" Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952) (emphasis added); see also Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, GO-386 v. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 295 F.3d 1337, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[I]n actions for declaratory judgment invoking the RLA, jurisdiction of the court is limited by general declaratory judgment law, and that a dispute appropriate for resolution under the declaratory judgment act `must not be nebulous or contingent, but must have taken on fixed and final shape.'") (quoting Atlas Air. Inc. v. Air Line Pilots. Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); Dana Corp., 2004 WL 503742, at *3 ("An actual case or controversy is one that is real and substantial . . . admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.") (internal citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original). While these principles are clear, their application is less precise.
Instead, plaintiffs are claiming that Delta is currently discriminating against them on the basis of their past union status. Plaintiffs' claims are thus similar to the garden-variety discrimination claims over which courts regularly exercise jurisdiction under § 152, Third and Fourth. See, e.g., Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 226 (D.C.Cir.2000) (reversing summary judgment for employer where employer “selectively penalize[d] unionized employees so as to interfere with, coerce, or influence their decision to exercise their rights under the RLA”). The complication in this case is that, at the same time that plaintiffs are before this Court complaining of alleged discrimination by Delta on the basis of their past union status, the union that represented plaintiffs in the past is before the Board complaining of Delta's alleged interference in the November 2010 election.
The RLA provisions that PACE invokes prohibit employers from engaging in discriminatory actions designed to impede or inhibit employees' exercise of their right to organize for collective bargaining purposes. Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Courts must ultimately consider "whether there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 754 F.2d at 1298 (internal citations omitted); see also Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 232 F.3d 218, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a dispute 'must not be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on fixed and final shape.'") (citations omitted).
North American argues that the threats by IBT were sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension of litigation by North American, and therefore established a case or controversy. (North American Mem. at 7) In repeating the unsuccessful argument it initially made in response to IBT's motion to dismiss, North American relies primarily on Atlas Air, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 69 F. Supp. 2d 155, 163 (D.D.C. 1999), overruled on other grounds, 232 F.3d 218 (D.C. Cir. 2000). However, that case, and, in particular its resolution on appeal, undermines North American's claim.
RLA Section 2, First and Seventh, and Section 6, the so-called "status quo" provisions, prohibit unilateral changes in wages or working conditions where there is a preexisting collective bargaining agreement. Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2000). B. Work Diversion Claim
The plain text of these provisions compels the conclusion that they do not apply after a carrier has abrogated its CBA and the "agreement" has ceased to exist. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast II, 125 F.3d at 43 (refusing to apply the RLA's status quo provisions to the parties' objective working conditions prior to their agreement to an initial CBA); Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 223 (D.C. Cir.2000) ("By their express terms, the so-called `status quo' provisions of the Act only prohibit unilateral changes in wages or working conditions where there is a preexisting collective bargaining agreement."); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 506 ("The meaning, logic and purpose of both the contract rejection provisions in Section 1113 and the status quo provisions in the RLA compel the conclusion that a collective bargaining agreement which has been rejected can no longer constitute an `agreement' within the meaning of RLA Section 2 Seventh and Section 6 such that the proscription in those provisions against changes in terms of employment would apply.").
Because the District Court decided this case on summary judgment we review de novo the issues before the District Court, and determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This review naturally entails our determining whether the District Court correctly identified and applied the governing law.
See, e.g., Melville Confections, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 327 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1964) ("Nor does the fact that the [petitioner's] violation antedated the Section 10(b) period applicable to the instant charge preclude a finding of a violation which occurred through a continuation of the proscribed conduct during and within the six-month period prior to the filing of the charge."). Because the RLA limitations period derives from that under the NLRA, courts have applied the same principles under the RLA. Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 226-27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (continuing violations doctrine applies to RLA claims just as it does to claims under Section 10(b) of the NLRA); Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1992) (RLA claim not barred where alleged bad-faith bargaining commenced outside the limitations period and continued into the six-month period prior to commencement of the action). ALPA relies on evidence that United has been aware of ALPA's positions on junior/senior manning and contract waivers since at least April 2007, but the evidence also shows that both the directives by ALPA to its members and the concerted action by United pilots designed to disrupt United's operations by refusing junior/senior manning and contract waivers have continued into the limitations period.
Moreover, the Board's decision does not constitute a gross violation of the RLA. Pinnacle insists on citing decisions applying the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for the proposition that a union's provision of legal services prior to certification interferes with employees' choice of representative, because this Circuit has interpreted RLA and NLRA provisions barring undue employer influence of employees as meaning "pretty much the same thing." (Pl.'s Opp. at 13 (quoting Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).) The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the NLRA "cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena.