Opinion
16 CA 22-00466
03-17-2023
William ARMSTRONG, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOWN OF TONAWANDA, Defendant-Respondent.
CREIGHTON, JOHNSEN & GIROUX, BUFFALO (JONATHAN G. JOHNSEN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS. GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP, BUFFALO (CHRISTOPHER P. MAUGANS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
CREIGHTON, JOHNSEN & GIROUX, BUFFALO (JONATHAN G. JOHNSEN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.
GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP, BUFFALO (CHRISTOPHER P. MAUGANS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, BANNISTER, AND OGDEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied and the complaint is reinstated.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs, retired employees of defendant, Town of Tonawanda, commenced this breach of contract action seeking to compel defendant to reimburse health insurance premiums, which they allege they are entitled to pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between defendant and the union that represented plaintiffs during their employment (union). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, contending, inter alia, that the grievance procedure in the CBA was the exclusive procedure by which plaintiffs could seek redress and that plaintiffs were required to bring their claims through the grievance procedure despite their status as retirees. Plaintiffs opposed defendant's motion, arguing, inter alia, that the CBA restricted the class of individuals who could file a grievance to active employees. Supreme Court determined that the language of the CBA contained no such restriction and granted defendant's motion. We agree with plaintiffs that the court erred in its interpretation of the CBA, and we therefore reverse the order, deny defendant's motion, and reinstate the complaint.
It is well settled that, "when an employer and a union enter into a collective bargaining agreement that creates a grievance procedure, an employee subject to the agreement may not sue the employer directly for breach of that agreement but must proceed, through the union, in accordance with the contract" ( Matter of Board of Educ., Commack Union Free School Dist. v. Ambach , 70 N.Y.2d 501, 508, 522 N.Y.S.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 509 [1987], cert denied 485 U.S. 1034, 108 S.Ct. 1593, 99 L.Ed.2d 908 [1988] ; see Clark v. County of Cayuga , 212 A.D.2d 963, 963, 623 N.Y.S.2d 57 [4th Dept. 1995] ). There are two exceptions to that rule. "The first exception applies when the contract provides otherwise ..., i.e., the contract either expressly allows such suits or implicitly does so by excluding the dispute at issue from, or not covering it within, the ambit of the contractual dispute resolution procedures" ( Buff v. Village of Manlius , 115 A.D.3d 1156, 1157, 983 N.Y.S.2d 145 [4th Dept. 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ledain v. Town of Ontario , 192 Misc.2d 247, 251, 746 N.Y.S.2d 760 [Sup. Ct., Wayne County 2002], affd 305 A.D.2d 1094, 759 N.Y.S.2d 426 [4th Dept. 2003] ). "The second exception applies when the union fails in its duty of fair representation ..., but the employee must allege and prove that the union breached its duty to provide fair representation to the employee" ( Buff , 115 A.D.3d at 1157, 983 N.Y.S.2d 145 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ambach , 70 N.Y.2d at 508, 522 N.Y.S.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 509 ). Here, plaintiffs did not allege or show that the union breached its duty of fair representation (see Clark , 212 A.D.2d at 963, 623 N.Y.S.2d 57 ), and therefore only the first exception is at issue.
In relevant part, the CBAs in effect prior to plaintiffs’ retirement provide that the grievance process is intended to settle any "grievance which may arise between the parties over the application, meaning or interpretation of this [CBA]." Each CBA further provides that the first step of the grievance procedure requires "[a]n employee covered by this agreement ... [to] file a grievance in writing to his department head." Inasmuch as plaintiffs were not aggrieved until after they had retired, and inasmuch as the CBAs "expressly limit[ ] the availability of the grievance procedure to current employees," we conclude that "the clear and unambiguous terms of the [CBAs]" establish that the grievance process was not available to plaintiffs at the time they became aggrieved ( Matter of DeRosa v. Dyster , 90 A.D.3d 1470, 1471-1472, 936 N.Y.S.2d 402 [4th Dept. 2011] ; see Buff , 115 A.D.3d at 1158, 983 N.Y.S.2d 145 ; cf. Ledain , 192 Misc.2d at 251-252, 746 N.Y.S.2d 760 ).
We have considered defendant's contentions raised as alternative grounds for affirmance (see generally Parochial Bus Sys., Inc. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 60 N.Y.2d 539, 545-546, 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 458 N.E.2d 1241 [1983] ; Matter of Harnischfeger v. Moore , 56 A.D.3d 1131, 1131-1132, 867 N.Y.S.2d 314 [4th Dept. 2008] ) and conclude that they lack merit.