Opinion
No. C 03-5802 MEJ.
August 23, 2004
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ORDER SCHEDULING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 21, 2004 AT 10:00 A.M.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed on March 3, 2004. After consideration of the parties' papers, relevant statutory and case law authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' motion for the reasons set forth below.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs Ashlee R., a minor, and Wanda Russell-Williams, parent of Ashlee R., bring this suit against the Oakland Unified School District Board of Education, Randolph E. Ward, Debra Lindo, Denise Jeffrey, Matin Abdel-qawi, Rick Gaston, Mary Maultsby and Jack Williams. Plaintiffs' causes of action arise out of Ashlee R's attendance at Castlemont High School ("Castlemont") during the 2001-2002 school year.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state that Ashlee R. has a learning disability as defined by federal and state law. In the second grade, while attending Brookfield Elementary School ("Brookfield") in the Oakland Unified School District ("OUSD"), Ashlee R. received a diagnosis for a special learning disability. Subsequently, Ashlee R. received an Individual Education Program ("IEP") and Brookfield educated Ashlee R. pursuant to the IEP. In 2000, before attending Castlemont, Plaintiffs learned that Ashlee R. had Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD").
Plaintiffs do not identify the specific learning disability with which Ashlee R. was diagnosed.
In 2001, Ashlee R. began attending classes at Castlemont. Plaintiffs allege that OUSD failed to provide Ashlee R. an appropriate education as it did not train her teachers at Castlemont to review or follow her original IEP. Plaintiffs also claim the OUSD did not respond to or modify Ashlee R.'s IEP in a timely manner after learning she had ADD. Plaintiffs state that the failure to inform Ashlee R.'s general education teachers of her disability caused friction and problems between Ashlee R. and her teachers, including incidents in which Ashlee R.'s teachers made hurtful and discriminatory comments when she displayed behavior associated with her disability.
Wanda Russell-Williams attempted to contact administrators at Castlemont to remedy the situation, but the administrators failed to respond to her inquiries. Plaintiffs claim that the problems between Ashlee R. and her teachers arose because they lacked knowledge of her disability and her teachers misconstrued behavior typically associated with her disability as being related to disciplinary problems. According to their Complaint, problems between Ashlee R. and her teachers became so tense that Wanda Russell-Williams removed her daughter from Castlemont and began home schooling her towards the end of the school year. On June 10, 2002, at the close of the academic school year, Ashlee R. received an IEP from OUSD which addressed her diagnosis of ADD.
The academic school year for the 2001-2002 year officially ended on June 30, 2002.
B. Procedural Background
On December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Damages. Plaintiffs allege violations under Section 504 of 29 U.S.C. 794, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 20 U.S.C. 1400, the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA); 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; and 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and those statutes' respective implementing regulations; as well as state law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, among others.
On February 20, 2004, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss, as well as the Declaration of Janette Puccetti in support thereof. On March 3, 2004, Defendants filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss.
On May 3, 2004, the City of Alameda filed a Motion to Dismiss Notice pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(4), as well as the Declaration of Gregory M. Fox in support thereof. In its motion, the City of Alameda states that Plaintiffs have no claim against it, served the complaint on it in error, and was not a named defendant in the complaint, nor was it a named party on the summons. Plaintiff did not contest this motion.
On May 21, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, as well as Exhibit 1, a letter from OUSD's claims agent requesting more information from Plaintiffs regarding their claim. Defendants filed no response to Plaintiffs' Opposition.
On July 8, 2004, the Court held a hearing on the matter. Nicole Hodge appeared for Plaintiffs. Neither the Defendants nor Defendants' counsel appeared before the Court. Christine Lee appeared on behalf of the City of Alameda and requested that the Court dismiss it from this action. The Court granted the City of Alameda's Motion to Dismiss for insufficiency of process. The Court then took the matter under submission.
III. DISCUSSION
In the present motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to establish a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the applicable state statute of limitations. In the alternative, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred as they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Ashlee R's minority status tolls the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants are estopped from asserting the defense of statute of limitations because Plaintiffs were led to believe that settlement would occur after OUSD completed its investigation of Plaintiffs' complaints. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants failed to inform them of their rights or possibility to seek administrative remedies under the IDEA. Thus, they cannot assert a failure to seek administrative remedies as a defense.
A. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). FRCP 8(a), which states that plaintiff's pleadings must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," provides the standard for judging whether such a cognizable claim exists. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). This standard is a liberal one that does not require plaintiff to set forth all the factual details of his claim; rather, all that the standard requires is that plaintiff give defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds for making that claim. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell Coord Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Under FRCP 12(b)(6), a complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. All material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 1999). The court may also consider documents attached to the complaint in connection with a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Parks Sch. of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980)). If a plaintiff fails to attach to the complaint the documents on which it is based, defendant may also attach to a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion the documents referred to in the complaint. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d at 688-89. In addition, whether requested or not, the court may consider documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff's pleadings. In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 986.
