McCready, 457 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. at 2544. See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. NFL, 791 F.2d, 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Most cases will find some factors tending in favor of standing . . ., and some against . . ., and a court may find standing if the balance of factors so instructs."); accord Southaven Land Co. v. Malone Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1983); Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Corp. of Cape Cod, 843 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D.Me. 1994). III.

Milton v. IIT Research Institute, 138 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1998). In Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Division of Car gill, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 759, 773 (D. Me. 1994), the plaintiff worked out of an office in Maine, traveled to several other states in the area for work, and met with his supervisors in several states. Defendant had headquarters in Massachusetts and that is where plaintiff was told his employment was terminated.

"The state of Maine generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts in determining choice-of-law issues." Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div., 843 F. Supp. 759, 772 (D.Me. 1994). In this case, the claims of the Amended Counterclaim sound in contract and, as stated earlier, none of the Term Sheets at issue in the Amended Counterclaim contain any choice-of-law provision.

"'" Sullivan, supra, 25 F.3d at 49 (quoting Province v. Cleveland Press Pub. Co., 787 F.2d 1047, 1052 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Southaven Land Co. v. Malone Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1983))). See also Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1984); Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Division, 843 F. Supp. 759, 769-70 (D.Me. 1994); Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1423, 1435-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court notes that other courts "have interpreted Supreme Court caselaw and the antitrust laws more narrowly, holding that a plaintiff must be a market participant in order to establish antitrust injury."

Some courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Shield v. McCready as extending standing to a third category of individuals whose injury is inextricably intertwined with the injury that the antitrust violators sought to inflict. See Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div., 843 F. Supp. 759, 760-70 (Me. 1994); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984). One year prior to Associated General, the McCready court held that a consumer of health services could sue under the antitrust laws to redress a supposed conspiracy between her insurance plan and Virginia psychiatrists.

This includes the forum state's choice of law rules.” Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted); see also Ashmore v. Ne. Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 759, 772 (D. Me. 1994) (“Supplemental state-law claims in a case where jurisdiction is based on federal question are also decided with reference to the choice-of-law provisions of the state in which the federal court sits”).

However, courts in Maine and Colorado have applied the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts in different contexts, and the court pre sumes that they would do so here. See Ashmore v. Ate. Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 759, 772 (D. Me. 1994) (‘The State of Maine generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Con- flicts in determining choice-of-law issues.”)

See id. "The state of Maine generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts in determining choice-of-law issues." Ashmore v.Northeast Petroleum Div., 843 F. Supp. 759, 772 (D. Me. 1994). In both contract and tort disputes, Maine utilizes "the `most significant contacts and relationships' approach."

Finally, we do not find, at this stage, that Plaintiffs' requested damages would be highly speculative or duplicative. Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 759, 767 (D. Me. 1994) (explaining that because the plaintiffs were directly affected by defendants' actions, there was no danger of duplicative recoveries or complex apportionment); Donovan v. Digital Equip. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 775, 784 (D.N.H. 1994) (stating that "in the absence of an action by a party claiming a more direct antitrust injury . . . there is little risk of duplicative recovery."). Being that "damage issues in antitrust cases are rarely 'susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts,'" Lago Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 892 F Supp. 325, 344 (D.N.H. 1995) (quoting J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565 (1981)), we see nothing, at this early stage in the parties' litigation, which would make Plaintiffs' requested damages unascertainable, highly complex, or would create duplicative recovery.

"A federal court which exercises supplemental jurisdiction over statelaw claims based on diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits." Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 759, 772 (Me. 1994). Maine law, which provides the rules to be applied in this case, requires a court to consider