Opinion
Nos. 05-08-00477-CR, 05-08-00478-CR, 05-08-00479-CR
Opinion issued April 3, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-38426-RY, F06-38427-RY F06-38428-RY.
Before Justices FRANCIS, LANG-MIERS, and MAZZANT.
OPINION
Alejandro Arredondo pleaded guilty to one charge of delivery of and two charges of possession with intent to deliver one gram or more but less than four grams of methamphetamine. The trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, at twenty years in prison and a $10,000 fine in each case. In a single issue, appellant complains the trial court erred in finding the State's "Notice of Intent to Enhance Punishment Range with Prior Felony Convictions" provided appellant reasonable notice because the notice was served three days before trial. We overrule appellant's issue and affirm the trial court's judgments. A defendant is entitled to notice of the State's intent to use prior convictions for enhancement purposes. Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Mayfield v. State, 219 S.W.3d 538, 539 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.). While notice must be given, "due process does not even require that the notice be given before the guilt phase begins, much less that it be given a number of days before trial." Villescas v. State, 189 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). When a defendant has no defense to an enhancement allegation and makes no suggestion of the need for a continuance in order to prepare a defense, notice given at the beginning of the punishment phase satisfies the due process requirements of the United States Constitution as well as the Texas Constitution's due course of law requirements. Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 294; Mayfield, 219 S.W.3d at 540. In these cases, appellant asserted no defense to the enhancement allegation and pleaded true to the prior conviction alleged in the enhancement paragraph. He did not move for a continuance or suggest a continuance was necessary to discover or prepare a defense. Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude constitutionally adequate notice was given by the State when, three days before trial, it filed notice of its intent to enhance appellant's punishment in each case with a prior felony conviction. See Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 294; Mayfield, 219 S.W.3d at 540; see also Callison v. State, 218 S.W.3d 822, 826 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (Callison not denied due process right to sufficient notice of State's enhancement claim; Callison pleaded true to enhancement allegation, did not request additional time to prepare defense after receiving notice and did not complain of surprise or assert he was unprepared to contest enhancement allegation). We overrule appellant's issue. We affirm the trial court's judgments.