Opinion
HHBCV155017096S
08-07-2017
Rakhmatulla Asatov v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (NO. 108.00) AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE (NO. 116.00)
Lisa K. Morgan, J.
The plaintiff filed this action on December 21, 2015 against National Railroad Passenger Corporation (" Amtrak") and Thomas Howard asserting various state and federal statutory and constitutional claims arising from Amtrak's alleged failure to hire the plaintiff. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (" District Court") on January 19, 2016. On March 21, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and Thomas Howard was terminated as a party to the litigation. Thereafter, Amtrak moved to dismiss all claims against it. On November 8, 2016, the District Court entered a ruling dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims except for his claim under the Veteran's Employment Opportunities Act (the " VEOA claim"). With respect to the VEOA claim, the District Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim and therefore remanded the VEOA claim to this court. Notably, in ordering the remand, the District Court also concluded that the plaintiff's VEOA claim was untimely.
The District Court case bears Case No. 3:16-cv-00080 (AVC).
The District Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants on December 12, 2016. By its amended judgment dated December 27, 2016, the District Court clarified that it was remanding the VEOA claim to this court and dismissing all remaining claims. Because Thomas Howard was terminated as a party to the case while the case was pending in District Court, he was no longer a party to the action upon its later remand to this court.
Once the case was remanded to this court, Amtrak moved for summary judgment on grounds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the VEOA claim and that this court is precluded from considering any claim dismissed by the District Court. The plaintiff opposes Amtrak's motion and seeks to " strike" it from the court's docket. The court heard argument on both motions at short calendar on May 1, 2017. At the hearing, the plaintiff acknowledged that his motion to strike should be construed by the court as his opposition to Amtrak's motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Amtrak contends that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the VEOA claim because the claim is " in essence, a petition for review of the [U.S. Merit System Board's (MSPB) dismissals of [p]laintiff's appeals" and that by statute a petition to review a final order or decision of the MSPB can only be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
" Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 393, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
Although lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue generally raised through a motion to dismiss rather than a motion for summary judgment, the court may treat a motion for summary judgment which challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction as a motion to dismiss and address the jurisdictional issue. Bellman v. West Hartford, supra, 96 Conn.App. at 392.
" Section 3 of the [Veterans Employment Opportunity Act] provides administrative redress for preference-eligible veterans who allege that an agency has violated a statute or regulation relating to veterans' preference." Campion v. MSPB, 326 F.3d 1210, 1213 (Fed.Cir. 2003). A veteran " who alleges that an agency has violated such individual's rights under any statute or regulation relating to veterans' preference may file a complaint with the [United States] Secretary of Labor." See 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a).
" The Secretary of Labor shall investigate each complaint under subsection (a)." 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(b). " If the Secretary of Labor determines as a result of an investigation under subsection (b) that the action alleged in a complaint under subsection (a) occurred, the Secretary shall attempt to resolve the complaint by making reasonable efforts to ensure that the agency specified in the complaint complies with applicable provisions of statute or regulation relating to veterans' preference." 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(c)(1)(A).
" If the Secretary of Labor is unable to resolve a complaint under subsection (a) [of 5 U.S.C. § 3330a] within 60 days after the date on which it is filed, the complainant may elect to appeal the alleged violation to the Merit Systems Protection Board in accordance with such procedures as the Merit Systems Protection Board shall prescribe . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(1). " In lieu of continuing the administrative redress procedure provided under section 3330a(d) . . . a veteran . . . may elect . . . to terminate those administrative proceedings and file an action with the appropriate United States district court not later than 60 days after the date of the election [described under 5 U.S.C. § 3330b(b) and (c)]." 5 U.S.C. § 3330b(a). " The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final order or a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(d) of Title 5." 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(9).
Based upon the foregoing statutes, this court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the VEOA claim. As argued by Amtrak, undisputed by the plaintiff, and confirmed by the pleadings, the VEOA claim is a petition for review by this court of a final decision or order of the MSPB. This court has no authority to adjudicate such a claim. Rather, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over any appeal from a final order or decision of the MSPB. 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(9). Moreover, any such appeal must be filed within sixty (60) days after the MSPB issues its final order or decision; 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A); and, as noted by the District Court in its November 8, 2016 ruling on Amtrak's motion to dismiss, this action, even if filed in the correct court (which it was not), is untimely. See Oja v. Dep't of the Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (dismissing case because plaintiff failed to file a petition for review with the Federal Circuit within 60 days of the date he first received notice of the final order of the MSPB). See also Nash v. United States Postal Serv., 345 Fed.Appx. 560, *1 (Fed.Cir. 2009) (the 60-day filing deadline is " statutory, mandatory, and jurisdictional").
B. Consideration of Claims Dismissed by District Court
Amtrak also contends that this court is precluded from considering any claims already dismissed by the District Court. To the extent the plaintiff seeks to have this court adjudicate claims that were dismissed by the District Court, this court is not permitted to do so.
" The doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel protect the finality of judicial determinations, conserve the time of the court, and prevent wasteful relitigation. Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has been determined in a prior suit." Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 501, 551 A.2d 1243 (1998).
The District Court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) decided the identical issues the plaintiff seeks to advance in this court. Consequently, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the plaintiff from relitigating those issues in this court. Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 38 n.17, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). Moreover, under federal law, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is considered a final judgment on the merits. See e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. Mottle, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is " judgment on the merits"); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976) (dismissal for failure to state a claim has a preclusive effect on any subsequent effort to relitigate that claim). Because the District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims on the merits and entered judgment, the doctrine of res judicata also precludes this court from re-litigating those claims. Virgo v. Lyons, supra, 209 Conn. at 501.
C. Legality of District Court Judgment
The plaintiff contends that this court should disregard the District Court's judgment as void. Even if this court disagreed with the District Court's reasoning, findings or judgment (which it does not), it has no authority to overturn the District Court's rulings. Massad v. Greaves, 116 Conn.App. 672, 679, n.8, 977 A.2d 662 (2009).
D. Delay of Proceedings by Amtrak
The plaintiff also contends that this court should strike Amtrak's motion for summary judgment from the record as a sanction for its intentional delay of these proceedings. The court does not find that Amtrak has intentionally delayed these proceedings or that there is any basis in law or equity for the court to strike Amtrak's motion for summary judgment from the record.
E. Alleged Infirmities in Amtrak's Motion for Summary Judgment
The plaintiff complains of procedural and other defects in Amtrak's motion for summary judgment. The court finds none.
CONCLUSION
The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's remanded VEOA claim for the reasons stated above. In addition, this court is precluded under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata from considering any claims dismissed by the District Court. This court has no authority to overturn the District Court's judgment and finds further that the plaintiff's claims of improper delay by Amtrak and procedural infirmities in the motion for summary judgment to be without merit. Consequently, Amtrak's motion for summary judgment, having been construed as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is granted and the plaintiff's motion to strike is denied. The plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety and judgment shall enter in favor of Amtrak.