Opinion
1:22-CV-1378-DII-ML
09-05-2023
CHRISTOPHER ARELLANO, Petitioner, v. G. ROSALEZ, Warden, FCI Bastrop,[1] Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MARK LANE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The Magistrate Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(e) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrates Judges, as amended. Before the court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. #2) (styled as “Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc”) and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Response to Petition (Dkt. #12). After considering the pleadings, the record, and the relevant law, the Magistrate Court issues the following Report and Recommendation.
Arellano did not submit a response to Respondent's Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Arellano is serving 240 months for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams or more of methamphetamine or 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual). Dkt. #12 at 1.
In 2015, a state district court sentenced Arellano to an eight-year term of imprisonment. Id. In 2018, the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas sentenced Arellano to the 240-month term of imprisonment, which began May 11, 2018, based on a BOP computation. Id. On December 13, 2018, Arellano was paroled from his state sentence and released to the exclusive custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. Id.
Petitioner Arellano “request[s] the Court to enter an order to clarify to the [Bureau of Prisons] the meaning of its original Judgment sentence.” Dkt. #2 at 1. Specifically, Arellano contends that he is entitled to apply toward his federal sentence 997 days he served in a state-imposed sentence. Id. at 2.
Arellano states that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Dkt. #2 at 2. Respondent argues that he did not. Dkt. #12 at 4-6.
II. ANALYSIS
A district court may grant habeas relief to a federal prisoner who is in custody in violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A “federal prisoner filing a § 2241 petition must first pursue all available administrative remedies.” Fillingham v. U.S., 867 F.3d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gallegos-Hernandez v. U.S., 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012)), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 1035 (2018). Prisoners may exhaust their claims by appealing the loss of FSA time credits through the Bureau of Prison's Administrative Remedy Program. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.43(b), 542.10; cf. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (discussing exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and explaining that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings”). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 2241 petition warrants dismissal. See Falcetta v. U.S., 734 Fed.Appx. 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of § 2241 petition because petitioner “failed to show that he exhausted his sentencing credit claim fully through the multistep BOP exhaustion procedure”).
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to hear a § 2241 petition because the requirement is jurisprudential and not statutorily required. Lowe v. Colvin, 582 Fed.Appx. 323, 324 n.2 (5th Cir. 2014); Taylor v. U.S. Treas. Dep't, 127 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“Whenever the Congress statutorily mandates that a claimant exhaust administrative remedies, the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional because it is tantamount to a legislative investiture of exclusive original jurisdiction in the agency.”).
Arellano states that he exhausted administrative remedies. Dkt. #2 at 2. He did not. Arellano only filed an initial administrative remedy at the institution level, which is but one step in a multi-step process. Dkt. #12-1 at 42-43; see 28 C.F.R. § 542.13-15.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies warrants dismissal. See Falcetta, 734 Fed.Appx. at 287. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend his petition be dismissed.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Court Recommends the district court grant respondent's motion to dismiss (dkt. #12) and dismiss without prejudice Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. #1) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
IV. WARNING
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. UnitedServs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).