If the court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court "should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
B. Application to the Case at Bar
1. Statute of Limitations
In their motion, Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs federal and state law claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to file their complaint in a timely manner within the applicable one year statute of limitations. Defendants further argue that Ashlee R.'s minor status does not toll the statute of limitations because OUSD is a public entity and all individuals named as defendants are public employees of OUSD. The Court shall address Defendants' statute of limitations argument as it applies to each of Plaintiffs' causes of action.
Although section 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has held that section 1983 civil rights claims are governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). In California, the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury is set forth in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.3. However, a plaintiff's claim is tolled under California law until the plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352 (a); Cal. Fam. Code § 6500 (providing that the age of majority in California is eighteen). Although Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(b) creates an exception to the tolling rule where the defendant is a public entity, section 352(b) is inapplicable to civil rights claims, including those brought under section 1983. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980).
Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 352 (2004) provides:
(a) If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335) is, at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of majority or insane, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of this action.
(b) This section does not apply to an action against a public entity or public employee upon a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with section 900) or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3, or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 950) of Part 4, of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code. This subdivision shall not apply to any claim presented to a public entity prior to January 1, 1971.
"Under federal law, 'the limitations period accrues when a party knows or has reason to know of the injury' which is the basis of the cause of action." Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994)). Based on Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court is unable to determine the exact date on which Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims accrued. The Complaint describes a series of alleged incidents which occurred throughout the 2001-2002 academic school year. Moreover, Plaintiffs refer to many of the alleged incidents in general terms and do not specify dates. However, Plaintiffs do state that Wanda Russell-Williams complained to the Castlemont administration about an alleged incident that occurred on December 7, 2001 between Ashlee R. and defendant Jack Williams. Although the Complaint is not clear as to when or how Wanda Russell-Williams contacted the administration, it is clear that the complaint is based on the December 7, 2001 incident. Therefore, construing Plaintiffs' allegations in a light most favorable to them, the Court finds December 7, 2001 as the date in which Plaintiffs' section 1983 claim accrued as Plaintiffs had reason to know of Ashlee R.'s injury on that date. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d at 1128. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 23, 2003, which is beyond the one-year statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.3. Therefore, Plaintiffs complaint would normally be considered untimely. However, Plaintiffs' claim is tolled under California law until Ashlee R reaches the age of eighteen. Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 352(a); Cal. Fam. Code § 6500. Moreover, even though OUSD is a public entity, the exception under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(b) is inapplicable to section 1983 claims. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d at 167. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs timely filed their section 1983 claims. b. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
Section 504 is closely analogous to section 1983 in that it is also a civil rights statute. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1987). Additionally, California's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury action applies to claims under section 504. Douglas v. Cal Dept of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Kramer v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 81 F.Supp.2d 972, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Thus, as discussed above, Plaintiffs' claim is tolled under California law until Ashlee R reaches the age of eighteen. Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 352(a); Cal. Fam. Code § 6500. Moreover, even though OUSD is a public entity, the exception under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(b) is inapplicable to section 504 claims. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d at 167. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs timely filed their section 504 claims.
c. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, Americans with Disability Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. ("ADA"), like other federal civil rights statutes, does not contain its own statute of limitations. However, ADA claims are typically governed by a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions as set forth in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.3. Avery v. Tri-County Extradition, Inc., 1999 WL 183604 (N.D. Cal.) (citing Pottgen v. Missouri St. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (interpretations of ADA must be consistent with Rehabilitation Act); Baker v. Board of Regents of the State of Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1993) (analogizing Rehabilitation Act claims to personal injury claims); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996) (relevant factors for establishing claims under Rehabilitation Act also apply to an ADA case.). Furthermore, as discussed above, Plaintiffs' ADA claim is tolled under California law until Ashlee R reaches the age of eighteen, Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 352(a); Cal. Fam. Code § 6500, and the exception under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(b) is inapplicable. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d at 167. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs timely filed their ADA claim.
d. 20 U.S.C. § 1400, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq., ("IDEA") does not have its own statute of limitations. However, California implements the IDEA through its special education programs laws. Cal. Ed. Code §§ 56000 et.seq.; Miller v. San Mateo-Foster City Unified Sch. District, 318 F.Supp.2d 851, 860 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Under California law, section 56505(j) establishes a three year statute of limitations for requesting a due process hearing. Under this section, any request for a due process hearing must be filed "within three years from the date the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know the facts underlying the basis of the request." Cal. Ed. Code § 56505(j). Section 56505 (j)'s "knowledge of facts" requires that the plaintiffs must have known or reasonably should have known the facts underlying the supposed learning disability and their IDEA rights. Miller, 318 F.Supp.2d at 861, (citing Jolly v. Eli Lilly Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658 (1988).
Due process hearings occur after parents complain about the identification, evaluation or educational placement of their child, or when they feel the school has failed to prove their child with a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E). The due process hearing is conducted by the state educational agency or by the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit, as determined by state law or by the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2). If either party is dissatisfied with the state educational agency's review, that party may bring a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). California has implemented the mandated procedural safeguards in California Education Code sections 56500 through 56507.
