Opinion
A20-1538
06-21-2021
Gideon Charles Arrington, II, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
ORDER OPINION
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-13-8457 Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan, Judge. BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On December 12, 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Gideon Charles Arrington II with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of kidnapping. Arrington entered an Alford plea to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and waived his right to a Blakely jury trial on the state's request for an upward sentencing departure in exchange for a maximum executed sentence of 324 months and dismissal of the remaining counts. The district court sentenced Arrington to a 324-month term of imprisonment.
An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the charged offense because there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty at trial. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970)).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004), holds that a defendant is entitled to a jury determination on whether there are aggravating factors warranting an upward durational sentencing departure. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Minn. 2006).
2. Arrington appealed, challenging his sentence as unduly exaggerating the criminality of his conduct and seeking to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Arrington, No. A14-1945, 2016 WL 102476, at *1, *3 (Minn. App. Jan. 11, 2016) (Arrington I), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). This court affirmed Arrington's sentence, but because the record was insufficient to determine whether the plea was invalid based on ineffective assistance of counsel, this court preserved that issue for postconviction proceedings. Id. at *3.
3. On August 1, 2016, Arrington petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel. In his exhibit list filed October 27, 2016, Arrington included a portion of the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) report and a portion of a signed search warrant. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition.
4. On May 2, 2017, Arrington filed a notice of appeal. In his pro se brief filed September 7, 2017, Arrington claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; that his plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent; and that he was otherwise entitled to relief based on prosecutorial misconduct and false statements by witnesses. Arrington v. State, No. A17-0695, 2018 WL 1247212, at *2-5 (Minn. App. Mar. 12, 2018) (Arrington II), review denied (Minn. May 29, 2018). In support of his third claim, Arrington included in his addendum a portion of the SANE report and a portion of the search warrant, both of which contained Arrington's handwritten notes.
5. On March 12, 2018, this court affirmed the district court's denial of Arrington's petition for postconviction relief. Id. at *1. This court first determined that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Arrington's plea was not invalid based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at *3. Second, this court determined that the district court properly determined that Arrington's plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, and noted that this argument exceeded "the scope of issues that this court preserved for postconviction review on Arrington's direct appeal." Id. at *4 n.3.
6. Last, this court declined to address Arrington's remaining claims because they were raised for the first time on appeal and because they were procedurally barred:
Arrington asserts, for the first time, claims involving prosecutorial misconduct and false statements by witnesses in the case. We ordinarily will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. . . . . Moreover, these claims are procedurally barred since Arrington should have known of these issues at the time of his direct appeal, yet he failed to raise them. As these claims are not properly before us, we decline to address them further.Id. at *5 (citations omitted). After the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review, this court entered final judgment on May 31, 2018.
7. On July 29, 2020, Arrington filed his second petition for postconviction relief. Arrington argued that he had newly discovered evidence demonstrating that the SANE report was falsified and that police searched his residence without a valid search warrant. In support, Arrington included the following attachments: (1) pages 4-7 of the SANE report containing his handwritten notes; (2) one page of an online Facebook profile for the alleged SANE and one page printed from an online "Board of Nursing" website licensee search page listing results for the alleged SANE; (3) one page printed from a website titled "RAINN" describing a SANE; (4) a document titled "Vaginal Tears" with unknown source and unknown author describing various injuries; (5) two pages of what Arrington alleges is a warrant and which contains a signature page signed on December 13, 2013; and (6) a blank form titled "Sexual Assault Exam Report."
8. On October 9, 2020, the district court denied Arrington's second petition without a hearing. The district court found that the petition was untimely and that the newly-discovered-evidence exception did not apply. Specifically, the district court concluded that the alleged evidence was discoverable before trial and Arrington failed to explain why the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence prior to trial. In addition, the district court concluded that Arrington's petition was procedurally barred because Arrington did not explain why his claims were previously unknown and not included in his two prior appeals. Arrington now appeals the denial of his second petition.
9. Arrington argues that the district court erred when it denied his second petition for postconviction relief. A district court may summarily deny a petition when the petition, files, and records conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). This court reviews the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. Id.
10. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years after the entry of judgment of conviction (if no direct appeal was filed), or the final appellate disposition of the person's appeal, whichever occurs last. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2020). This time limitation bars postconviction relief unless one of five statutory exceptions can be shown. Id., subd. 4(b)(1)-(5).
11. The statutory exception for newly discovered evidence is at issue in this case. To succeed under this exception, the petitioner must show that the evidence:
(1) is "newly discovered," (2) "could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner's attorney within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition," (3) "is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial," (4) "is not for impeachment purposes," and (5) "establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense . . . for which the petitioner was convicted."Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Minn. 2018) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2)). Any petition invoking this exception "must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises." Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c)). A petitioner's claim arises under subdivision 4(b) "on the date that the petitioner 'knew or should have known of the claim' giving rise to the exception." Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Minn. 2018) (quoting Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 560). "A petitioner bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that facts exist that warrant postconviction relief." Tscheu v. State, 829 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 2013).
12. In this case, the district court concluded that the newly-discovered-evidence exception did not apply because the alleged evidence was discoverable before Arrington's Alford plea and Arrington failed to explain why the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence prior to his plea. Arrington argues that this conclusion is in error because it was his counsel's job, not his, to know about the false SANE report or the illegal search warrant. This argument is unavailing. Arrington attached the documents on which he now relies to his first postconviction petition and his second appeal in which he appeared pro se. Arrington filed his second postconviction petition more than two years after this date. Thus, even assuming the newly-discovered-evidence exception applies, Arrington's claims are time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(c).
13. The district court also determined that Arrington's claims were procedurally barred for a second, independent reason pursuant to State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). In that case, the supreme court held that after a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised on appeal and all claims known at the time of the appeal "will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." Id. This procedural bar also applies to claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in previous petitions for postconviction relief. Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2006). Claims that are otherwise Knaffla-barred may be considered "(1) if a novel legal issue is presented, or (2) if the interests of justice require review." Taylor v. State, 691 N.W.2d 78, 79 (Minn. 2005). "The second exception may be applied if fairness requires it and the petitioner did not 'deliberately and inexcusably' fail to raise the issue on direct appeal." Id. (quoting Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1991)).
14. Arrington argues that his claims are not procedurally barred because he did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise them. We disagree. Again, Arrington attached the documents on which he now relies to his first postconviction petition and his second appeal, and this court has already concluded that Arrington's claims should have been raised in his first direct appeal. Arrington II, at *5. We decline to address them further.
15. Because Arrington's claims are both time-barred and Knaffla-barred, we affirm the district court's decision to deny the petition without a hearing.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order of denial is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: June 21, 2021
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan