Opinion
No. C 03-02326 SBA, [Docket Nos. 31, 41].
September 27, 2004
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Fernando Artiga's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand [Docket No. 41] and Defendant Federal Express Corporation's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 31]. Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. The Court therefore does not reach Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed the instant action in California Superior Court. The Complaint alleged that Defendant had failed to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff's disability in violation of the State of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Gov't Code § 12940, et seq. ("FEHA"). Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability following an injury he sustained on the job. Plaintiff sought damages for, inter alia, loss of earnings and benefits, humiliation, embarrassment and emotional distress, along with punitive damages and attorney's fees.
Defendant removed this action to the District Court on May 19, 2003. In its removal petition, Defendant asserted that removal was appropriate because there was complete diversity and because the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. In support of its assertion that the jurisdictional minimum had been met, Defendant stated that during 2002, the last year in which Plaintiff worked for Defendant, his compensation equaled $35,955.00 per year, plus benefits. Defendant also asserted that because punitive damages, emotional distress damages, and attorney's fees were available, the sum of likely damages exceeded $75,000. On July 27, 2004, Plaintiff moved to remand the action to state court. Plaintiff asserted that because it had recently determined that Plaintiff's economic damages equaled $22,585, Defendant could not carry its burden of demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. On June 15, 2004, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Court Order, Defendant filed its opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand by September 14, 2004. Plaintiff has chosen not to file a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion to remand, the burden of proving the propriety of removal rests in the party who removed. United Computer Systems v. ATT Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to remove on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the parties must be from different states and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.The jurisdictional amount is normally met if the plaintiff claims a sum greater than the jurisdictional minimum. Gaus v. Miles Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). If, however, the allegations of a complaint filed in state court do not conclusively demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, the removing party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum has been met. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d 564 at 566; see also Matheson v. Progressive Speciality Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). A district court should consider facts presented in the removal petition or any "summary-judgement-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal." Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. "Conclusory allegations as to the amount in controversy are insufficient." Id., at 1090-91.
The court can consider "the amount in controversy based on the damages that can reasonably be anticipated at the time of removal." Simmons v. PCR Technology, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Matheson, 319 F.3d 1089 at 1090. Furthermore, the jurisdictional minimum may be satisfied by claims of general and specific damages, attorney's fees, and by punitive damages. Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1031; see also Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 946 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is well established that punitive damages are part of the amount in controversy in a civil action"); Galt v. Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys' fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy").
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts that its economic damages amount to only $22,585, and that therefore Defendant has not demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Motion to Remand ("Motion"), at 2.) Defendant, however, argues that because Plaintiff has also claimed emotional distress along with attorney's fees and punitive damages, the jurisdictional minimum has been met. (See Opposition to Motion to Remand ("Opp."), at 5.) Defendant also asserts that in other, similar employment discrimination cases, compensatory damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees, when combined, have easily exceeded the jurisdictional minimum. (Id.)
Here, Defendant has not met its burden. In its removal papers, Defendant presented evidence that Plaintiff's annual compensation at the time he was terminated was $35,955. (Opp., at Exh. A, Declaration of Carolyn Winstead, ¶ 3.) Thus, even if Plaintiff had been unable to secure comparable employment from the time of his termination in March 2002, to the time of removal in May 2003, he would have only suffered approximately $42,000 in economic damages. Thus, Plaintiff's economic damages, at the time of removal, would not alone have reasonably exceeded the jurisdictional minimum.
A court evaluates the amount of damages that could have reasonably been anticipated at the time the action was removed.Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. Any attempt to reduce the amount in controversy by affidavit or stipulation subsequent to removal does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292 (1938). Plaintiff's July 26, 2004 evaluation that his economic damages total only $22,585 occurred after Defendant removed this action to federal court. (Motion, 2.) Although Plaintiff now claims that he mitigated his damages by finding new employment, this fact was not disclosed at the time of removal. (Id.)
In its removal petition, Defendant also suggested that Plaintiff would also have earned other benefits, but does assign any numerical value to those benefits.
Defendant asserts that specific and general damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees are all included in the calculation of the jurisdictional minimum. (Opp., 2-3.); see Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1031. Although the amount of such damages is often difficult for a defendant to ascertain, it can offer to the court examples of damage awards in similar cases to suggest that the jurisdictional amount has been met in a given case. See Id. at 1033; Martinez v. Kirk Xpedx, 2003 WL 21715875, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has sought compensation for, inter alia, humiliation, embarrassment and emotional distress, and also seeks punitive damages and attorney's fees. In its removal petition, Defendant cited employment discrimination verdicts in which the combination of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees have easily exceeded the jurisdictional minimum. See e.g., Czarik v. Illumina Inc., Case No. GIC 763972 (Opp., 5, fn.2 and Exh. A) (jury award of $5 million in punitive damages and $325,000 in attorney's fees). Based on the evidence provided by Defendant, these cases bear little factual similarity to the instant action. Although Defendant need not provide cases that are identical to the instant action, neither will cases in the general genre of employment discrimination suffice. Compare Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 with Martinez, 2003 WL 21715875 *2.
Specifically, the two cases that Defendant suggests the Court should pay particular attention to are inapposite to the instant case. (Opp., 5, fn. 2.) In Czarik, the plaintiff was a co-founder of a biotechnology company who alleged he was discriminated against because of a mental disability, and also alleged retaliation for expressing concerns about a business decision. (Opp., Exh. A.) Not only is Plaintiff in the instant case a relatively low-level employee, he has also not claimed retaliation. In Koth v. City of Pasadena and Wells Fargo Bank, the plaintiff, who was deaf, sought damages for emotional distress for being misidentified as a wanted bank robber when he entered a Wells Fargo Bank. Plaintiff was arrested by the police, placed in jail for 24-hours and was not provided a sign-language interpreter. (Opp., Exh. A.) Plaintiff was awarded $100,000 in damages for emotional distress. (Id.) The instant case does not suggest facts remotely resembling the facts in Koth. Moreover, it does not appear that any of the examples Defendant provided in its removal petition involve punitive damage awards or attorney's fees for an employer's failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability. Other than its reference to these inapplicable examples of jury verdicts, Defendant has not provided any evidence to support its assertion that its claims for "attorney's fees, emotional distress and punitive damages yields a total amount in controversy well in excess of $75,000." (Opp., Exh A.) Because it appears that Plaintiff's economic damages, at the time or removal, did not meet the jurisdictional minimum, and because Defendant has not provided sufficient evidence of other damages or attorney's fees, Defendant has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is GRANTED. Because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, all matters calendared in this action are VACATED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Docket No. 41] is GRANTED. The above captioned action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for San Francisco County. All matters calendared in this action are VACATED. The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending matters.
IT IS SO ORDERED.