As discussed above, the Court finds December 7, 2001 as the date in which Plaintiffs' IDEA claims accrued as Plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of Ashlee R.'s injury regarding her learning disability. It is not clear from the complaint whether Plaintiffs requested and were denied a due process hearing. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state only that they attempted to contact the administration in order to modify Ashlee R.'s IEP, alleging that the IEP Ashlee R. received was not performed in a timely manner and did not involve the appropriate representatives from the school and district. Furthermore, in their opposition, Plaintiffs state that they did not receive information regarding their procedural rights and the administrative remedies available to them under the IDEA. Therefore, construing Plaintiffs Complaint in a light most favorable to them, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs actually received a due process hearing. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 983. However, Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient in that it contains a short and plain statement showing that they are entitled to relief under the IDEA. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. Plaintiffs are not required to set out all of the factual details of their IDEA claim in order to satisfy the FRCP 12(b)(6) standard. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. Rather, Plaintiffs are only required to give Defendant fair notice of their IDEA claim and the grounds for making that claim. Id. Accordingly, the Court must deny Defendants motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs' IDEA claim.
e. State-Tort Claims for Negligence, Tortuous Conduct, and Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs' Complaint also enumerates tort claims for negligence, tortuous conduct and emotional distress, which are normally governed by the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury as set forth in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.3. However, the limitations period for claims against the state and local government and their employees is dictated by the California Government Code. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. District, 830 F.Supp. 1560, 1570 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Martell v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Cal.App.4th 978, 984 (1998). Section 945.6(a)(1) provides that plaintiffs must file their suit after receiving written notice that their claim has been denied, "not later than six months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail." Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(1). However, if Plaintiffs do not receive written notice from Defendants denying their claim, they may file their suit "within two years from the accrual of the cause of action." Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(2).
Here, as Defendants are a public entity, the limitations period under section 945.6 applies. In their opposition, Plaintiffs state that they never received written notice from Defendants that their claim was denied. Therefore, construing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the six month statute of limitations stated in section 945.6(a)(1) is inapplicable and Plaintiffs had two years from the date of the accrual of their claim to file their Complaint. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(2). Plaintiffs' Complaint does not specify the dates associated with their tort claims. Rather, the complaint refers to a series of alleged incidents that occurred throughout the 2001-2002 school year, up through and including May 2002. Thus, their claims accrued no later than May of 2002 and Plaintiffs had two years from then to file their complaint. As they filed their complaint on December 23, 2003, the Court finds that Plaintiffs timely filed their state-law claims and it must deny Defendants' motion to dismiss as to these claims.
2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies under IDEA
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred as they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them under the IDEA before filing suit. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies results in the Court lacking jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' claims. In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to inform Wanda Russell-Williams of the procedural protection to which she was entitled as the parent of Ashlee R., they failed to inform her of the administrative exhaustion requirements. Plaintiffs further argue that they attempted to exhaust all administrative remedies of which they had knowledge prior to filing their claims.
Under the IDEA, parents are entitled to the following procedural protections: (1) examination of all relevant records pertaining to the evaluation and educational placement of their child; (2) prior written notice whenever the responsible educational agency proposes, or refuses, to change the child's placement; (3) an opportunity to present complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency's provision of a free appropriate public education; and (4) an opportunity for an "impartial due process hearing" with respect to any such complaints. Furthermore, if a party is dissatisfied with or aggrieved by the findings and decisions made after the impartial due process hearing, that party may obtain additional administrative review by the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)
"[T]he IDEA provides procedural safeguards to permit parental involvement in all matters concerning the child's education program and allows parents to obtain administrative and judicial review of decisions they deem unsatisfactory or inappropriate." Robb v. Bethel Sch. District, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1998)). However, the IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before commencing suit if that person is "seeking relief that is also available under" the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state that they attempted to present claims concerning Ashlee R.'s educational placement, requested that Defendants modify Ashlee R.'s IEP, and attempted several times to contact the administration regarding the various alleged incidents between Ashlee R. and her teachers. Although Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, they do not enumerate any specific administrative remedies or procedures Plaintiffs failed to exhaust. Therefore, construing Plaintiffs' allegations in a light most favorable to them, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs did, in fact, fail to exhaust their administrative remedies. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 983. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient in that it contains a short and plain statement showing that they are entitled to relief under the IDEA. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. Plaintiffs are not required to set out all of the factual details of their IDEA claim in order to satisfy the FRCP 12(b)(6) standard. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. Although Defendants ask the Court to make a determination as to Plaintiffs' exhaustion of administrative remedies on the basis of the pleadings alone, the Court finds that further discovery on this issue is required. Thus, the Court must deny Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Defendants shall file an answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order. The Court shall conduct a Case Management Conference on October 21, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom B, 15th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. The parties shall file a joint case management statement no later than October 14. A copy of Judge James's standard Joint Case Management Statement form may be found on the Court's website.
IT IS SO ORDERED.