Opinion
No. CV92 29 41 02 S
October 10, 1995
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant, People's Bank, moves to dismiss the first, second, and third counts of the eleven-count complaint. It contends the four plaintiffs; Arm Development, Ltd., Arm Industries, Ltd., Arm Projects, Ltd., and Arm Equities, Inc.; lack standing to assert the claims alleged in the first three counts. This court denies the motion to dismiss for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs have standing. Second, the defendant did not timely file the motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs have met the minimum requirements of standing for the purpose of this court's subject matter jurisdiction. "Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity."Unisys Corporation v. Department of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 693, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991). In the first three counts, the plaintiffs allege they have suffered financial losses by reason of the bank's conduct with respect to a loan transaction. The court has examined the pleadings and documents submitted by the parties. Based upon this review, the court concludes the plaintiffs have demonstrated a colorable claim of injury.
A motion to dismiss which does not attack the subject matter jurisdiction of this court must be filed within thirty days of the defendant's filing of an appearance. See Practice Book § 142. People's Bank does not question the power of this court to hear and decide this controversy. Rather, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs are not third-party beneficiaries of the contracts which form the basis of their claims and, therefore, are not the appropriate persons to bring the claims asserted in the first three counts. The plaintiffs' standing is based on common-law principles. In a well reasoned decision, Connecticut Allied Business Legal Rights Association v. Gaitor, 10 Conn. L. Trib. No. 30, p. 12 (1984), Judge Aspell analyzed our Supreme Court opinions on standing and found a distinction between statutory standing and common-law standing and concluded that common-law standing does not attain the level of subject matter jurisdiction. "A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it." Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185 appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801 (1979). Since the defendant does not truly contest the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, the defendant should have filed the motion to dismiss within the thirty day limitation period required by Practice Book § 142.
The relevant part of Judge Aspell's decision is as follows: Defendant next asserts that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. It is unclear whether standing relates to subject matter jurisdiction in Connecticut law. The Connecticut Constitution contains no case or controversy requirement like that found in article III of the United States Constitution; however the courts have recognized that a person is not "entitled to set the machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain redress for an injury suffered . . . either in an individual or representative capacity." Alarm Application Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 546 (1989). Standing is a "practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented."Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 (1981). Standing has been characterized as a jurisdictional question. Gannon v. Sanders, 157 Conn. 1, 6 (1968). However, the Supreme Court has also stated that standing "focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before the court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated . . . the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable. . . ." Berlin v. Santaguida, 181 Conn. 421, 423-424 (1980) (citations omitted). It is clear that the implication from cases such as Berlin is that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issue, but that the party seeking relief is not one to whom relief may be granted. Such an interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's willingness to allow standing to be challenged by motion to strike, i.e., that the complaint by that party, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Alarm Applications Co., 179 Conn. at 550-551. Such an interpretation is consistent with, the Supreme Court's hesitancy to "give an expansive interpretation to the concept of `subject matter jurisdiction.'" See Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358, 363 (1979). Where a statute or court rule sets prerequisites to suit by a particular plaintiff, a plaintiff not meeting the statutory criteria lacks standing and the court is said to lack jurisdiction over the case. Thus where a statute allows only an aggrieved party to appeal from an agency decision, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal brought by a nonaggrieved party.Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 (1978); see Hall v. Planning Commission, 180 Conn. 442, 444 (1980). See also Poly-Pak Corporation of America v. Barrett, 1 Conn. App. 99, 103 (1983) (foreign corporation's failure to comply with Connecticut General Statutes § 33-412 appropriately, raised by motion to dismiss); Gannon, 157 Conn. at 6 (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of declaratory judgment action where plaintiff failed to meet Practice Book § 390). Only by recognizing the differentiation of statutory and common-law standing by the Supreme Court can that court's standing cases be reconciled. See Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 53 (1975). Such a differentiation is apparent from the manner in which the court tests the right of a party to maintain an action. If first examines the precise grounds on which the right is based. See Gannon, 157 Conn. at 7; Maloney, 183 Conn. at 320. Where a plaintiff has alleged common-law, rather than statutory, standing, plaintiff has been allowed to prove injury at trial. Belford, 170 Conn. at 53. Such an analysis is inconsistent with the concept of common-law standing attaining the level of subject matter jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
THIM, JUDGE