While we have not previously considered the validity of this Act, we have heretofore considered in other cases many of the legal problems presented and argued in this case. In Associated Industries of Oklahoma et al. v. Industrial Welfare Commission et al., 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899, 901, the fourth paragraph of the syllabus is as follows: "Power to determine the policy of the law is primarily legislative, and cannot be delegated whereas the power to make rules of a subordinate character in order to carry out that policy and apply it to varying conditions, although partaking of a legislative character, is in its dominant aspect administrative and can be delegated."
The purpose of the constitutional provision, supra, regarding title is to put both the individual legislator and the people on notice as to legislation. Associated Industries, etc., v. Industrial Welfare Comm., 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899. That purpose was subserved by the title now considered. The Supreme Court of Tennessee recently so held in a very similar issue where it was contended a statute providing unemployment compensation was broader than its title.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the power to determine the policy of the law is primarily legislative and cannot be delegated, whereas the power to make rules of a subordinate character in order to carry out that policy and apply it to varying conditions, although partaking of a legislative character, is in its dominant aspect administrative and can be delegated. Associated Industries v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899; Atchley v. Board of Barber Examiners, 208 Okla. 453, 257 P.2d 302; Schmitt v. Hunt, Okla., 359 P.2d 198. The general rule is that if the statute involved lays down the policy of the Legislature and establishes a standard or guideline for administrative action, the delegation is proper. Ex Parte Herrin, 67 Okla. Cr. 104, 93 P.2d 21; Ludwig v. Yancey, Okla., 318 P.2d 450.
See, also, 11 Am. Jur. 881, note 11. One of the best statements of the rule as to what power may or may not be delegated by the Legislature is found in Cincinnati, etc., Co. v. Clinton County Com'rs (1852) 1 Ohio St. 77, at 88, quoted with approval in Associated Industries v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899, as follows: "The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
(c) The title must be construed with reference to the language used in it alone and not in the light of what the body of the act contains. Associated Industries of Oklahoma et al. v. Industrial Welfare Commission et al., 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899. 4. COUNTIES — Federal census of 1930 sole guide in determining population and classification of Washita county for payment of salaries.
Here was no arbitrary discretion reposed in the commission; its duty was to see that all wages should meet the statutory requirement. (See Associated Industries v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1939), 185 Okl. 177 [ 90 P.2d 899, 906], where a like construction was put upon a substantially identical statute.) Order No. 10A, on which this prosecution is based, manifestly is not such an order as is authorized by the statute.
¶ 14 You ask next whether the Legislature's authorization to the Board to adopt criteria for the selection of persons or business enterprises who will be permitted to contract with the Authority for the tax credits and put options set forth in the Act constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority. The general rule followed in Oklahoma regarding the Legislature's power to delegate its authority is expressed in Associated Industries of Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 90 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1939), where the Court held, in paragraph four of the Syllabus by the Court: Power to determine the policy of the law is primarily legislative, and cannot be delegated whereas the power to make rules of a subordinate character in order to carry out that policy and apply it to varying conditions, although partaking of a legislative character, is in its dominant aspect administrative and can be delegated.
This legislative authority to determine law and policy is distinct from the power to make rules of a subordinate character to carry them out, and it cannot be delegated. Associated Indus. of Okla. v. Indus. Welfare Com'n , 1939 OK 155, ¶ 16, 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899. SeeTulsa County Deputy Sheriff's Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge Num. 188 v. Bd. of County Com'rs of Tulsa County , 2000 OK 2, ¶ 9, 995 P.2d 1124 ; Isaacs v. Okla. City , 1966 OK 267, ¶¶ 10-11, 437 P.2d 229. However, where a law does not actually delegate authority, there is no violation of the above-noted non-delegation doctrine.
Union Indemnity Co. v. Saling, 1933 OK 481, 26 P.2d 217, 221–222 (“It may be safely stated as a general rule that the provisions of our Constitution require that the decisions of administrative boards especially on questions of law be subject to judicial review ... This rule, however, is subject to exceptions and qualifications....”). Cf. Associated Industries of Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 1939 OK 155, 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899, 901, (Syllabus by the Court), (“Due process of law requires an opportunity for judicial review of administrative orders establishing minimum wages and maximum hours of employment for the purpose of determining whether such orders are within the reasonable limits of administrative discretion and are confiscatory in their application.”).In State ex rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission, 1946 OK 95, 167 P.2d 71, 72–73, we relied upon a right-privilege dichotomy for the principle that an administrative agency may possess final authority to decide an issue without judicial review.
However, a presumptively valid statute may result in an unconstitutional application to a particular person. ¶ 26 In Associated Industries of Oklahoma, et al. V. Industrial Welfare Commission, et al., 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899 (1939), this Court held in Syllabus 1: "If a legislative act is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render the act valid, while the other would subject it to grave doubts upon constitutional grounds, that construction should be adopted which renders the act valid, and frees it from doubts on constitutional considerations." Following the rationale of Associated Industries, we do not in this case hold the preclusive provision of OSDA to be unconstitutional.