Indeed, both provisions require service by certified mail or personal service. The most closely analogous Alabama case our research has revealed is Asam v. Alabama State Bar, 675 So.2d 866 (Ala.1996) (superseded by rule on other grounds, Rule 5.1.(d), Ala. R. Disc. P.), in which our supreme court held that, despite Asam's contention that she had been denied due process because she had not been properly served with notice of the disciplinary proceedings against her, the evidence indicated that Asam had, in fact, been provided with sufficient notice of the disciplinary proceedings against her. The court noted that the Alabama State Bar had mailed notice of the disciplinary hearing to Asam's home and to her office both by regular first-class mail and by certified mail. Even though the certified-mail receipts for the notices of the hearing were returned to the Bar indicating that the notices had been unclaimed, the supreme court determined that Asam had sufficient notice of the disciplinary hearing against her, noting that “[t]he record makes it clear that, despite her assertions to the contrary, Asam had sufficient notice of the disciplinary hearing involving the complaints against h
Lampkin-Asam is a former member of the Alabama State Bar. See Asani v. Alabama State Bar, 675 So.2d 866, 878 (Ala. 1996).
In May 2003, the State Bar filed formal charges against Caffey. "Formal disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Board must be instituted by the filing of formal charges within six (6) years from the accrual of the offense. . . ." Rule 31, Ala. R. Disc. P. See also Asam v. Alabama State Bar, 675 So.2d 866, 877 (Ala. 1996) (quoting Rule 31, Ala. R. Disc. P., and holding without merit Asam's argument that the State Bar's prosecution of her case was untimely because it had formally filed the charge four years and three months after the lawsuit upon which the charge was based). Because the State Bar filed formal charges against Caffey within the six-year limitation period specified in Rule 31, Ala. R. Disc. P., Caffey's argument is unpersuasive.
We agree with the Bar's comment that the "clearly erroneous" standard is applicable to the Board of Appeals' review of decisions of the Disciplinary Board, but we note that the standard is required by Rule 5.1, not Rule 12. Although we articulated the standard of our review in Asam v. Alabama State Bar, 675 So.2d 866, 878 (Ala. 1996), the appeal procedure then prescribed by the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure was markedly different from that now in effect. When Asam was decided, Rule 5.1 had not yet been adopted; the Board of Appeals did not exist; and appeals from a Report and Order of the Disciplinary Board came directly to this Court.