Opinion
2018–00126 Index No. 508362/14
10-23-2019
Inna ARSHINOV, Appellant, v. GR 10-40, LLC, Defendant, Alla Gonchar Medical, P.C., Respondent.
Krause & Associates, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Leonid Krimsky of counsel), for appellant. James J. Toomey, New York, N.Y. (Jason Meneses of counsel), for respondent.
Krause & Associates, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Leonid Krimsky of counsel), for appellant.
James J. Toomey, New York, N.Y. (Jason Meneses of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she fell on a stairway located outside of the entrance to a pediatrician's office operated by the defendant Alla Gonchar Medical, P.C. (hereinafter the defendant). The office was located in a residential apartment building. The plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against the defendant and another defendant. The defendant moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
" ‘As a general rule, liability for a dangerous condition on real property must be predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control, or special use of the property’ " (Futter v. Hewlett Sta. Yogurt, Inc., 149 A.D.3d 912, 913, 52 N.Y.S.3d 432, quoting Franks v. G & H Real Estate Holding Corp., 16 A.D.3d 619, 620, 793 N.Y.S.2d 61 ; see Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 ; Micek v. Greek Orthodox Church of Our Savior, 139 A.D.3d 830, 831, 31 N.Y.S.3d 189 ). Therefore, a tenant's common-law duty to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition is limited to those areas which it occupies and controls, or makes a special use (see Alnashmi v. Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 A.D.3d 10, 11, 929 N.Y.S.2d 620 ; Milewski v. Washington Mut., Inc., 88 A.D.3d 853, 931 N.Y.S.2d 336 ).
Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it had no contractual obligation to maintain and repair the subject stairway (see Hernandez v. Dunkin Brands Acquisition, Inc., 136 A.D.3d 980, 980, 25 N.Y.S.3d 355 ; Hahn v. Wilhelm, 54 A.D.3d 896, 899, 865 N.Y.S.2d 240 ). In support of its motion, the defendant submitted, inter alia, the lease between it, as the tenant, and the owner of the building. The lease provided that the defendant leased apartment 1G and that the owner was responsible for maintaining the exterior and structural portions of the building in good working order. The defendant further established, prima facie, that it did not own, occupy, control, or make special use of the area where the plaintiff fell (see Quarless v. Dengler, 48 A.D.3d 438, 439, 851 N.Y.S.2d 620 ; Indence v. 225 Union Ave. Corp., 38 A.D.3d 494, 495, 831 N.Y.S.2d 489 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
MASTRO, J.P., MALTESE, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.