolous.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
If Plaintiff wishes to challenge this Report and Recommendation, he must seek review by the district judge by filing objections within seventeen days of service. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.