Opinion
C086321 C086322 C086329
02-25-2019
A.S., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAURA C. YOUNG, Defendant and Appellant. As.S., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAURA C. YOUNG, Defendant and Appellant. M.W., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAURA C. YOUNG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CVPT-17-1695) (Super. Ct. No. CVPT-17-1696) (Super. Ct. No. CVPT-17-1700)
Defendant Laura C. Young appeals from three cases in which civil restraining orders were granted to three of her then roommates, plaintiffs A.S., As.S., and M.W., prohibiting Young from engaging in harassing conduct and limiting her proximity to those roommates. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) Only one of the three roommates, M.W., filed a respondent's brief. The three appeals have been consolidated for purposes of argument and disposition. Young maintains the burden of affirmatively demonstrating trial court error has prejudiced her. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We understand Young's arguments to challenge both the availability of section 527.6's restraining orders to roommates and also the evidentiary showing made by her roommates to obtain those orders, whom she asserts were actually doing whatever it took to make her leave.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. --------
Because we find Young has forfeited her arguments by failing to adhere to mandatory rules of appellate procedure and review, we must summarily affirm the lower court's orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 16, 2017, A.S. sought a temporary restraining order to prevent Young from harassing her. In support of her petition, A.S. described the two most recent incidents of harassment, the first of which involved Young allegedly blocking A.S.'s doorway and shoving A.S.'s door with sufficient force that it punctured a hole in the wall. In the second incident, Young allegedly sent a group message threatening to "MAKE OUR LIVES A LIVING HELL" if her roommates changed the air conditioning temperature; this threat coincided with Young engaging in disruptive behavior in the early morning hours.
As.S.'s October 16, 2017 petition substantially mirrors A.S.'s complaints, including allegations of Young's harassing conduct related to disagreements concerning the air conditioning and that she had sent a group text stating, "Ac on you fucking bitches . . . open your damn windows stupid . . . find somewhere else to live if you don't like it . . . auto stays on of [sic] fuck off I'll make your life hell."
M.W.'s October 17, 2017 petition similarly recounted Young's alleged escalating behavior, threats, and M.W.'s concern that Young's previously passive aggressive behavior had morphed into violence, as seen by her recent damage to the landlord's property. It further alleged that Young's conduct had violated Family Code section 6203, subdivision (a)(1) and (3).
Young filed written responses to each petition, denying the allegations of harassment, explaining why she took the complained of actions, and in the case of M.W., denying that M.W. was present for at least part of the alleged harassment.
The matters were heard before the court on November 13, 2017. No reporter's transcript of the proceedings is included in the record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued each plaintiff a three-year restraining order. The personal conduct orders prohibited Young from, among other things, harassing, threatening, or contacting A.S., As.S., and M.W. The orders further commanded Young to maintain identified distances away from each roommate while outside of the residence and designated a separate stay-away distance for when they were in the interior of their shared home.
Young appeals from these orders.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, we observe that Young is not entitled to special treatment by this court even though she is representing herself without the assistance of an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) We must hold her to the same standards as if she were a practicing attorney. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) This rule is not intended to penalize self-represented litigants; instead, it is necessary to maintain stability in appellate proceedings, requiring adherence to the forms and procedures that govern appeals, and it supports the appellate court's independence and unbiased decisionmaking.
Young's briefs consist of lengthy and rambling recitations of her version of the facts, coupled with an explanation of why the acts of annoyance and harassment of which she was accused were justified. While these papers contain the occasional mention of certain exhibits, her presentation lacks citations to pertinent authority or a coherent legal argument for reversal. In fact, Young's briefs are devoid of any case authorities and the vast majority of citations she does make are to the wrong code, citing the Civil Code instead of the Code of Civil Procedure.
"To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, 'it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.' [Citations.]" (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
Young's briefs are also defective because they contain no argument headings, much less subheadings sufficient to alert the reader to the nature of the points she wishes to raise. Because her arguments are not presented through appropriate headings, Young has forfeited the right to have us consider them. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); see, e.g., In re Mark B. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 61, 67, fn. 2; accord, Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831, fn. 4.)
Young takes issue with many of her roommates' accusations from their petitions, but has failed to furnish this court with a reporter's transcript of the hearing on the requests for injunctive relief.
"In assessing whether substantial evidence supports the requisite elements of willful harassment, as defined in . . . section 527.6, we review the evidence before the trial court in accordance with the customary rules of appellate review. We resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value. [Citations.]" (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)
The party challenging the judgment or order has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; see Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 670, fn. 13 ["to overcome the presumption of the correctness," appellant must assure record reflects the asserted error].) "[T]he reviewing court presumes the judgment of the trial court is correct and indulges all presumptions to support a judgment on matters as to which the record is silent." (Baker v. Children's Hospital Medical Center (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1060.)
"Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant]. [Citation.]" (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) "A necessary corollary to this rule [is] that a record is inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record [she] provides . . . , but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could be affirmed." (Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. American Vanguard Corp. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 285, 302.) Without a record of the evidence presented to the trial court at the hearing, we must affirm the judgment. (Weiss v. Brentwood Sav. & Loan Assn. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 738, 746-747.)
Where "the record on appeal consists of only a clerk's transcript and exhibits and no error appears on the face of the record, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's rulings is not open to consideration by a reviewing court; in such a case, 'any condition of facts consistent with the validity of the judgment will be presumed to have existed rather than one which would defeat it [citations].' " (County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 16, 23.) If, for some unknown reason, a reporter's transcript of the hearing was unavailable, Young could have proceeded with an agreed or settled statement. (Leslie v. Roe (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 104, 108; see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134, 8.137.)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. M.W. shall recover her costs, if any, on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
BUTZ, J. We concur: HULL, Acting P. J. RENNER, J.