We defer to the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS's") "interpretation of its own regulations unless its interpretation is 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S. Ct. 905, 911, 137 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1997)). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") provides for two bases for removability including grounds of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 and grounds of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, which governs the removal of aliens admitted to the United States.
We review the BIA's legal conclusions de novo and its factfindings for substantial evidence. Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001). Bayolo argues that his case is factually indistinguishable from St. Cyr and therefore, like the alien in that case (St. Cyr), he too should be allowed to apply for a now-extinct form of relief. Bayolo, like St. Cyr, was convicted of a pre-IIRIRA crime that rendered him deportable.
Whether an alien had “entered” mattered because “important immigration provisions were keyed to an alien's ‘entry.’ ” Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.2003). Aliens who had not yet entered the United States were subject to “exclusion” hearings.
We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration by the BIA for abuse of discretion. Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). This review is limited to determining whether the BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). However, we review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction.
The statute’s structure reinforces this conclusion. Cf. Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 332 F.3d 1321, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2003) (looking to a statute’s structure to ascertain its meaning).
Parole "allowed [Perdomo] into the country but [he] remain[ed] constructively at the border, seeking admission and subject to exclusion proceedings." See Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1338 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) ("parole . . . is simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted" and "was never intended to affect an alien's status"). To qualify for suspension of deportation, Perdomo had to have been "physically present" in the United States for a continuous period.
Adrien does not argue that the agency's interpretation of its own regulations is not entitled to deference. See Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that we defer to the agency's "interpretation of its own regulations unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"). --------
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion. Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). "Our review is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious."
"`We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.'" Calle v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003)). We also review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.