See, e.g., Col. 1:12–15 (discussing lattice defect reduction). This fact weighs against Lexington's proposed construction even where Figure 2B is a disclosed embodiment, because “[a]lthough reluctant to exclude an embodiment, this court must not allow the disclosed embodiment to ‘outweigh the language of the claim, especially when the court's construction is supported by the intrinsic evidence.’ ” Rolls–Royce, PLC v. United Technologies Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1334–35 (Fed.Cir.2010) (quoting TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2008)); see also Ascion, LLC v. Ruoey Lung Enter. Corp., No. 09–10293–GAO, 2010 WL 4183834, at *4 (D.Mass. Oct. 25, 2010) (construing claims in light of purpose of invention over disclosed embodiments, noting that “[n]one of those features [in disclosed embodiments] is necessary to achieve the purpose of the invention”). In addition, the Court notes that while there is certainly no presumption of “having” being an open or closed term, it is clear that a closed construction is more consistent with the context of the specification and claims.